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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
OvERvmw
From September 1977 through August 1978 the Tenth Cir-
cuit decided many cases which directly or indirectly contained
administrative law issues. In re Carlson,' dealing with probable
cause standards for an administrative search and seizure, is the
subject of a case comment which follows this overview. Seven
cases will be discussed briefly in this section.
A. Agency Access to Private Information
The FAA by regulation' requires flight recorders on some
airplanes, primarily for the purpose of accident investigation. In
United States v. Frontier Airlines, Inc.,I the FAA sought to obtain
a flight recording tape for the purpose of investigating a supposed
violation of its rules during an otherwise normal flight. After de-
ciding that a general inspection regulation promulgated by the
FAA did not apply,' the Tenth Circuit determined that the
agency had not exercised its rulemaking authority to allow use of
the tapes for purposes other than accident investigation. The
attempt to gain access to the information was therefore beyond
the scope of the FAA's authority.'
B. Private Access to Agency Information
In Poss v. NLRBI the National Labor Relations Board un-
successfully claimed exemption from several provisions of the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiff, who had
been terminated from her employment, filed an unfair labor
practice charge against her employer which the NLRB declined
580 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1978).
214 C.F.R. § 121.343 (1978).
563 F.2d 1008 (10th Cir 1977).
Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1013.
565 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 19771
75 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976).
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to pursue. Plaintiff's attempt to obtain information from the in-
vestigative file relating to her charge was rebuffed by the agency.
The Tenth Circuit rejected the NLRB's contention that ma-
terial in the file was exempt from disclosure under several provi-
sions of the FOIA.' It therefore affirmed the trial court's order for
disclosure.'
C. Scope of Review
In Hurley v. United States0 and Squaw Transit Co. v.
United States, " the Tenth Circuit set aside decisions of the Civil
Service Commission Board of Appeals and Review and the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, respectively, as being arbitrary
and capricious. Although a reviewing court is limited in its scope
of review of agency decisions, it clearly has the authority to
"require the agency to adhere to its own pronouncements, or ex-
plain its departure from them. '
'2
In Rutherford v. United States,3 the court seemed to be
applying the "arbitrary and capricious" standard to the FDA's
attempts to regulate the use of Laetrile. Although new drugs must
be established as safe and effective before approval, the court
concluded "that the 'safety' and 'effectiveness' requirements...
have no application to terminally ill cancer patients who desire
to take the drug intravenously.""
D. Black Lung Act 5
The Tenth Circuit addressed the merits of the appeal in
The NLRB relied primarily upon § 552(b)(7) which provides that the disclosure
provisions do not apply to matters that are: "(7) Investigatory records compiled for law
enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would
(A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, . . (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source ... 
565 F.2d at 659.
575 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1978).
574 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 496.
"3 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. granted 99 S. Ct. 1042 (1979). Rutherford was
previously before the court in 1976. See Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th
Cir. 1976), and Administrative Law Overview, 55 DEN. L.J. 391, 392-95 (1978).
1 582 F.2d at 1237. The court acknowledged the concern that some patients may be
victimized by "unscrupulous persons who will seek to profit by offering Laetrile as a
'cure.'" Judge Seth noted that the FDA could address the problem through regulation.
"1 The Black Lung Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-941 (1976), is part of the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1976).
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Paluso v. Mathews"-whether HEW has jurisdiction to grant
black lung benefits to claimants who timely filed their applica-
tions, overcoming the procedural hurdle where proof of total dis-
ability was by evidence obtained and presented after the filing
deadline.
Recognizing the progressive nature of the disease and the
diagnostic difficulties involved, the court held that medical evi-
dence obtained at any time would be acceptable as proof of disa-
bility if it could be shown to relate back and indicate the presence
of the disease on June 30, 1973, the filing deadline.'7 Further, a
miner meeting this filing deadline would be regarded as a good
faith claimant; if medical evidence tended to prove that the pres-
ence of black lung disease was probable on June 30, 1973, all
reasonable doubts would be resolved in his favor.' s
One could infer from its opinion in Whitley v. Marshall" that
the Tenth Circuit thought that it might be unnecessarily im-
perialistic for an administrative law judge to hold hearings on
the Island of Crete concerning a Greek citizen's claiml under the
Black Lung Act.21 Absent an express statutory provision to the
contrary, an agency's authority may be exercised only within the
territorial limits of the United States.2 Furthermore, to the court
it was "not at all clear that the Greek officials would permit such
a proceeding by foreigners." ' Thus it was quickly decided that
the judge be permanently enjoined from holding the hearing on
Crete.2'
" 562 F.2d 33 (10th Cir. 1977), aff'd on rehearing, 573 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1978). Judge
Barrett acknowledged that a district court order remanding a case to an agency has often
been held to be an interlocutory order and thus nonappealable. 573 F.2d at 8. He found
the instant case distinguishable for it presented "an important issue of federalism" which
involved "the interests of many potential claimants for black lung benefits." Id.
" 573 F.2d at 10.
Id. at 11.
" No. 77-1583 (10th Cir. Jan. 30, 1978)(Not for Routine Publication).
The claimant had worked for an American coal company in the 1930's. Id. at 2.
See note 15 supra.
2 No. 77-1583 at 2.




PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
SEARCHES IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE SUMMARY TAX PROCEEDINGS: In Re Carlson
I INTRODUCTION
The law of administrative search and seizure is very new and
rapidly changing.' Less than ten years after its determination in
Frank t, Maryland2 that the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment did not apply to administrative inspections, the Su-
preme Court reversed itself in two companion decisions. Camara
v. Municipal Court' and See v. City of Seattle' repudiated the
distinction between criminal and administrative investigations
for fourth amendment purposes when it declared that the purpose
of the fourth amendment is to "safeguard the privacy and secu-
rity of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials." 5 Thus the Supreme Court concluded that in adminis-
trative inspections there is a protectible fourth amendment inter-
est involved which requires use of a warrant procedure.
The administrative search warrant has had a checkered, al-
beit brief, history since the Camara/See decisions. Lower court
decisions have indicated a willingness to allow warrantless
searches based upon an exception to Camara/See for pervasively
regulated industries.' The courts' apparent confusion as to
whether to apply the rule or broaden the exception reflects the
tension of growing and competing legal needs. With the explosion
of administrative inspections pursuant to expanded federal legis-
lation and funding, the need for articulating a constitutionally
valid inspection procedure in order to promulgate appropriate,
effective agency regulations has become acute.' At the same time,
I See McManis & McManis, Structuring Administrative Inspections: Is There any
Warrant for a Search Warrant?, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 942 (1977); Rothstein & Rothstein,
Administrative Searches and Seizures: Whatever Happened to Camara and See?, 50
WASH. L. REv. 341 (1975).
1 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
- 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. at 528.
See note 33 infra and accompanying text. For commentary on cases where lower
courts have upheld warrantless administrative searches pursuant to laws regulating food,
drugs, mining, and industrial safety see McManis & McManis, supra note 1, at 953-60.
1 See generally Carmichael, At Sea With The Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 51 (1977); La Fave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Ca-
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the courts' growing recognition of a legally protectible right of
privacy has led to a gradual strengthening of protections for those
being investigated." Two recent decisions, In re Carlson, and
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., '0 bring some clarity by reaffirming the
principle laid down earlier in Camara that warrantless inspec-
tions or searches of private property are violations of the fourth
amendment. They also cast some light on the probable cause
standards required to support issuance of administrative search
warrants.
This comment will analyze the protections afforded by an
administrative search warrant by focusing on the Tenth Circuit
Carlson decision and the probable cause standards which support
issuance of such a warrant in the context of Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) summary tax proceedings. The discussions will in-
corporate a review of the major Supreme Court decisions since
Frank culminating in Barlow.
II. REvIEw OF THE MAJOR SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
The fourth amendment, the constitutional authority for
search and seizure, embodies two concepts-the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and the requirements for issuance of
warrants." In Frank v. Maryland, 12 the Supreme Court held that
mara and See Cases, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 1; Note, Warrantless Inspections Under The
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 108a (1974); Note, G.M.
Leasing Corp. v. United States: The Fourth Amendment Rises to Restrict IRS Jeopardy
Assessment Warrantless Seizures, 23 S.D. L. REv. 261 (1978); Comment, The Constitu-
tionality of Warrantless OSHA Inspections, 22 Vra. L. REv. 1214 (1976-77).
1 See generally Jesmore, Toward The Preservation of Personal Privacy: Chief Justice
Wright's Opinions on Search and Seizure and the Right of Privacy, 4 HASTINGS CON. L.
Q. 723 (1977); Parnell, The Right to Privacy and the Administration of the Federal Tax
Laws, 31 TAx LAw. 113 (1977). See also K. DAVIS, ADMINTRATIVE LAW TRATI sE §§ 3.00-
3.01 (Supp. 1970) (The author chronicles 84 Supreme Court cases since 1958 concerned
with strengthening the Constitutional protections of suspects under criminal investiga-
tion).
1 580 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1978).
,0 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or Affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Justice Frankfurter described the fourth amendment protection as twofold: "the right
to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy" and "the right to resist unauthorized
entry" of governmental officials, i.e., entry "without a judicially issued search warrant."
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. at 365.
12 359 U.S. 360 (1959). In Frank, appellant violated the Baltimore City Code by re-
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an inspection by a municipal health inspector did not constitute
a "search" within the meaning of the first clause of the fourth
amendment because the amendment is only applicable to crimi-
nal investigations and the inspector was not seeking "evidence for
criminal prosecution."'"
In Camara v. Municipal Court, '4 while acknowledging that a
routine inspection of private property is "less hostile" than a
criminal investigation, the Court repudiated the criminal
/administrative distinction, recognizing that "the possibility of
criminal entry under the guise of official sanction is a serious
threat" and "most regulatory laws, fire, health and housing codes
are enforced by criminal processes."'" Reversing Frank, the
Camara Court weighed the individual's rights to privacy against
the governmental interest in warrantless inspections and con-
cluded that "administrative searches of the kind at issue here are
significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment" and "except in certain carefully defined classes of
cases" require a search warrant.'"
For the purpose of securing a warrant, the constitutional
requirement of reasonable searches prescribes the probable cause
standard for a particular search." However, the Court recognized
that the determination of reasonableness required an additional
balancing test: "Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
fusing to allow a city health inspector, pursuant to a complaint, to search her basement
for rodent infestation. The inspector had found evidence of rodents outside the premises
and had cause to believe a nuisance existed.
"1 Id. at 365-67. Justice Frankfurter said this type of inspection touched at most upon
"the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment's protec-
tion against official intrusion." He emphasized the Code strictly limited the inspection
to a reasonable time, there were grounds for suspicion of rodent infestation, and the official
had no power to force entry. Id. at 366-67.
11 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Appellant violated the San Francisco Housing Code by refus-
ing to permit a building inspector to inspect his premises which the inspector suspected
were being used partly in violation of the building's commercial occupancy permit.
"Id. at 530-31.
I Id. at 534, 528.
" '[Plrobable cause' is the standard by which a particular decision to search is
tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness." Id. at 534.
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search against the invasion which the search entails."'' I The Court
concluded that " 'probable cause' to issue a warrant to inspect
must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards
for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a
particular dwelling."'19
In the companion decision See v. City of Seattle,20 the Court
extended its holding in Camara to those portions of commercial
premises which are not open to the public.
The common dissent in these cases questioned the need for
a search warrant at all and decried the creation of this "new-
fangled 'warrant'" based on diluted probable cause standards
"foreign to Fourth Amendment standards."'21 Citing a profu-
sion of inspection statistics, the dissent justified the reasonable-
ness of code-enforcement inspections based upon the great pub-
lic interest in health and safety, their long acceptance histori-
cally, and the impersonal nature of the inspections. Thus the
dissent used the same balancing test of reasonableness and the
same factors as the majority but not to define a probable cause
standard. Instead the balancing test led the dissent to conclude
that these warrantless administrative inspections were reasona-
ble within the meaning of the first clause of the fourth amend-
ment. The Camara/See Court did not disagree on the need for
administrative inspections or the need to safeguard individual
privacy. Its conflict revolved around the warrant procedure itself.
The dissent feared a degradation of the fourth amendment by
allowing "paper warrants . . . issued by the rubber stamp of a
willing magistrate."'2
" Id. at 536-37.
" Id. at 538. The Court acknowledged that the standards would vary with the pro-
gram being enforced and the area under consideration. The standards would not depend
upon specific knowledge of a violation. Id.
387 U.S. 541 (1967). Appellant was convicted for refusing to allow an inspection of
his locked commercial warehouse without a warrant during a periodic city-wide canvass
to insure compliance with the city's fire code.
1I Id. at 547.
2 Id. at 554.
" Id. at 547. This is similar to the approach taken by the majority in Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
"' See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 447-48. Justice Frankfurter called warrants for
inspection "synthetic" search warrants and reasoned "the [warrant] requirement cannot
be flexibly interpreted to dispense with the rigorous constitutional restrictions for its
issue." Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. at 373.
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In Camara the Court acknowledged an exception to the war-
rant requirement for inspections carried out in emergency situa-
tions. 5 Another exception was implied in Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States"0 where the Court stated in dictum that
Congress could indeed authorize warrantless searches directed at
a certain class of licensed businesses, though it had not done so
in this situation. Colonnade dealt with the liquor industry and
the Court stressed the long history of federal regulation and taxa-
tion of the manufacture and sale of liquor; in addition there was
no criminal penalty, only a fine, for failure to consent to the
inspection.Y
United States v. Biswell5 took the implication in Colonnade
further; the Court upheld a warrantless inspection and seizure of
firearms pursuant to a valid authorizing statute. Once again the
Court stressed the pervasive system of regulation and reporting
imposed on licensed gun dealers.2 The inspections were termed
"reasonable official conduct" in view of the fact that a warrant
would frustrate the effectiveness and flexibility of inspection. 0
As courts applied the basic proposition of Camara/See and
its exception as applied in Colonnade/Biswell in the subsequent
cases involving administrative investigative searches, inconsis-
tencies began to emerge. One commentator noted, "in less than
ten years the courts have enlarged upon the exceptions to Camara
and See so tremendously that the very essence of those decisions
" 387 U.S. at 539.
" 397 U.S. 72 (1970). In Colonnade, when the warrantless inspection of a catering
establishment was refused, the agents broke into the storeroom and removed bottles of
liquor. The Court did not uphold this seizure of liquor because Congress had not chosen
to set standards authorizing forcible, warrantless entry. The implication is that if such
standards had been authorized they would be constitutional.
Id. at 77.
n 406 U.S. 311 (1972). In Biswel, agents inspected appellant's books and requested
entry pursuant to the Gun Control Act of 1968 to a locked gun storeroom where they found
two unlicensed guns.
2 Id. at 315. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, where the Supreme Court dis-
cussed the difference between a civil search that requires a warrant and the warrantless
search exceptions to Camara. "A central difference between those cases [Colonnade and
Biswell] and this one is that businessmen engaged in such federally licensed and regu-
lated enterprises accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their trade . . . . rTlhe
businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon
him." 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973).
3 Biswell v. United States, 406 U.S. at 316 (1972).
1979
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* . . is seriously threatened."'31 The flexibility of the Camara test
"balancing the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails" 32 and the warrant exception for pervasively regu-
lated industries gave the courts wide discretion which resulted in
uncertainty as to which was the rule and which was the excep-
tion.Y
Amid this trend of expanding exceptions to the fourth
amendment warrant requirement, the Supreme Court unani-
mously reasserted the Camara/See doctrine. In G.M. Leasing
Corp. v. United States,3 the Court held that warrantless entry
into a corporation's business premises by IRS agenits to seize
property in satisfaction of a tax assessment violates the corpora-
tion's right to privacy. 35 The Court concluded that G.M. Leasing
did not conform to the Colonnade/Biswell exception: "In the pres-
ent case. . . intrusion into petitioner's privacy was not based on
the nature of its business, its license, or any regulation of its
11 Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 1, at 382.
3 387 U.S. at 537.
The following decisions, presented in chronological order, give an indication of the
courts' inconsistent application of the warrant requirement to civil searches. Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (Supreme Court upheld welfare inspections, termed home
visitations, conducted without a warrant to determine compliance with state Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children program); United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co..
345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972) (District Court upheld routine warrantless inspections
pursuant to Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act. Court equated the pervasive regulation of the
Act with the federal license in Biswell); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973) (Supreme Court invalidated a warrantless search by a roving border patrol of U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Camara/See rule not the (olonnade-/Bisu,-I/
exception was applied); Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa C orp., 416 1 .S.
861 (1974) (Supreme Court upheld warrantless inspection to conduct air pollution tests
because the entry of respondent's outdoor premises was not an invasion of privacy com-
parable to that in Camara or See); Brennan v. Buckeye Industries, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1350
(S.D. Ga. 1974) (District Court upheld warrantless OSHA inspections based on reasoning
of Colonnade/Biswell); Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex.
1976) (District Court held that warrantless inspections of non-public area of shoe store
violated the fourth amendment); Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627
(D.N.M. 1976) (In accord with Gibson's Products, the court found Camara/See governs
OSHA inspections and requires a search warrant). See generally, McManis & McManis,
supra note 1, at 953-60; Note, OSHA Inspections and the Fourth Amendment: Balancing
Private Rights and Public Need, 6 FoRD. URB. L.J. 101 (1978); Comment, The Constitu-
tionality of Warrantless OSHA Inspections, 22 ViLL. L. Rgv. 1214 (1976-77).
' 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
1 "[Olne governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has
consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of
private property is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search war-
rant." Id. at 352-53 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. at 528-29).
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activities . . . . This involves nothing more than the normal en-
forcement of the tax laws . . .3. The Court drew a distinction
between warrantless seizures and warrantless searches:
It is one thing to seize without a warrant property resting in an open
area or seizable by levy without an intrusion into privacy, and it is
quite another thing to effect a warrantless seizure of property...
situated on private premises to which access is not otherwise avail-
able for the seizing officer. 7
The G.M. Leasing Court recognized the IRS's right of levy and
distraint by any means.38 However this authorization is applica-
ble only to seizure of property, not to intrusions into privacy.39
The Court clearly required that a search warrant be obtained
from a neutral, detached magistrate for searches of private prop-
erty in summary tax proceedings. 0
The most recent Supreme Court consideration of administra-
tive inspections, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 1 held that Camara
and See were controlling of Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA) inspections. At issue was a routine inspection for the
purpose of identifying safety hazards and violations of OSHA
regulations. Recalling American colonial experience, the offen-
siveness of the general warrant, and the acute need for fourth
amendment protection, 2 the Court reasserted: "[E]xcept in cer-
tain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property
without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been au-
thorized by a valid search warrant. '4 3 An individual's privacy
429 U.S. at 354.
31 Id. The Court held that the warrantless seizure by the IRS of the corporation's
automobiles from public streets was not a fourth amendment violation. However warrant-
less entry into the corporation's business premises in order to seize books, records, and
furnishings in satisfaction of the assessment violated the corporation's right to privacy.
u Id. at 349-50.
3, "26 U.S.C. § 6331 (b) ... authorizes 'distraint and seizure by any means ....
Read narrowly, it authorizes the use of every means to deprive the taxpayer of use,
enjoyment or title to property .... It does not refer to warrantless intrusions into pri-
vacy." Id. at 356-57.
See Note, G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States: The Fourth Amendment Rises to
Restrict IRS Jeopardy Assessment Warrantless Seizures, 23 S.D. L. Rav. 261 (1978).
" 98 S. Ct. at 1816. In Barlow, an OSHA inspector on a routine inspection sought
entry to a non-public area of an electrical-plumbing business. Barlow refused entry and
sought a declaratory judgment that the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 657 (a) (1970), was unconstitu-
tional insofar as it purported to authorize inspections of business premises without a
warrant.
Id. at 1819-20.
Id. at 1820 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. at 528-29).
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interest suffers regardless of whether the governmental intrusion
is motivated by suspected violations of criminal laws of by rou-
tine inspections for breaches of statutes or regulations."
The Court rejected the government's argument that OSHA
inspections fall within the exception for closely regulated busi-
nesses. "The clear import of our cases is that the closely regulated
industry of the type involved in Colonnade and Biswell is the
exception. The Secretary would make it the rule.
' '45
The government also argued that the enforcement scheme f
OSHA requires warrantless searches since it is essential to inspect
"without prior notice" giving the "advantages of surprise."' 6 The
Court was not convinced that the warrant requirement would
eliminate this advantage since ex parte warrants could be issued
and executed without prior notice or delay; nor would the warrant
requirement severely burden OSHA or the courts since the great
majority of inspections could be executed upon consent of the
business person thus eliminating the need to seek a warrant. 7
The distinction between administrative and criminal proba-
ble cause standards for issuance of a search warrant re-emerged
in Barlow. The Secretary's "entitlement to inspect will not de-
pend on his demonstrating probable cause to believe that condi-
tions in violation of OSHA exist on the premises. Probable cause
in the criminal law sense is not required.""5 The requirement is
the standard first suggested in Camara: "[P]robable cause . . .
may be based . . . on a showing that 'reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are
satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].' "
The businessman has a constitutional right to go about his business free
from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property
... . [TIhat right [is] placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and
inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the
inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant.
Id (quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 543).
" Id.
, Id at 1821. The Court was unconvinced by the argument that a business is "closely
regulated" merely because all businesses involved in interstate commerce have long been
subjected to close supervision of employee safety and health conditions and regulation of
wages and hours.
" Id at 1822.
Id. at 1822-23.
" Id at 1824.
Id at 1830 (quoting 387 U.S. at 538).
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The Barlow Court described the standards it would consider
reasonable for routine inspections.
A warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an
OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the
enforcement of the Act derived from neutral sources such as, for
example. dispersion of employees in various types of industries
across a given area, and the desired frequency of searches in any of
the lesser divisions of the area, would protect an employer's Fourth
Amendment rights."
However, the Court placed limits on the application of this stan
dard.
The reasonableness of a warrantless search will depend upon
the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each stat-
ute . ... [W]e base today's opinion on the facts and law con-
cerned with OSHA and do not retreat from a holding appropriate
to that statute because of its real or imagined effect on other, differ-
ent administrative schemes."
The Barlow Court's reassertion of the warrant requirement
for administrative searches and its description of administrative
probable cause standards for routine searches makes no retreat
from its position taken in Camara/See. The Court's refusal to set
a more definitive standard for probable cause or to expand the
application of the standard reemphasizes its position that admin-
istrative probable cause standards must be determined in the
context of the particular search and the particular place to be
searched. What is reasonable will vary as the factors weighed in
the balancing test vary.
G.M. Leasing and Barlow are significant decisions since they
challenged the lower courts' reluctance to require, with consist-
ency, warrants for civil searches and they clearly established that
the Camara/See rule should be widely applied and the exception
sparingly used. G. M. Leasing requires a warrant for searches in
a summary tax proceeding but offers no guidelines for the issu-
ance of the warrant.2 Barlow goes a step further delineating a
descriptive probable cause standard for routine regulatory inspec-
tions.
50 Id. at 1825.
51 Id.
12 See notes 56-63 and accompanying text infra.
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III. CIVIL PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN IRS
TAX ASSESSMENT PROCEEDING
A. In re Carlson53
In the shadow of Barlow, the Tenth Circuit addressed con-
cerns relating to the issuance of search warrants in connection
with the enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code. In dispute
was the tax liability of Dell W. Carlson, owner of a Denver bar,
for failure to pay income and social security taxes.54 The United
States attorney submitted an application to the district court for
entry of ex parte orders 5 granting IRS officers authority to enter
Carlson's bar to search for and to seize property to satisfy the tax
assessment. The officer's affidavit submitted in support of the
search warrant indicated that all of the pre-levy administrative
processes directed by law had been pursued, i.e., tax assessment,
notice of deficiency and demand for payment, and refusal by
Carlson to pay.m When a visual inspection was conducted from
outside the premises, assets within were observed, and Carlson
refused to allow entry.
Acknowledging the G.M. Leasing requirement that a search
warrant be obtained before an IRS entry is effected, Judge
Matsch refused to enter the ex parte orders claiming "the Su-
preme Court did not indicate or suggest any authority or proce-
dure for the issuance of such warrants by any judicial officer." 57
Specifically Judge Matsch held: 1) The district court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the government's application for a search
warrant; 58 2) Assuming jurisdiction, the government had failed to
demonstrate sufficient probable cause for a search warrant, 5 and
3) The application for a search warrant was deficient for failure
to describe adequately the place to be searched and the property
" 580 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 1367. The case originated as four consolidated actions but the tax liabilities
of the other taxpayers were satisfied prior to trial. Eventually Carlson sold the business
and his successor in interest voluntarily paid all the taxes. The court found the matter
"too important to be denied effective review" and concluded it was not moot. Id. at 1372.
" The Tenth Circuit elects the term "warrant" instead of "entry order" since G.M.
Leasing requires that IRS entries be made with a valid search warrant. Id. at 1377.
" Id. at 1368, 1376.





to be seized.60 The Tenth Circuit held for the IRS on all issues.6'
The most significant aspect of the opinion is the second issue,
administrative probable cause standards. Judge Matsch's refusal
to issue the search warrant reflects a notable view disfavoring the
trend toward expanding the issuance of search warrants upon
diluted probable cause standards in the context of administrative
investigations. 2
Judge Matsch expressed concern that while probable cause
in the context of criminal searches is extensively developed, prob-
able cause in the context of administrative searches remains em-
bryonic, lacking clear case authority, therefore he was "reluctant
to give blanket authority to federal tax officers to invade the
privacy of these citizens." Though he indicated that probable
cause was not shown, Judge Matsch did not delineate what he
would consider sufficient to establish probable cause."
The Tenth Circuit addressed this issue of what should consti-
tute probable cause for a warrant in an IRS search, but it also
failed to identify specifics. The court began by acknowledging the
warrant requirement as laid down in G.M. Leasing.65 Then, fol-
lowing the approach of Camara and Barlow, the court made a
descriptive, rather than prescriptive, analysis of probable cause.
Through a review of cases, the court described and thereby estab-
lished some parameters for probable cause and distinctly sepa-
rated administrative from criminal standards. "[W]hile the con-
tours are yet somewhat loosely defined, the 'probable cause' re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment in relation to issuance of
search warrants in conjunction with administrative proceedings
cannot be equated with the 'probable cause' requirement of the
'traditional' Fourth Amendment search in the criminal law set-
ting." 6
0Id.
11 The court held that jurisdiction vested in the district court pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
§ 7402 (a). Id at 1376. It also held that the alleged unsatisfactory form of the IRS order
was not a sufficient basis upon which to deny issuance "We know of no rule which
prohibits the court from directing a redraft of any order submitted to it in order to conform
or company Isic} with the mandates of the court." Id. at 1378
6 See notes 13, 21-24, and 31 supra and accompanying text.
's 434 F. Supp. at 556.
' 580 F.2d at 1378.
*' 429 U.S. at 358. See also text accompanying notes 34-40 supra.
580 F.2d at 1381. Criminal probable cause "exists if the facts and circumstances
within the affiant's knowledge or of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are
1979
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The Tenth Circuit remanded the case, implying that the IRS
procedural standards were sufficient to establish probable
cause, 7 but nevertheless instructing the district court to deter-
mine the sufficiency of the IRS affidavit based upon the "loose
contours" of reasonable administrative standards suggested in its
opinion. 61
B. Describing Civil Probable Cause Standards- "Loosely
Defined Contours"
The Carlson court's discussion of probable cause begins with
the guiding rule that "under the Fourth Amendment. . .search
warrants must be treated by courts in a common sense and realis-
tic manner, and warrants issued pursuant thereto are not to be
given a hypertechnical interpretation." 9 The court paraphrases
the Camara reasonable administrative standards balancing test
this way:
[Tihe 'probable cause' required to support a particular inspection
(search) in relation to the enforcement of municipal health, housing
or fire regulations is reasonable if the public need for effective en-
forcement of the particular regulations involved justifies the intru-
sion, weighed in relation to the reasonable goals of the codes or
statutes.7 0
The court's "common sense" method for extending the
Camara probable cause standards to the IRS levy proceeding is
to review other decisions regarding administrative searches to
identify factors which should be considered in the balancing pro-
cess in order to make the intrusion upon privacy justifiable.
Examination of OSHA inspection guidelines which, without
a warrant, were found violative of the fourth amendment suggests
that the requirements that inspections be conducted "during reg-
ular working hours" and "at other reasonable times" and "within
reasonable limits and in -a reasonable manner" are not sufficient
sufficient to lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense probably has been
or probably is being committed." Id. at 1378.
I d. at 1381.
Id. at 1382.
e Id. at 1377.
I d. at 1378. This paraphrase does nothing to improve upon the Camara requirement
for probable cause which is essentially a two-step process. Probable cause exists if reason-
able legislative or administrative standards for conducting a search are satisfied. Camara
v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. at 538. Reasonableness is determined by balancing the need for
a search against the invasion which the search entails. Id. at 536-37.
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in themselves, without a valid warrant, to define a complete prob-
able cause standard, but are to be considered as among the con-
tours which make a search reasonable.7 Another contour is the
nature of the penalty imposed; for a violation discovered in the
course of an administrative inspection the penalty should be civil
rather than criminal.72
Two additional contours are suggested by Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States" in which the Supreme Court found warrantless
searches by a roving border patrol to be unconstitutional.
Searches should not be conducted within the "unfettered discre-
tion" of the administrative official74 and there should be assur-
ances that "the individual searched was within the proper scope
of official scrutiny.
'75
The contour pertaining to routine regulatory searches of the
OSHA variety, as previously discussed in Barlow, is a general
administrative plan derived from neutral sources."
The final contour to be considered is the "true nature of the
warrant" requested. The court reasons that if a traditional fourth
amendment search is not at issue, then traditional probable cause
is not required to support the warrant." Thus probable cause
standards will vary with the true nature of the warrant at issue.
The Tenth Circuit's discussion of these contours is not
clearly focused and suffers from a lack of particularity. The con-
tours are suggested in the context of other cases where the facts
are quite dissimilar to the IRS search. Though the court itself
states that a neutral magistrate's "finding of probable cause must
be predicated on the particular facts of the case presented,"7" the
court never addresses the particular facts of the IRS search.
Based upon the probable cause requirement of reasonable
administrative standards, whether probable cause is met in
Carlson becomes a question of the reasonableness of the stan-
" 580 F.2d at 1378.
I d. (citing Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1975), aff'd 430 U.S. 442 (1976)).
73 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
71 ,580 F.2d at 1379.
Id. at 1380.
76 Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Blanchard, 495 F.2d 1329 (1st Cir. 1974)).
580 F.2d at 1378.
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dards for tax assessment and levy in the Internal Revenue Code. "
The balancing test weighing public need against an individual's
right of privacy must be applied in light of these contours sug-
gested by the Tenth Circuit which help minimize intrusions upon
an individual's privacy.
Addressing one side of the balancing test, the court clearly
acknowledges and supports the right of the federal government to
collect revenue by administrative means and the necessity of a
levy procedure to encourage voluntary compliance in our self-
assessment tax system.80 The other side of the balancing test
requires IRS standards which limit the intrusion upon an individ-
ual's privacy. Though the Carlson court did not say so directly,
it clearly implied that the probable cause standards are met in
the instant case' because the current Internal Revenue Code re-
quires a notice of the tax deficiency, demand for payment, and a
refusal to pay prior to the IRS application for the search warrant
and seizure of property." Since a neutral magistrate reviews the
affidavit and issues the warrant, the IRS official's discretion is
held in check, the time and manner of the search are reviewed,
and the warrant can indicate the official scope of scrutiny by
describing the limits of the search and the property to be seized.
Finally, the penalty in the IRS levy procedure is not criminal in
nature-it is an extra-judicial seizure of property to satisfy the
tax assessment.9
1' "The. . . affidavit submitted in support of the IRS application in the instant case
thus must be judged in the context of the applicable provisions of the Code." Id. at 1381.
- "The subject of federal taxes, including remedies for their collection, has always
been conceded to be the paramount right of the federal government independent of the
legislative action of the states." Id. at 1368 (citing United States v. Union Cent. Life Ins.
Co., 368 U.S. 291 (1961)).
81 580 F.2d at 1381. See also United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 568 F.2d 853 (2d
Cir. 1977). In this case the court held that the district court had jurisdiction to enforce
IRS jeopardy levies by summary proceedings and the taxpayer was not allowed to inter-
vene in summary proceedings to enforce IRS levies on the contents of a safe deposit box.
The Tenth Circuit considered this case in relation to the jurisdiction issue and suggested
that current IRS proceedings were sufficient to establish probable cause. "There is no
discussion in . . . United States v. First National City Bank. . . concerning deficiencies
in the government's application/processes meeting probable cause requirements. We thus
assume that these requirements were met, as surely they had to be in order to support
the issuance of a search warrant." 580 F.2d at 1376.
" See I.R.C. §§ 6301-03, 6321, 6331 which set out the procedure. It can be inferred
from the Tenth Circuit opinion that these are reasonable administrative standards suffi-
cient to establish probable cause.
" I.R.C. § 6331 authorizes distraint and seizure by any means.
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C. Analysis of the Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit opinion which loosely defines the contours
of administrative probable cause is in harmony with earlier deci-
sions that adopted a descriptive approach to setting probable
cause standards. The Camara and Barlow decisions unequivo-
cally asserted that an administrative probable cause test cannot
be rigid and prescriptive as it must account for the purposes and
circumstances of each search situation. 4 However, the courts
since Frank have been divided over the use of such a flexible,
diluted probable cause test." The dissenters in Camara/See and
Barlow were not concerned with denying the poblic's need for
regulatory inspections or preventing the government from exer-
cising enforcement powers indispensable to maintaining com-
munity health and safety. Their foremost concern was safeguard-
ing the individual's fourth amendment privacy interests by main-
taining, not diluting, the requirements of particularized probable
cause set forth in the fourth amendment."' The dissenters were of
the opinion that a warrant based upon diluted probable cause
standards actually provided less protection to the individual than
no warrant at all since it raised the risk of abuse of the "general
warrants" to which the framers addressed the fourth amend-
ment. 7 The dissenters argued that "reasonable" searches of the
type in Camara and Barlow did not require a warrant at all under
the first clause of the fourth amendment.8 8
" 580 U.S. at 1378 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. at 538); see, e.g., Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. at 1824; see also text accompanying notes 19, 49, and 77 supra.
0 Frank was a 5-4 decision; Camara was a 6-3 decision; Barlow was a 5-3 decision.
" "[The Court] prostitutes the command of the Fourth Amendment that 'no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause' and sets up. . .a newfangled 'warrant' system
that is entirely foreign to Fourth Amendment standards." See v. City of Seattle, 397 U.S.
at 547 (Clark, J., dissenting).
'7 Since the general warrant, not the warrantless search, was the imme-
diate evil at which the Fourth Amendment was directed, it is not surprising
that the Framers placed precise limits on its issuance. The requirement that
a warrant only issue on a showing of particularized probable cause was the
means adopted to circumscribe the warrant power.
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
u "While the subsequent course of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in this Court
emphasizes the dangers posed by warrantless searches conducted without probable cause,
it is the general reasonableness standard in the first clause, not the Warrant Clause, that
the Framers adopted to limit this category of searches." Id. See also text accompanying
notes 22-23 supra.
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The descriptive approach to civil probable cause necessitates
a careful factual analysis of the particular search in question and
the particular target of the search, 9 but the Tenth Circuit opinion
fails to analyze the nature of the IRS search and thus fails to
address the concern raised in the Camara and Barlow dissents.
The omission is significant since warrants to enter and seize
property to satisfy tax deficiencies resemble the dreaded gen-
eral warrants used to collect import duties during the colonial
period.' 0 The similarity between the general warrant and the
IRS warrant suggests that the probable cause standard for IRS
searches should require a higher quantum of individual protec-
tion than the standard for routine regulatory inspections.
The Carlson court is also remiss in its failure to distinguish
the nature of the IRS search from routine, regulatory searches of
the OSHA variety. An OSHA inspection is a less hostile intrusion
into an individual's privacy than an IRS search. The OSHA
inspection is routine. It is not directed at one individual alone but
is based upon a neutral plan with industry-wide application. Its
purpose is enforcement of regulations. The penalty is either a
directive compelling compliance or a fine; nothing is seized. In
contrast, an IRS search is not routine. It is directed at one indi-
vidual based upon a self-assessment tax system which requires
extensive disclosure of personal and financial information. Its
purpose is to collect a tax assessment. The penalty is seizure of
property. Searches which affect the individual so differently are
bound to weigh differently in the balancing test. Probable cause
standards should reflect such differences.
If searches and inspections could be viewed on a continuum
graduated to represent the degree of hostility inherent in the
intrusion, routine regulatory inspections would be at one pole and
criminal searches at the other pole with IRS searches somewhere
in between." Thus the IRS search can be seen as possessing some
*' 580 U.S. at 1378.
98 S. Ct. at 1828. The Barlow dissenters recalled that England issued general
warrants to enforce seditious libel laws and writs of assistance to collect various import
duties. Abuses of these warrants were the stimulus for the fourth amendment's require-
ment of particularized probable cause.
" Searches of the type in Barlow, 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978), should be placed at the
pole for routine, regulatory investigations. Searches of the type in Colonnade, 397 U.S. 72
(1970), are a more significant invasion of privacy than those in Barlow, but at the same
time the degree of hostility is mitigated by the pervasive regulation of the liquor industry
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characteristics which approach or resemble those of searches in
the criminal context and such characteristics weighed in the bal-
ancing test would require stricter administrative standards for
IRS searches than for routine regulatory inspections in order to
qualify as reasonable.
The court's failure to articulate the meaningful distinctions
between OSHA inspections and IRS searches did not preclude the
conclusion that the current administrative standards of the IRS
Code are reasonable and adequate to establish probable cause. In
the IRS search the probable cause standard is indeed stricter; it
is quasi-criminal since once there is an assessment, notice of defi-
ciency, demand for payment and refusal to pay, there is an as-
sumed tax violation. In addition, the taxpayer is on notice of the
IRS's suspicions. While the court's failure to distinguish the facts
of an IRS search may not have changed the final judgment, the
court missed its opportunity to undergird the respectability of the
flexible, descriptive approach to civil probable cause standards.
The descriptive approach to probable cause has been criti-
cized as abusing the warrant system, allowing "paper warrants"
issued by the "rubber stamp of a willing magistrate." 2 A cursory
analysis of the nature of the intrusion resulting from a particular
search and superficial examination of administrative standards
leaves the courts vulnerable to such criticism. Fourth amendment
protection of an individual's privacy in administrative searches
will only be meaningful if the courts carefully analyze the factors
of each search situation to insure that administrative standards
are reasonable and the concomitant intrusion is minimal.
When Judge Matsch refused to enter the ex parte tax entry
orders he expressed concern, not only about the ambiguities of
administrative probable cause standards, but also about the ex
parte nature of the proceedings because taxpayers are given "no
notice and no opportunity to contest the allegations in the affida-
vits .. .or [to contest] the legality of the orders requested.'
' 3
Thus the Colonnade-type searches should occupy a position on the continuum near
Barlow, between Barlow and IRS searches. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
12 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 547-48 (Clark, J., dissenting).
3 434 F Supp at 556-57. Judge Matsch wrote:
It is one thing to deprive a taxpayer temporarily of his property until a
prompt post-seizure hearing can be held to determine entitlement to contin-
ued possession; it is altogether another thing to deprive a citizen of his right
to privacy in his home or business premises without any pre-invasion oppor-
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One critic has suggested that a warrantless procedure may pro-
vide the individual more protection because there is an opportun-
ity for an adversarial hearing before a judge after refusal of entry
and before issuance of an entry order." Another critic has recom-
mended a procedure similar to that for administrative subpoenas
which allows for an adversarial proceeding where the person af-
fected may obtain a judicial determination of his right of privacy
without risk of punishment before the warrant is issued. 5 Unfor-
tunately the Carlson court did not consider this issue.
A final concern not addressed in the Tenth Circuit opinion
is the potential, in a search situation where property is to be
seized, to acquire information outside the original scope of the
search which may lead to other, perhaps criminal, charges. Some
critics have suggested that diluted administrative probable cause
is an imperfect protection for an individual's right of privacy if it
is not accompanied by an exclusionary rule."1
The Carlson court did not address the need for an adversarial
hearing or for an exclusionary rule possibly because it chose to
characterize the IRS search as just another of the general admin-
istrative searches. Given this characterization the court did not
perceive or articulate the meaningful distinctions of the IRS
search which would require additional administrative safeguards
or at the least would indicate which of the present standards in
the Internal Revenue Code are minimal requirements.
The court's failure to carefully distinguish the IRS search
from other non-criminal searches may stem from the novelty of
this area of law, inexperience with descriptive probable cause
standards, and uncertainty as to the court's own role in applying
a standard which requires a specific factual analysis. Whatever
the reason, probable cause for issuance of warrants in non-
criminal searches will not be meaningful if the descriptive stan-
dards are not carefully applied within the context of the particu-
lar search at issue.
tunity to be heard. Unlike property, one's privacy cannot be returned intact
if the government has overstepped its bounds.
Id. at 557.
" McManis & McManis, supra note 1, at 962 n.121.
" La Fave, supra note 7, at 31.




In re Carlson follows the trend of earlier decisions and ex-
tends administrative probable cause standards for issuance of
search warrants for regulatory inspections to issuance of search
warrants for IRS summary tax proceedings. The Tenth Circuit
relied on the Camara tests for determining probable cause. Prob-
able cause exists if reasonable legislative or administrative stan-
dards for conducting a search are satisfied. Standards are reason-
able when the need for a search outweighs or justifies the invasion
which the search entails. In addition, the court suggested some
"loosely defined contours" which are to be considered in the bal-
ancing process as a means of minimizing the intrusions upon
privacy. The recommended contours indicate that searches
should be conducted at reasonable times, within reasonable lim-
its and in a reasonable manner; the penalty for violation should
be civil in nature; there should be assurances that searches are
not conducted at the sole discretion of an administrative official
or beyond the scope of official scrutiny; consideration should be
given to the nature and purpose of the search.
This flexible, descriptive approach to probable cause re-
quires a deliberate, careful analysis of the particular search at
issue in order to determine reasonable standards The Tenth Cir-
cuit fails to distinguish the facts of the IRS search from those of
a regulatory inspection. Thus it does not recognize the IRS search
as a more hostile intrusion upon privacy than a regulatory inspec-
tion. The court misses the opportunity to set minimal standards
for conducting an IRS search and to require a higher quantum of
protection for an individual's privacy in the context of an IRS
search and the concomitant seizure of property. The effect of the
court's analysis is an implication that administrative standards
for conducting a civil search will be found reasonable without
careful scrutiny of the particular search. Undoubtedly this will
not end the debate or still the critics who charge that warrants
issued upon administrative probable cause standards weaken the






During the period of this survey, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed four antitrust cases, each
private actions under the Sherman Act.' None of the decisions
present major developments or changes in antitrust law. Two
cases, Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. v. Denver Board of
Realtors' and Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Association,' have
been selected for discussion to illustrate difficulties establishing
subject-matter jurisdiction over intrastate conduct and damages
for lost profits. A third case, Lamp Liquors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors
Co.,' is of some interest as the latest in a recent series of attacks
on Coors' territorial marketing restrictions.' In this appeal, the
Tenth Circuit considered but rejected Coors' defenses that the
twenty-first amendment and Wyoming liquor laws preempted
application of the antitrust laws, and that the doctrine of in pari
delicto barred Lamp Liquors from pursuing its claim.'
The discussion following omits extended review of the Tenth
Circuit's fourth antitrust case during this period, T'ai Corp. v.
Kalso Systemet, Inc.7 In T'ai, the plaintiffs Sherman Act claims'
were predicated on elements of an alleged oral contract granting
plaintiff an exclusive franchise to sell "Earth Shoes"' in Colo-
rado. Judge McWilliams, for the Tenth Circuit, agreed with the
trial court that the evidence was insufficient to establish exist-
' 15 U.S.C. §H 1-7 (1976).
2 578 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1978).
3 568 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1977).
4 563 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1977).
1 Predating Lamp in the series are Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561
F.2d 807 (10th Cir. 1977) and Adolph Coors Co. v. F.T.C., 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
See Lamp Liquors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 563 F.2d 425, 430-31 (10th Cir. 1977).
568 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1977).
T'ai Corp., a shoe retailer in Boulder, Colorado, asserted that Kalso, a vertically
integrated shoe manufacturer, had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act in two respects:
first, by imposition of a restriction on T'ai's solicitation of mailorder sales outside Colo-
rado; and second, by refusal to supply T'ai with sufficient stock for a new retail outlet in
Denver. Id. at 148.
* "Earth Shoes" are a patented shoe design characterized by a "negative heel," that
is, a heel approximately one and one-half inches lower than the ball of the foot. Id. at 146.
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ence of the contract. 0 As a result, T'ai's antitrust claims had no
foundation."
I. ANTITRUST JURISDICTION: Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. v.
Denver Board of Realtors"
Establishing a link between an alleged trade restraint and
interstate commerce is a jurisdictional prerequisite for invoking
protection of the Sherman Act. 3 In most Sherman Act cases, the
interstate commerce connection has not been at issue." Where
the issue has arisen, two modes of analysis have been identified
for determining whether a course of conduct falls within the juris-
dictional reach of the Act.'5 The first, the "in commerce" test,
encompasses activities in the stream or flow of interstate com-
merce-for example, shipment of goods across state lines.'6 The
second, the "affecting commerce" test, encompasses conduct
having a substantial effect on interstate commerce." Through
Id. at 147.
" Id. at 148.
" 578 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1978).
" Section one of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), prohibits "[e]very contract,
combination . ..or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States .... " Section 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), prohibits conspiracies and attempts to
monopolize "any part of the trade or commerce among the several States .... " See
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229-34 (1947)
(tracing the historical evolution of the interstate commerce requirement of the Sherman
Act). One source of confusion is that the interstate commerce requirement has both
jurisdictional and substantive aspects. A motion to dismiss for failure to establish a
sufficient connection with interstate commerce may be based on either FED. R. Crv. P.
12(b)(1) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction) or FlD. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted). The U.S. Supreme Court has recently stated that
the analysis in either case is identical. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hsp., 425
U.S. 738, 742 n.1 (1976).
" Note, Portrait of the Sherman Act as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U. L.
Rav. 323, 327 (1974).
's See id. at 327-28; Eiger, The Commerce Element in Federal Antitrust Litigation,
25 FED. B.J. 282, 286-87 (1965); L. SUituvAN, ANT'RrUST 709-10 (1977). See also Burke v.
Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967).
" Note, supra note 14, at 328. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186,
194-95 (1974). The "in commerce" test is the only test used for jurisdictional analysis of
alleged violations of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts, because these statutes con-
tain express "in commerce" language. Id. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 13a. 14.18 (1976). The jurisdic-
tional reach of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts is thus more limited than that of
section one of the Sherman Act. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.. 419 U.S. at 195.
1 Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v.
American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234 (1948). A classic explanation of the
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application of the "affecting commerce" test, local business ac-
tivities may become subject to Sherman Act regulation. 8
In Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. v. Denver Board of
Realtors,"5 the Tenth Circuit was presented with an opportunity
to evaluate the interstate impact of the real estate brokerage
business in Colorado. Income Realty, a Denver broker, comm-
enced an action against a local real estate trade association and
other Denver-area brokers for violations of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.20 Income Realty's complaint, however, was seri-
ously deficient. The allegations in the complaint regarding the
defendants' connection with interstate commerce were confined
to a statement that the parties were "engaged in interstate bro-
kerage of real estate."' 2' After reciting a number of Supreme Court
cases illustrating the "affecting commerce" test,n Judge Pickett,
for the majority, noted that Income Realty had alleged no facts
"affecting commerce" test appears in United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n,
336 U.S. 460 (1949) (Jackson, J.):
Restraints, to be effective, do not have to be applied all along the line of
movement of interstate commerce. The source of the restraint may be intra-
state, as the making of a contract or combination usually is; the application
of the restraint may be intrastate, as it often is; but neither matters if the
necessary effect is to stifle or restrain commerce among the states. If it is
interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the
operation which applies the squeeze.
Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
," The U.S. Supreme Court applied section 1 to local hospital services in Hospital
Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976), and to a county bar association's
activities in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The Court has empha-
sized that the "affecting commerce" test is qualitative, not quantitative. See United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225 (1946). There isno requirement thathe
quantity of interstate commerce be reduced; in fact, anticompetitive activity may operate
to stimulate interstate trade. See, e.g., Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 322 n.2 (1967). As
long as a local trade restraint has some appreciable impact on interstate commerce, the
restraint is within the ambit of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
332 U.S. 218, 225 (1946); L. SuLLrVAN, supra note 15, at 710-11.
, 578 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1978).
The substance of Income Realty's complaint was that the Denver Board of Realtors
had engaged in a conspiracy to destroy Income Realty's business by a series of unfair trade
practices. Among other things, Income Realty alleged that defendants had published
defamatory statements concerning it, threatened to discontinue dealings with it, and
solicited filing of grievances concerning it with the Colorado Real Estate Commission. Id.
at 1327.
I Id. at 1328.
E.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976); United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), cited in Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc.
v. Denver Bd. of Realtors, 578 F.2d 1326, 1328 (10th Cir. 1978).
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indicating the brokers' conduct affected interstate commerce."
Relying on Bryan v. Stillwater Board of Realtors, 24 a recent Tenth
Circuit case similarly concerned with the interstate effects of
local real estate transactions, Judge Pickett affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of Income Realty's complaint without leave to
amend.2
Judge Logan filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in part. Criticizing the majority's reliance on Bryan v.
Stillwater Board of Realtors,"e he quoted with approval language
from an Eighth Circuit decisionl indicating that real estate bro-
kerage services may have a sufficient connection with interstate
commerce, depending upon the evidence presented. Judge Logan
was of the opinion that "realtors and real estate board activities
in large metropolitan areas such as Denver, do sufficiently affect
interstate commerce that they cannot be classified as immune
from all antitrust claims."' '
0 578 F.2d at 1328.
" 578 F.2d at 1319 (10th Cir. 1977). Bryan was a private antitrust suit brought by a
real estate broker against his local real estate board after expulsion from board member-
ship. Unlike Income Realty, Bryan had made some attempt to establish subject-matter
jurisdiction. Specifically, Bryan alleged:
First, a substantial number of persons using the services of Board members
in conjunction with real estate transactions are persons moving into the City
of Stillwater from outside the State of Oklahoma, and persons moving from
the City of Stillwater to places outside the State of Oklahoma. Secondly..
Board members have caused substantial amounts of. .. financing, insur-
ance, commodities and services to move into the City of Stillwater from
outside the State of Oklahoma from business operating in interstate com-
merce . . . . Lastly, Board members have access to national referral and
marketing systems, whereby cooperating broker members split commission
fees in return for early information about a prospective seller or buyer.
Id. at 1322-23. Judge Barrett, for the Tenth Circuit, affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of Bryan's complaint on both substantive and jurisdictional grounds. With respect to the
jurisdictional deficiency, Judge Barrett stated: "[the conduct complained of is entirely
of a local character. ._. nothing contained in Bryan's complaint does other than indicate
that the acts complained of affect a business engaged in interstate commerce . . . the
complained of conduct does not affect the interstate commerce of such a business." Id. at
1326 (emphasis added). Cf. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738,
741 (1976) (plaintiff's complaint alleged that plaintiff's interstate commerce involvements
had been adversely affected).
0 Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. v. Denver Bd. of Realtors, 578 F.2d 1:26. 1329
(10th Cir. 1977).
0 578 F.2d at 1319 (10th Cir. 1977).
" Diversified Brokerage Services, Inc. v. Greater Des Moines Bd. of Realtors, 521 F.2d
1343, 1347 (8th Cir. 1975).




Judge Logan also focused on a distinction that has been
drawn between the burden of proof of interstate-commerce effect
in cases where a per se violation of the Sherman Act is alleged
and in cases requiring a rule-of-reason analysis.2 Resolution of
the jurisdictional issue of whether local activity substantially
affects interstate commerce may involve detailed consideration of
the nature of the local business and its interrelationship with
interstate markets.A0 This type of inquiry is quite appropriate
where the substantive aspects of plaintiff's claim must be evalu-
ated under the rule of reason. Where a plaintiff has alleged a per
se violation of the Sherman Act,3' however, it has been suggested
that the standard for pleading and proof of the interstate com-
merce nexus should be less rigorous.12 Judge Logan adopted this
viewpoint, expressing his opinion that Income Realty's complaint
would have been adequate jurisdictionally if the complaint had
presented a substantive claim of per se unlawful conduct.3 Since
the anticompetitive impact of defendants' conduct would have to
be measured by the rule of reason, however, Income Realty was
remiss in failing to make a prima facie showing of subject-matter
jurisdiction. 3' Judge Logan would have granted Income Realty
the opportunity to amend its complaint. 5
2 The difference between use of per se rules and the "rule of reason" in Sherman Act
analysis was succinctly restated by the U.S. Supreme Court this year in National Society
of Professional Engineers v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1355, 1363 (1978):
There are . . . two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the
first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish
their illegality-they are "illegal per se;" in the second category are agree-
ments whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts
peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it
was imposed.
See also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977).
30 L. SULLVAN, supra note 15, at 712; P. AREEDA, ANTrrRUST ANALYSIs 122 (1977).
,1 Examples of per se violations include price-fixing, group boycotts, and horizontal
territorial allocations.
n L. SULLVAN, supra note 15, at 712; P. AREEDA, supra note 29. See also United States
v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 509 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975). One of the rationales for use of per
se rules in Sherman Act analysis is to obviate the need for extensive consideration of
economic effects.
" Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. v. Denver Bd. of Realtors, 578 F.2d 1326, 1331
(10th Cir. 1978).
u Id.
u Id. For an example of a complaint successful in establishing Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion over the activities of local real estate brokers, see Gateway Assoc., Inc. v. Essex-
Costello, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 75,231 (N.D. II1. Aug. 28, 1974).
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II. DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS: Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers
Association3
An important component of antitrust enforcement policy is
preservation of the efficacy of private civil actions as a deterrent
to business conduct in violation of the antitrust laws. 37 One way
this goal has been served is by relaxation of the burden of proof
of the amount of damages for injury to plaintiffs business inter-
ests.3' The trier of fact is permitted to approximate the extent of
the injury by making "a just and reasonable estimate of the dam-
age based on relevant data," and to "act upon probable and
inferential, as well as direct and positive proof.
'3
In keeping with this relaxed standard of proof, the Supreme
Court has not attempted to impose any single formula for arriving
at a reasonable estimate of damages for lost profits." To date,
three methods for proving lost profits in private antitrust cases
have been sanctioned by federal courts. First, the "before and
after" theory compares plaintiff's earnings record before and
after defendant's violation." Second, the "yardstick" theory ex-
* 568 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1977).
v Zenith Radio v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 339 (1971). See also Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); Semke v. Enid
Automobile Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361, 1369 n.9 (10th Cir. 1972).
- L. SuLurvN, supra note 15, at 785. It is important to distinguish plaintiffs burden
with respect to the amount of damages from plaintiff's burden with respect to the fact of
damage. Proof of the fact of damage is required in order to establish standing to sue under
section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), which grants the right to bring a
private treble damage action to "[alny person . . . injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws .... " See generally ABA SEcrON
or Aerrusur LAw, A-rmusT LAw D aLoPMmNrs 262-63 (1975); L. SULLIVAN, supra note
15, at 785. The two standards of proof were differentiated in Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931):
[Tihere is a clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to
establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage, and the mea-
sure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount. The rule which
precludes the recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the
certain result of the wrong, not to those damages which are definitely attrib-
utable to the wrong and only uncertain in respect of their amount.
282 U.S. at 562.
" Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946), (citing Story Parch-
ment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co. 282 U.S. 555, 561-64 (1931)). See also Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 376-379 (1926).
" Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429 F.2d 873, 879-80 (7th Cir. 1970). See Bigelow
v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 266 (1946).
"1 Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 667 (5th Cir. 1974). See, e.g., Bigelow v.
RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 266 (1946). See generally Hoyt, Dahl & Gibson,
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amines the profit record of businesses that are closely comparable
to plaintiffs operation." Last, the newer "market share" theory
contrasts plaintiff's and defendant's market shares, and trans-
lates plaintiff's lost market share into a dollar volume of lost
sales, which is, in turn, multiplied by plaintiffs historical profit
record. 3 Whatever method is used, the essential task of a private
antitrust plaintiff is to advance a rational theory for measure-
ment of his injury and to introduce a sufficient amount of data
to support a reasonable estimate of the loss."
In Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Association," plaintiffs' fail-
ure to introduce a sufficient amount of evidence to support their
lost profits claim reduced their damage award by approximately
$65,000 on appeal to the Tenth Circuit.'" Defendants in Webb
were a group of bus tour brokers licensed by the ICC who had
formed a trade association, the Utah Tour Brokers Association.
Plaintiffs were unlicensed, independent operators who had con-
ducted several tours as agents for some of the defendants. Con-
tending that defendants had conspired to prevent plaintiffs' entry
into the tour brokerage business and to eliminate plaintiffs as
competitors, the plaintiffs instituted an action under sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act.'7 There was ample evidence offered at
trial to support a finding that defendants had engaged in a con-
certed effort to boycott the plaintiffs," and the district court (Rit-
Comprehensive Models for Assessing Lost Profits to Antitrust Plaintiffs, 60 MINN. L. REv.
1233 (1976); Note, Private Treble Damage Antitrust Suits: Measure of Damages for De-
struction of All or Part of a Business, 80 HAv. L. REv. 1566 (1967). The obvious difficulty
with this approach is that is precludes recovery by new businessmen. See text and accom-
panying note 58, infra.
1 Under the "yardstick" theory, the business used as a standard of comparison must
be as nearly identical to the plaintiff's as possible. Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d
659, 667 (5th Cir. 1974). The Tenth Circuit has employed the "yardstick" theory in
determining lost profits. See, e.g., Loew's, Inc. v. Cinema Amusements, Inc., 210 F.2d 86,
92 (10th Cir. 1954).
," Hoyt, Dahl & Gibson, supra note 41, at 1239-43. See, e.g., Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling
Nelson & Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
" L. SuLLivAN, supra note 15, at 786.
a 568 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1977).
" See text accompanying notes 49 and 50, infra.
" In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had refused to deal with
them as agents unless they maintained a joint bank account with defendants, had refused
to allow plaintiffs' names to appear in advertising for tours conducted by the plaintiffs,
and had filed protests with the ICC to prevent plaintiffs from becoming licensed. 568 F.2d
at 672.
" On appeal, Judge Doyle, for the Tenth Circuit, agreed with the trial court that
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ter, C.J.) entered judgment in plaintiffs' favor. The trial court's
damage award included $10,165 actual damages" and $21,726 for
lost future profits. The total was trebled in accordance with sec-
tion four of the Clayton Act.50
On appeal, Judge Doyle, for the Tenth Circuit, vacated that
portion of the judgment representing plaintiffs' lost profits award,
on grounds that plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence
on which to base a lost profits claim.5' The evidence offered con-
sisted solely of plaintiffs' testimony that they had planned to
conduct eight additional tours the year of the boycott, but that
they had abandoned their plans after losing money on scheduled
tours they were forced to refer to Greyhound as a result of defen-
dants' boycott.52 Plaintiffs calculated that their profits on the
eight tours cancelled would be approximately 25% of the tour
price. Judge Doyle, however, focused on plaintiffs' admission that
they had little previous experience as tour operators. Acknow-
ledging the principle that reasonable estimates are permitted in
calculation of antitrust damage awards, Judge Doyle nevertheless
insisted that some "credible and substantial" foundation for a
lost-profits award be laid.53 He found critical plaintiffs' failure "to
show that from prior experience they would have made a profit
defendants' conduct constituted a group boycott. Defendants' activities were therefore per
se unlawful, under United States v. General Motors, Corp. 384 U.S. 127 (1966), Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963) and Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). See Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Ass'n, 568 F.2d at 674-76. There
was documentary evidence that defendants had organized their trade association with
express intent to exclude plaintiffs from the tour brokerage business, to discourage other
brokers from using plaintiffs as their agents, and to encourage protest of the plaintiffs'
license application before the ICC. 568 F.2d at 672-73. Judge Doyle held that defendants'
activities in connection with the plaintiffs' ICC license application were protected by the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965);
Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Govt. Action: The Basis and Limits
of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. Cm. L. REV. 80 (1977). However, there was
enough evidence independent of the defendants' ICC involvements to support the finding
that defendants had made concerted efforts to prevent plaintiffs' entry into the tour
brokerage business. 568 F.2d at 674.
" As a result of defendants' refusal to allow plaintiffs to act as their agents, plaintiffs
were forced to refer previously scheduled tours to Greyhound. These alternative arrange-
ments were more costly. 568 F.2d at 676-77.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
" 568 F.2d at 678.
" Id. at 677.
" Id. at 678.
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. . . had the defendants allowed them to [act as defendants']
agents."'" Judge Doyle stressed the importance of expert testi-
mony in presentation and analysis of economic information, 5
with the implication that plaintiffs' failure to secure the assis-
tance of an economist at trial was a strategic error.
In view of Judge Doyle's emphasis on plaintiff's lack of an
established prior earnings record, Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers
Association could be read to support the proposition that the only
theory recognized in the Tenth Circuit for measurement of dam-
ages for lost profits is the "before and after" theory. 5 Judge Doyle
stated, "future profits cannot rest on possibilities. It must be
more tangible and prior experience is about the only foundation
on which this kind of evidence can rest."" The difficulty with this
emphasis is that it restricts lost-profits recovery to the class of
plaintiffs in business for a sufficient length of time to develop the
necessary quantum of prior experience, and precludes recovery by
new business entrants." There is additional-language in Judge
Doyle's opinion, however, indicating that the Webb case should
not be given such a limited reading and that the Tenth Circuit is
receptive to alternative theories for ascertaining lost future
profits. Judge Doyle was careful to emphasize that "courts are
" Id. at 677.
U Id. at 678.
" See text and accompanying note 41, supra.
" 568 F.2d at 677.
S On the other hand, proof of damages for lost future profits in cases involving new
businesses is always speculative to some degree. Under any theory of measurement, the
problem is to identify the point at which policies favoring antitrust recovery are su-
perseded by evidentiary standards demanding a credible basis for the award.
The treble damage suit would be inadequate to the policy requirements of
antitrust law if it did not give some relief to the new entrant whose attempt
to enter an industry is repelled by the defendant's illegal practices. But a
serious problem arises in defining an attempted entry substantial enough to
justify the conclusion that profits would have been made. Mere intention and
capability to go into a given line of business are not enough-the problems
of proof of intent and speculativeneas of the measure of damages are unsur-
mountable there. Thus, while potential entrants are a vital concern of anti-
trust policy, judicial practicalities deny the vindication of their interests in
treble damage suits. To succeed, a plaintiff that never emerged as a viable
business must prove an attempt to enter and the existence of a reasonable
chance of success if no illegal conduct had interfered; relevant factors are his
experience in the line of business, the undertaking of affirmative action to
engage in it, the ability to finance it, and the purchase of necessary facilities.
Note, note 41 supra, at 1576.
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not strict about the kind of foundations or theories which are
employed so long as it is credible and substantial. . ."" More-
over, in reaching his conclusion that plaintiffs offered insufficient
evidence to justify their claim for lost profits, Judge Doyle relied
on cases where "yardstick" and "market share" approaches
were employed to arrive at lost profits estimates."0
III. PRESUMPTIVE EFFECT OF STATE LIQUOR REGULATION; In Pari
Delicto DOCTRINE: Lamp Liquors v. Adolph Coors Co."
Lamp Liquors v. Adolph Coors Co. is the third antitrust case
involving the Adolph Coors Co. to reach the Tenth Circuit in the
last four years." In all three actions, the root of the controversy
has been the legality of certain restrictions imposed by the brew-
ery on marketing and distribution of its beer. For years, Coors has
limited geographical distribution of its product to eleven western
states, and has required distributors and retailers to observe cer-
tain standards in handling and storage, in the interests of quality
control and product "integrity."
In 1966, the U. S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Arnold
Schwinn & Co.,' ruled that all vertical territorial and customer
restraints imposed by manufacturers after title, dominion and
risk of loss had passed to distributors were illegal per se under the
Sherman Act. In light of the Schwinn rule, Coors' restrictive mar-
keting scheme appeared to be headed for extinction. 5 In 1977,
however, in its landmark decision, Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc.," the Supreme Court overruled Schwinn, announc-
" Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Ass'n,-568 F.2d at 678.
0 E.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946) (yardstick); Rangen,
Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
936 (1966) (market share).
" 563 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1977), rev 'g and remanding 410 F. Supp. 536 (D. Wyo. 1976).
The others are Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807 (10th
Cir. 1977), and Adolph Coors Co. v. MTC, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
" Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807, 810-11 (10th Cir. 1977).
- 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967), overruled in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). For an excellent historical review of the law on vertical restraints up
to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in GTE Sylvania, see ABA ScrMON ON ANTrrRusT
LAw, VmcAL RESTRICIONs Laifrmso InTMrRAND COMPETTON (1977)
0 See Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1105 (1975) (territorial assignments illegal per se under Schwinn rule). In the
FTC case, the Tenth Circuit noted that Coors had a legitimate interest in quality control,
and urged the Supreme Court to reconsider the Schwinn rule. 497 F.2d at 1187.
" 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In GTE Sylvania, the Court expressly acknowledged the Tenth
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ing that all vertical restraints would henceforth be judged under
the rule of reason." Coors' marketing policies have fared mark-
edly better in litigation since GTE Sylvania.68
Plaintiff in Lamp Liquors v. Adolph Coors Co." was a re-
tailer licensed under Wyoming liquor laws, who had com-
menced selling large quantities of Coors beer to wholesalers in
Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C., outside the limits of Coors'
established geographical marketing area.7 0 When Coors' Wyo-
ming distributor, Cheyenne Beverage, Inc., learned of this pirati-
cal scheme, it reported Lamp to the Wyoming Liquor Commis-
sion and ceased supplying Lamp with Coors beer. Lamp promptly
sued Coors and Cheyenne Beverage under sections one, two, and
three of the Sherman Act," complaining that defendants' refusal
to deal was the product of an unlawful conspiracy. Lamps' com-
plaint focused on Coors' vertical customer and territorial restric-
tions. 2 Coors filed a motion to dismiss.
The district court decision on Coors' motion was rendered
before GTE Sylvania. The trial judge noted that, if the conspir-
acy were proven, application of the Schwinn rule would require a
judgment that Coors' vertical restraints were unlawful per se.73
The judge seemed to recognize, however, that the equities were
in Coors' favor. He noted that the Tenth Circuit had criticized
the rigidity of the Schwinn rule, and that Coors had persuasive
justifications for its marketing policies to assure quality of its
perishable product.7' The judge was therefore receptive to Coors'
arguments on motion: first, that enforcement of the Sherman Act
Circuit's suggestion that greater flexibility was needed in the law of vertical restraints.
Id. at 48 n.14.
" See note 29, supra. Under a rule-of-reason analysis, courts may consider factors
such as Coors' desires to assure speedy, refrigerated delivery of its product in assessing
the lawfulness of a vertical territorial restraint.
, See Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807, 813-14 (10th Cir.
1977) (remanding issue of Coors' territorial restraints for evidentiary hearing in light of
GTE Sylvania). See also Denver Post, June 9, 1978, at 29, Sec. C, col. 3. (On remand from
the Tenth Circuit's decision in Lamp Liquors, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in
Coors' favor The iury had been instructed that they could find Coors' restrictions on east
coast distribution reasonable and permissible under the antitrust laws.)
563 F.2d 425 (10th Cir 1977), rev'g and remanding 410 F. Supp. 536 (D. Wyo. 1976).
" 410 F. Supp. at 538.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976).
n See Lamp Liquors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 410 F. Supp. at 538.




would conflict with Wyoming state liquor laws enacted under the
twenty-first amendment;" and, second, that plaintiff lacked
standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act7" since his business
activities violated Wyoming law." Accordingly, the district court
granted Coors' motion to dismiss.78 Lamp appealed to the Tenth
Circuit.
In the interim, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Continental
T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.7" As a result, the merits of
Lamp's case-the legality of Coors' vertical territorial restric-
tions-could be evaluated at trial under the rule of reason, with
appropriate weight given to Coors' business justifications."0 The
Tenth Circuit was therefore not constrained to adopt the trial
court's rulings on preemption and standing in order to circum-
vent the Schwinn rule. Instead, the Tenth Circuit was free to
examine the analytical correctness of the trial court's view with-
out regard to the underlying equities of Coors' position on the
merits.
Judge Doyle, for the majority, first examined the twenty-first
amendment, finding that its main purpose was to empower dry
states to prohibit importation of liquor for use within their bor-
ders." Relying on United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 82 Judge
Doyle focused on the distinction between importation and expor-
tation drawn in the Frankfort case." Contrary to the view of the
" U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. This section provides: The transportation of impor-
tation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
" 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). See note 38, supra.
" See Wvo. STAT. §§ 12-1-101, 12-1-102, 12-1-121 (1977). Since Lamp held a retail
license only, it was prohibited from making sales to wholesalers. Lamp Liquors, Inc. v.
Adolph Coors Co., 410 F. Supp. at 540.
"410 F. Supp. at 541.
- 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
0 See Lamp Liquors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 563 F. 2d 425, 431-32 (10th Cir. 1977).
I Id. at 429.
- 324 U.S. 293 (1945). Frankfort is one of only two U.S. Supreme Court cases to have
considered the interrelationship between the states' regulatory authority under the
twenty-first amendment and the antitrust laws. Frankfort held that the twenty-first
amendment did not give "the states plenary and exclusive power to regulate the conduct
of persons doing an interstate liquor business outside their boundaries." Id. at 299. See
also Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45-46 (1966) (twenty-first
amendment does not prevent enforcement of antitrust laws against conspiracy to fix liquor
prices).
0 Chief Judge Markey, dissenting in Lamp Liquors, disagreed with Judge Doyle on
this point. He would have affirmed the trial court's dismissal on the basis of twenty-first
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trial court, he found that the states' regulatory authority over
liquor importation under the twenty-first amendment did not
preempt federal authority to regulate out-of-state commerce in
liquor under the Sherman Act. Judge Doyle also examined the
Wyoming licensing statutes enacted pursuant to the twenty-first
amendment, concluding that the state had not undertaken to
regulate liquor traffic in a way that would conflict with applica-
tion of the antitrust laws. 4
Judge Doyle went on to comment that, even if a conflict had
been found, Coors did not have standing to assert the state's
immunity as a defense. He noted that there were no signs that
"Wyoming has expressed an intention to allow Coors . . . to as-
sume its official function."" Judge Doyle's opinion did not depart
into an extended consideration of the "state action" exemption
to the antitrust laws,8" but his view is fully consistent with two
recent Supreme Court decisions concerning the proper scope of
this exemption, Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.87 and Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar. 88 Together, Cantor and Goldfarb require that,
in order for a private party to assert state sovereign immunity as
a defense to anticompetitive conduct, that conduct must have
been required or directed by the state acting in its sovereign
capacity. If a state directive is found, antitrust immunity will be
implied only to the minimum extent necessary for operation of
the state's regulatory scheme.8"
In the second part of his opinion, Judge Doyle considered the
trial court's ruling that Lamp did not have standing to maintain
its claim. The trial court had reasoned that, since Lamp's resale
business was in violation of Wyoming liquor licensing statutes,
Lamp did not have a business interest protectible by the antitrust
amendment supremacy, in light of the fact that Lamp's customers, rather than Lamp
itself, were exporting. 563 F.2d at 432-33.
" Id. at 430.
u Id.
" The "state action" exemption, granting antitrust immunity for anticompetitive
restraints sanctioned by a state acting in its sovereign capacity, stems from the U. S.
Supreme Court decision in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). For a review of the
historical development of the state action doctrine, see City of Lafayette, La. v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
- 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
- 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
" Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. at 596-97; Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. at 790-91.
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laws." Judge Doyle characterized the trial court's rule as an ap-
plication of the doctrine of in pari delicto."
The doctrine of in pari delicto, which translates, "of equal
fault," is a common law defense applicable where a plaintiff seek-
ing legal or equitable relief is also involved in the wrongdoing that
forms the basis of his claim.2 In Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp.,' 3 recognizing that private antitrust
suits serve the important public purpose of deterring potential
antitrust violations, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the doc-
trine of in pari delicto would not be recognized as a defense to
antitrust cases." Relying on Perma Life, as well as two subse-
quent Tenth Circuit decisions,' 5 Judge Doyle noted that the doc-
trine had been rejected as an antitrust defense in the Tenth Cir-
cuit. He also observed that Lamp's alleged violation of the Wyo-
ming state liquor laws was not at all related to Coors' territorial
restrictions that constituted the basis of Lamp's suit, and reiter-
ated the common law requirement for application of the defense
that plaintiff must have participated in the wrong of which defen-
dant complained. 8 Judge Doyle reversed and remanded the case
with instructions that the trial court consider the effect of GTE
Sylvania at trial on the merits."
Suzanne L. Weakley
Lamp Liquors v. Adolph Coors Co., 410 F. Supp. at 541.
'4 563 F.2d at 431.
" Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-39 (1968).
"Id.
' Id. For two recent comments on the proper role of the in pari delicto doctrine in
antitrust litigation, see Hover, The Viability of the In Pari Delicto Defense in Private
Antitrust Actions, 31 RuTmms L. REv. 126 (1977), and Katz, A Reexamination of In Pari
Delicto under the Antitrust Laws, 19 B.C. L. Rzv. 207 (1977).
' Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, 561 F.2d 807 (10th Cir. 1977); Semke v.
Enid Automobile Dealers Assoc., 456 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1972).
' Lamp Liquors v. Adolph Coors Co., 563 F.2d at 431.




This section of the Tenth Circuit Survey provides a brief
summary of the decisions rendered by the Tenth Circuit in the
general area of commercial law during the 1977-78 survey period.
Only those opinions which have been selected for official publica-
tion are reviewed herein.
The most noteworthy' cases involving commercial law this
term arose out of bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, this section will
be devoted entirely to decisions wich in some way had their origin
in, or were directly affected by, a bankruptcy proceeding.
BANKRUPTCY
A. Liability of a Trustee in Bankruptcy for F.I.C.A., and
F. U. T.A. I Taxes on Wages Paid Subsequent to Initiation of Bank-
ruptcy Proceedings.
In the case of United States v. Ennis (In re Armadillo Corp.)4
the court approached some unsettled questions with regard to the
liability of trustees in bankruptcy for wage claim related taxes.
The taxes involved were: 1) F.I.C.A. and F.U.T.A. taxes on prior-
ity wage claims;5 2) F.I.C.A. and F.U.T.A. taxes on unsecured
wage claims; and 3) employee portions of withheld income and
F.I.C.A. taxes on general unsecured wage claims. The court ap-
proached the issues from the perspective of "the degree to which
a trustee is required to function as an employer in paying and
withholding wage claim related taxes."' Further, the court relied
heavily on the Supreme Court decision in Otte v. United States.
7
In its analysis of the issue, the court first noted that the
applicable sections of the Internal Revenue Code make an
"employer" liable for withholding and remitting the taxes in
I Cases dealing with other topics within commercial law were decided but were not
selected for official publication, and they are not treated herein.
2 I.R.C. § 3101.
I.R.C. § 3301.
561 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1977).
Priority wage claims in bankruptcy proceedings are wages and commissions, not to
exceed $600 to each claimant, which have been earned within three months before the date
of the commencement of the proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1976) (amended 1978).
561 F.2d at 1385.
419 U.S. 43 (1974).
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issue.8 The Otte opinion restated the definitions of employer to
include persons having "control of the payment of wages."' Based
on an analogy to Otte and applying the guidelines set forth
therein, the court concluded that the trustees were liable for all
of those taxes as an employer would be.
The court then addressed the issue of whether the United
States was required to file proof of claims'0 in order to collect such
taxes. Once again relying on the reasoning from the Otte opinion,
the court held that no proof of claim was necessary in order to
preserve the United States' right to the taxes.
Finally, the United States asserted that all the wage claim
related taxes were entitled to be considered first priority debts."
This issue had previously been addressed in the Otte case. In
reliance thereon, the court concluded that wage claim related
taxes were entitled only to the same priority as the wages from
which they emerge, and not to the status of first priority treat-
ment.
B. Power of the Bankruptcy Court to Enjoin a Civil Action
Against the Guarantor of a Bankrupt.
Globe Construction Co. v. Oklahoma City Housing
Authority2 primarily addressed the issue of whether an order
staying all proceedings against a bankrupt pending bankruptcy
proceedings precluded a judgment being entered against a surety
of the bankrupt during the effective period of the order.
The case arose out of a construction contract in which a
surety provided a performance bond guaranteeing performance
by the general contractor and its surety for failing to satisfactorily
I.R.C. § 3402 and Tress. Reg. § 31.3402(a)l(b) (1960 as amended) require employers
to withhold income taxes, and I.R.C. § 3403 along with Treas. Reg. § 31.3403(1) (1960)
require employers to pay the withheld taxes to the United States; I.R.C. § 3102 requires
employers to withhold employee F.I.C.A. taxes and Treas. Reg. § 31.3102-2 (1960 as
amended) requires employers to pay these taxes to the United States; I.R.C. § 3101 and
Treas. Reg. § 31.3111-4 (1960) impose liability on an employer for the employer's portion
of F.I.C.A. taxes and Treas. Reg. § 31.3111.5 dictates the manner of payment; I.R.C. §
3301 and Treas. Reg. § 31.3301-1 (1960) impose liability upon the employer for the
F.U.T.A. taxes.
419 U.S. at 49.
A proof of claim is required to be filed in a bankruptcy proceeding as a condition
precedent to a creditor receiving an xpportionment of the debtor's assets for a debt.
561 F.2d at 1387.
571 F.2d 1140 (10th Cir. 1978).
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complete the construction contract. Subsequently, the general
contractor filed a petition in bankruptcy under Chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act."' The bankruptcy judge immediately entered an
order staying all proceedings against the bankrupt. In spite of the
order, judgment was entered against both the general contractor
and the surety.'4 On appeal from these judgments, the plaintiff
conceded that the entry of judgment against the bankrupt was in
error but sought enforcement of the judgment against the surety.
The court held that the "power of the bankruptcy court to
enjoin in personam suits is confined to suits against the debtor,
and there is no jurisdiction to enjoin a suit brought to enforce the
liability of a guarantor of bonds secured by a mortgage upon
property owned by the debtor."' 5 The judgment against the sur-
ety was enforceable.
C. Preferential Transfers under Section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy
Act. ,6
In Furedy v. Appleman (In re Vodco Volume Development
Co.), 7 the court approached the issue of whether filing a contin-
uation statement in accordance with Colorado law,' 8 after a pro-
perly filed financing statement has lapsed, causes continuous
perfection of the original security interest against a trustee in
bankruptcy.
The issue arose when the trustee in bankruptcy asserted that
a certain payment on a loan to a creditor, Appleman, (the appel-
lee) was a preferential transfer 9 under the Bankruptcy Act and
thus to be included in the bankrupt's assets for distribution to the
general creditors. Appleman contended that because of Colo-
rado's unique addition to the Uniform Commercial Code section
' 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (1976) (amended 1978).
" 571 F.2d at 1143.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1976) (amended 1978).
17 567 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1977).
oLO. REv. STAT. § 4-9-403(3) (1973).
" A preferential transfer is defined as transfer "of any of the property of a debtor to
or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered
by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or against him
of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title, the effect of which transfer will be
to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor
of the same class." 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1976) (amended 1978).
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dealing with continuation statements," a late filing of a continua-
tion statement relates back to the date of the original financing
statement and causes continuous perfection of his security inter-
est. Since the security interest would thus be continuously per-
fected, the antecedent debt requirement of a preferential trans-
fer 2' would not be met.
The court rejected this argument, holding that the intent of
the federal bankruptcy law took precedence over the state law in
this situation. n In distinguishing a prior case, n the court stated
that although the procedure to be followed in perfecting a security
interest in the property of a bankrupt is determined by state law,
the time at which perfection becomes effective against the trustee
in bankruptcy is determined by federal law. This conclusion pre-
serves the superiority of the federal bankruptcy law but at the
same time does not override the use of the Colorado revision of
the Uniform Commercial Code in all situations .
2
D. Other Cases
1. In Nitz v. Nitz15 the court considered the definition of
alimony, child support, and maintenance under Utah law" to
determine whether certain obligations of the bankrupt incurred
at divorce were dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding.21 The
court held that the trial judge's determination that the petitioner
ft COLO. REv. STAT. § 4-9-403(3) (1973) initially follows the Uniform Commercial Code
provision allowing a continuation statement to be filed within six months before and sixty
days after a stated maturity date in the original financing statement but then adds:
The failure to file a continuation statement within the time provided in this
section shall not affect the validity of a secured party's security interest as
against the debtor, and if a continuation statement is filed subsequent to the
time provided for but in no event later than two years thereafter, then the
late filing shall have the same effect as if it were filed within the time
provided, except as to pesons who may have acquired rights subsequent to
the time when the filing should have been made and prior to the late filing,
and as to them only to the extent of the rights so acquired. ...
" A condition to a finding of a preferential transfer is that the property be transferred
for or on account of an antecedent debt. If this is not found, the trustee cannot successfully
assert that a given transfer is a preference.
" 567 F.2d at 971.
See E. F. Corp. v. Smith, 496 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1974).
, 567 F.2d at 971.
s 568 F.2d 148 (10th Cir. 1977).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1953).
' Under the Bankruptcy Act, obligations for alimony and support for a wife and child
are nondischageable. 11 U.S.C. § 35 (a)(7) (1976) (amended 1978).
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had failed to meet her burden of proof with respect to showing the
nature of the obligations to be nondischargeable, was not clearly
erroneously and thus not reversible.28
2. The court in Wellston, Oklahoma, Natural Gas Author-
ity Bondholders v. Nesbitt (In re Eufaula Enterprises, Inc.)z ap-
plied the "clearly erroneous" standard30 to a bankruptcy judge's
determination that a public trust was the mere instrumentality
or alter ego of the bankrupt. The rule governing piercing the veil
in the bankruptcy context was stated to be "[wihen one legal
entity is but an instrumentality of alter ego of another, by which
it is dominated, a court may look beyond form to substance and
may disregard the theory of distinct legal entities in determining
ownership of assets in a bankruptcy proceeding."'3 The court also
expressly found that even though the legal entity attacked was a
public trust,32 it could be validly brought within the ambit of the
aforementioned rule.
3. In Coldwell Banker v. Godwin Bever Co.,3 the Tenth
Circuit resolved the status of a claim by Coldwell Banker and
Company, i.e., whether it was a general, unsecured claim or an
expense of administration .3 The claimant had acted as an agent
for sale of certain of the bankrupt's stores. Prior to the bank-
ruptcy proceedings, the claimant had completed its entire obliga-
tion of procuring a willing buyer, but the sale was not completed
until after the proceedings had begun. The claimant asseted that
it was the third party beneficiary of the purchase and escrow
agreement made by the bankrupt with the buyer, which was not
consummated until after bankruptcy, and thus was entitled to
recover its debt as an administrative expense.35 The court rejected
this argument and held that the debt was a general, unsecured
debt.
"' 568 F.2d at 152.
- 565 F.2d 1157 (10th Cir. 1977).
The ruling of the trial court as to factual matters will not be overruled unless it is
"clearly erroneous."
565 F.2d at 1161.
I2 d. at 1161-62.
575 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1978).
', An expense of administration has the highest priority for payment for the assets of
a bankrupt whereas a general, unsecured claim has the lowest priority for payment.
' 575 F.2d at 807.
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4. In Zarate v. Baldwin,36 a bankrupt doctor sought dis-
charge of an obligation incurred by reason of the settlement of a
suit based on his allegedly negligent medical treatment. The
judgment entered in the case, which incorporated the terms of the
settlement agreement, provided that the debt was not "provable
or dischargeable in bankruptcy."37 After making payment for sev-
eral years, the bankrupt filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy
and inter alia sought discharge of the debt.
In addressing the issue, the court first noted that liability for
negligent medical malpractice is a dischargeable debt. 8 However,
the court distinguished the case at bar by classifying the peti-
tioner's claim as a claim "for the property she forwent by entering
into the settlement agreement in reliance on Baldwin's [the
bankrupt's] false representation."' 39 Thus, the claim by peti-
tioner was sustained based on the fraudulent representations of
the bankrupt when he entered the settlement agreement.
5. In Belcher v. Turner,10 the bankrupts filed a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy in which they claimed a duplex as exempt
property." The duplex was occupied on one side by the bank-
rupts; the other side was leased and occupied by another family.
The bankrupts claimed exemption for the entire duplex. In
applying Kansas law,42 the court held that the intent of the bank-
rupts was always to use the leased portion for the production of
income and thus the property was non-exempt," and further, that
the purpose and intent of the Bankruptcy Act is to preserve and
protect only the residence of the debtor and such purpose would
be fulfilled by exempting only half of the duplex.
6. In Kansas State Bank v. Vickers," the bankrupt sought
discharge of approximately $249,000.00 in promissory notes pay-
able to Kansas State Bank and Trust Company. The bank ob-
jected on the grounds that the bankrupt had obtained the loans
31 578 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 294.
Id. at 295.
v Id.
- 579 F.2d 73 (10th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 74.
42 11 U.S.C. § 24. The Bankruptcy Act makes available to bankrupts those exemp-
tions prescribed by state law. Thus the court looked to the law of Kansas for guidance.
a 579 F.2d at 75.
" 577 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1978).
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based on fraud45 and that the bankrupt created the debts fraudu-
lently while acting in a fiduciary capacity with the bank.4 6
In the course of business affairs with the bank, the petitioner
filed periodic financial statements, including one on May 23,
1973, showing a net worth of $3,711,310.79 and on November 9,
1973, (approximately six months later) showing a net worth of
only $32,386.15. The bank contended that it was fraudulently
deceived in renewing the bankrupt's notes based on the inaccu-
rate financial statements submitted.
The court, in upholding the bankruptcy court's findings of
dischargeability stated that "[tlo be false or fraudulent within
the meaning of the statute [the Bankruptcy Act] the statement
[financial report] must be more than erroneous. It must have
been false and intended to deceive, and relied upon by the credi-
tor."47 This is in accordance with the opinions of the majority of
circuits addressing the issue." The court held further that the
bankrupt, while acting only as an outside director of the bank,
was not acting in a fiduciary capacity with the bank and the debt
was thus not nondischargeable.'5
Michael M. Page
" A debt incurred by fraud is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2)
(1976) (amended 1978).
" A debt created fraudulently while dcting in a fiduriary cape(itv is not discharge-
able in bankruptcy 11 U.S.C § 35(a)(4) (1976) (amended 1978)
" 577 F.2d at 687.
See, e.g.. In re Taylor, 514 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1975).





During the 1977-78 term, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
enjoyed its usual quiet time in the constitutional law area and
had a few occasions to consider new issues of major import. More
than half of the cases discussed in this overview are statute-
related, only five being purely constitutional in nature. The more
interesting cases involve employees' rights, the newsman's privi-
lege, and obscenity. This overview is not intended as a compre-
hensive review of every case considered by the Tenth Circuit
but is, instead, an attempt to isolate and condense the major
issues of the more significant cases.
I. DIRECT CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
A. Commerce Clause: Aldens, Inc. v. Ryan'
At issue was the constitutionality of provisions of the Okla-
homa Consumer Credit Code which imposed a maximum interest
rate on credit sales and prohibited state actions to collect bal-
ances on which the interest rate exceeded the statutory maxi-
mum.
2
Aldens, a nationwide mail-order business, sought a declara-
tory judgment that the code provisions, as they applied to the
plaintiff's business, violated the commerce clause and the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the trial court decision that the provisions were
constitutionally valid. In so doing, it joined the Seventh and
Third Circuits which had reached similar conclusions on the
same issue.'
In holding that the doctrines of place-of-contracting and per-
formance must give way to considerations of the degree of state
interest and the local consequences of contracts, the court cited
Travelers Health Association v. Virginia.' The court observed
that "the state's interest in the cost of credit . . . to its residents
571 F.2d 1159 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 180 (1978).
2 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 1-201(5)(a), 1-201A (West 1972 & Supp. 1978-79).
See, e.g., Aldens, Inc. v. Lafollette, 552 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977); Aldens, Inc. v.
Packel, 524 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1975).
1 339 U.S. 643 (1950). Travelers Health Ass'n involved a mail order insurance busi-
ness. See also Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943).
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is sufficient to overcome due process objections."5
The court applied the balancing test to the commerce clause
argument and stated that "states can. . . pass Acts which affect
commerce unless the burden so imposed greatly exceeds the ex-
tent of the local benefits."6 The appellate court agreed with the
lower court that the burden on the plaintiff was not excessive
when compared to the state interest in protecting state consum-
ers.7
B. First Amendment-Newsman's Privilege: Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp.5
The principal action was filed by the administrator of Karen
Silkwood's estate and involved claims which had accrued during
her life and which survived her death. The main allegations were
that the defendant Kerr-McGee had violated the decedent's con-
stitutional rights by 1) conspiring to prevent her from organizing
a labor union; 2) conspiring to prevent her from filing complaints
against the defendant; and 3) willfully and wantonly contaminat-
ing her with toxic plutonium radiation.'
Arthur Hirsch, the appellant, was a nonparty witness in the
principal action. As a free-lance reporter, he had conducted his
own investigation of the death of Karen Silkwood, in preparation
for a documentary film. During pretrial discovery, the defendant-
appellee Kerr-McGee sought to depose the appellant. Hirsch ap-
plied for an order which would protect the information gathered
during his investigation, but protective relief was denied. Hirsch
was ordered to produce the materials and answer questions which
probed his sources and this appeal followed.
The trial court stated as its primary ground for denial that
the motion was not timely filed, but went on to hold that, even
571 F.2d at 1161.
Id. at 1162 (emphasis added)(citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274 (1977); Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Head v.
New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963)).
The cost to the plaintiff Aldens, Inc. would total $160,000 per annum; the gross
credit sales to 13,800 Oklahoma consumers were approximately $1,800,000. In light of
these figures, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that "on balance, a conform-
ance with the Oklahoma cost of credit rules would not constitute an undue burden on
interstate commerce." 571 F.2d at 1162.




had the motion been timely, protective relief would have been
denied for lack of merit.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for
further proceedings. The court observed that due to the impor-
tance of the motion it should have been considered out of time.'0
As to the merits of the motion, the Tenth Circuit stated that the
trial court had erred in failing to give any consideration to the
existence of a qualified privilege for newsmen."
The appellate court engaged in a three-pronged inquiry: 1)
Whether a nonparty witness has a privilege which allows him to
resist pretrial discovery which probes his confidential sources; 2)
whether such a privilege applies to one in the position of the
appellant; and 3) how the trial court should proceed if the appel-
lant indeed has such a privilege."
The circuit court cited Branzburg v. Hayes3 as the "guiding
light" in determining the existence and scope of a newsman's
privilege. In a footnote," the court quoted a portion of the
Branzburg decision to support the existence of a qualified privi-
lege." The court inferred from this that "the present privilege is
no longer in doubt."'"
The court, having -found the privilege in Branz burg,'7 then
concluded that its scope and extent was unaffected by the fact
that appellant Hirsch was not a "regular" newsman."
In advising the trial court as to the proper procedure, the
I d. at 436.
Id. at 435.
" Id. at 435-36.
13 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
563 F.2d at 437 n.1.
" The relevant portions quoted are as follows:
Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment
protection . . . . But these cases involve . . . no express or implied com-
mand that the press publish what it prefers to withhold . . . . No attempt
is made to require the press to publish its sources of information or indiscri-
minately to disclose them on request.
Id. (quoting 408 U.S. at 681-82).
563 F.2d at 437.
" Lest this feat be underestimated, it should be pointed out that the main thrust of
Branzburg was the holding that a newsman has no privilege to resist a grand jury sub-
poena to appear and testify as to his sources. In fact, the Branzburg majority stressed the
administrative difficulties concomitant to a judicially-created privilege for newsmen. 408
U.S. at 703-04.
" 563 F.2d at 437 (citing Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1935)).
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Tenth Circuit cited several cases by which the trial court should
be guided on remand.19 The essential thrust of these cases is that
courts should engage in a weighing process and assure that any
infringement of first amendment rights be kept to an absolute
minimum.
The court found that the trial court record was inadequate
to enable it to conduct any meaningful weighing process and
remanded the case with instructions that additional evidence be
taken and considered in determining the extent of the appellant's
privilege."
C. First Amendment-Freedom of Religion: Tate v. Akers
21
Plaintiffs, "literature evangelists" of the Seventh Day Ad-
ventist Church, sought a declaratory judgment that a city ordi-
nancez barring door-to-door solicitation was inapplicable to them
" See, e.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding need for testimony
outweighed newsman's claim of privilege); Baker v. F&F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973) (holding that first amendment considerations
outweighed the need for information and stressing the significance of the type of civil
action); Cervantes v. Time, 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972) (denying disclosure where the
demand therefore was vague); Garland v. Tore, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 910 (1958) (compelling the disclosure because of the paramount public interest
therein).
The Tenth Circuit singled out Garland for the importance of the criteria set forth
therein:
The important thing about the Garland case is, however, that it laid down
criteria for solving a problem such as the present one:
1. Whether the party seeking information has independently at-
tempted to obtain the information elsewhere and has been unsuccessful.
2. Whether the information goes to the heart of the matter.
3. Whether the information is of certain relevance.
4. The type of controversy.
563 F.2d at 438.
Specifically, the court suggested that the appellee catalog the specific evidence it
was seeking and state the extent of its efforts to obtain the information elsewhere. Con-
versely, appellant-Hirsch was to provide a general description of the information and
witnesses sufficient for the trial court to weigh the competing interests. Id.
The Tenth Circuit, while recognizing a qualified privilege, has adopted a sliding scale
type of privilege, the strength of which will vary according to the facts of each case. Lower
courts may find it difficult to administer a privilege which is qualified but not
"quantified."
2! 565 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1977).
n Lum, Wyo., Crry CoDE § 28-3. The ordinance provides that "[t]he practice of
going in and upon private residences. . . by solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant mer-
chants, not having been requested or invited to do so . . . is hereby declared to be
unlawful and a nuisance. .. "
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and, if applicable, was unconstitutional under the First and four-
teenth amendments of the United States Constitution.
The Tenth Circuit sidestepped the constitutional question
by affirming the lower court holding that the ordinance was in-
applicable to the plaintiffs.? The majority opinion concluded, in
what might be considered dictum, that if the ordinance were
rewritten to include the plaintiffs and others similarly situated,




The logic of the dissent is compelling in its criticism of the
majority for employing the "good purpose doctrine" to exempt
the plaintiffs from the operation of a constitutionally valid ordi-
nance.2 5 The dissent cited Reynolds United States2 1 as evidence
of the historic distinction between protecting belief and protect-
ing activity.
The majority opinion blurs the separation of church and
state by condoning prohibited activity on the basis of its margin-
ally religious nature. The decision created the potential that all
who cloak themselves in religious fervor will be able to circum-
vent such ordinances and ignores the right to privacy which the
ordinance was designed to protect.
D. Due Process-College Athletics Colorado Seminary v.
NCAA2
In a justifiably brief opinion, the Tenth Circuit upheld the
lower court decision that the right to participate in college athlet-
ics is not a property interest entitled to constitutional protection.
In the action to enjoin the NCAA from imposing sanctions upon
" The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial court that "the dominant and primary
mission of the colporteur is to spread the gospel, and the sale of church literature is
incidental thereto and does not convert a minister into a peddler." 565 F.2d at 1170.
It is clear from similar statements throughout the opinion that the court focused on
the purpose rather than the nature of the activity. The court did not discuss the rights of
private landowners which have been given renewed protection by recent opinions of the
United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
"4 565 F.2d at 1170.
" The dissent cites several Supreme Court cases to refute the less persuasive author-
ity cited by the majority. See, e.g., Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 (1959).
" 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978).
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certain University of Denver athletic teams, the trial court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. In af-
firming, the appellate court observed that federal and state courts
have no jurisdiction over athletic association sanctions which af-
fect no legal rights.2"
The appellate court stated that the appeal was controlled by
Albach v. Odle' and Oklahoma High School Athletic Association
v. Bray,0 Tenth Circuit cases which had considered the same
issue in the high school setting. The court reiterated its holding
in Albach that Goss v. Lopez, 31 while protecting certain property
rights in education, had not established a property interest in
each separate component of the educational process.
3 2
E. Fourteenth Amendment-Employment: Martin v. Harrah
Independent School District3
In a somewhat convoluted opinion, the Tenth Circuit re-
versed the district court and held that the dismissal of a tenured
teacher violated due process and equal protection safeguards even
though procedural due process may have been observed .
3
Under Oklahoma law, the plaintiff's contract of employment
was automatically renewed unless she had been guilty of immo-
rality, willful neglect, cruelty, incompetency, teaching disloyalty
to the Constitution, or moral turpitude.35 The plaintiff's contract
incorporated by reference the rules and regulations of the defen-
dant school board. One such regulation required teachers to take
certain continuing education courses and allowed them three
years in which to complete the required courses. The only sanc-
tion for failure to complete the courses was that the teacher
would have to forego salary increases in the event of such failure.
Is Id. at 321-22. The court also found nonmeritorious a secondary argument that the
action of the defendant was a violation of equal protection, citing San Antonio Indepen-
dent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), as authority for its rejection of the
equal protection argument.
0 531 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1976).
321 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1963).
3, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
n 570 F.2d at 321.
579 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir. 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3227 (Sept. 15,
1978) (No. 78-443).
Id. at 1200.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 6-122 (West Supp. 1973) (repealed 1977).
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For three years, the plaintiff, among others, chose to give up the
increased pay rather than take the courses.
In 1973, the Oklahoma legislature provided for mandatory
salary increases, thereby nullifying the school board's sanction.
The board immediately adopted a new policy of discharge for
failure to comply with the continuing education regulation. In
September, 1973, the school board notified the plaintiff and three
other teachers that their contracts would not be renewed unless
they completed the required courses within seven months. Plain-
tiff, in January, 1974, appeared before the board to protest the
deadline and state that she would be unable to comply within the
allotted time. In April, 1974, the school board voted not to renew
the plaintiffs contract; the plaintiff then instituted an adminis-
trative appeal and an action in the state courts for injunctive
relief.36 After failing to obtain satisfaction from either of these
proceedings, the plaintiff filed suit in federal district court alleg-
ing a denial of equal protection and deprivation of property with-
out due process.
After finding that there was no impermissible classification
in the board's regulation and concluding that the board had satis-
fied the procedural due process requirements by complying with
the statutory requirements of notice and a hearing, the trial court
dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.
In reversing, the Tenth Circuit stated that the term "due
process of law" refers not only to procedural safeguards but "also
protects substantive aspects of [life, liberty, and property]
interest[s] against unconstitutional restrictions by the states."
3
Referring to the term "due process" as an "almost amorphous
phrase," the court observed that the equal protection clause was
a more specific safeguard which increased the protection of the
due process clause .3 After cataloging various theories of due pro-
Plaintiff lost at the first level of her administrative appeal and failed to pursue the
administrative action; the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the state trial court deci-
sion ordering plaintiff's reinstatement, holding that the state court was without jurisdic-
tion due to plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. See Martin v. Har-
rah Independent School Dist., 543 P.2d 1370 (Okla. 1975).
'7 579 F.2d at 1198.
Id. at 1196.
Id. at 1197. The court did not enunciate the factors which render the phrase "equal
protection" any less amorphous than the term "due process."
1979
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cess and equal protection, ' 4 the court settled on the "sliding
scale" approach."
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the
plaintiff's right to continued employment was a property right
under Oklahoma law and, therefore, was entitled to constitu-
tional protection. 2 The Tenth Circuit found that the board's im-
position of unequal time limitations within which teachers could
avoid the penalty, followed by the decision not to renew the plain-
tiff's contract, was a violation of the fourteenth amendment.' 3
The court stated that there was no rational basis for the board's
action, whether viewed as an unreasonable classification or as
arbitrary and capricious conduct."
It is unclear exactly which portion of the fourteenth amend-
ment is the real basis for the reversal. The court's commitment
to the sliding scale theory is blurred in its extensive discussion of
equal protection. That the court itself is aware of the confusion
is exemplified by its statement that "[iut is . . . not surprising
that in the same case some justices have employed an equal pro-
tection analysis while other justices have used a due process ana-
lysis to reach the same result ... ,
I. STATUTORY CLIMS
A. State Action and 42 US.C. § 198346
1. Employment: McGhee v. Draper47
Plaintiff was a nontenured teacher who had been employed
I d. at 1197-98.
I d. at 1198. The court stated as follows:
In each case the reviewing court must consider the constitutional importance
of the affected individual interests, the character of the state action or classi-
fication in question and the state's asserted interests in support of its action
or classification. As these factors vary from case to case . . . courts must
. . . apply a "spectrum of standards"....
Id. The court prefaced this finding by the rather mysterious statement that "not
all property interests are protected by the Constitution," but did not give any examples
of those property interests which do not have "constitutional dimensions." Id.
1 "The gravaman of the board's action was . . . the imposition of unequal time
limitations . Id. at 1199.
"Id.
Id. at 1197.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute. . . subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured. . . [in a] proper
proceeding for redress.
'7 564 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1977).
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for two years when the school board voted not to renew her con-
tract. She brought this 1983 action for an injunctive order for
reinstatement, for damages, and for attorneys' fees, alleging vio-
lations of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Before trial, the lower court dismissed as to the defendant school
district on the basis of the eleventh amendment and that dis-
missal was not appealed. At trial, the trial court sustained a
motion tor a directed verdict in favor of the individual defen-
dants, members of the school board and the superintendent of
schools. The court based its decision on the grounds that 1) no
property interest was involved; 2) no liberty interest had been
infringed; 3) no denial of constitutional rights was shown; and 4)
the unrefuted evidence of the defendants' good faith rendered
them immune from damages.'9 On review, the appellate court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. It agreed with the trial
court holding as to the property interest and damage claims, but
held that the liberty interest claim should have been submitted
to a jury.
a. The property interest claim
In March, 1974, the school board voted to renew the plain-
tiffs teaching contract for the 1974-75 year. However, following
a later meeting at which numerous persons appeared to protest
the renewal, the board unanimously resolved not to renew the
contact and so informed the plaintiff by a letter which stated no
reasons for the change of mind. The plaintiff argued that the
initial vote to renew her contract created a legitimate claim of
entitlement which could not be abridged without due process.'9
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial court that the decision
to renew the contract had created no property interest under
Oklahoma law.
b. The liberty interest claim
Plaintiff alleged that she was the innocent victim of com-
munity gossip, that she was denied the opportunity to clear her
Id at. 904-05.
" Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, 27-28, 564 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1977).
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name at a hearing, and that, as a direct consequence of the de-
nial, she had been unable to secure another teaching job.5 The
trial court noted the holding of Board of Regents v. Roth5' that
notice and a hearing are essential when a person's reputation is
at stake because of what the government is doing to him,52 but
held that the board itself had taken no action which required it
to provide the plaintiff with a hearing."
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that, even though the board
had made no charges, it had adopted the public charges of immo-
rality. She argued further that the rescission of her renewal, fol-
lowing such charges, imposed a stigma upon her. The appellate
court noted that the board minutes focused on allegedly porno-
graphic material and allegations of misconduct by the plaintiff
and held that discharge against this background raised a substan-
tial question as to whether the board had imposed a stigma which
limited the plaintiff's freedom to obtain future employment. The
court attached great importance to evidence submitted by the
plaintiff as to her inability to obtain another teaching job.5 The
court held that the trial court had erred in directing a verdict on
the liberty issue and remanded the case for further proceedings.
c. The procedural due process claim
The holding on appeal was that, if a liberty interest had in
fact been affected, the plaintiff should have been provided with
notice of the reasons for her discharge and a hearing thereon. The
trial court was instructed to provide a remedy for the denial of
due process if, on remand, it found that a liberty interest ex-
isted."
" 564 F.2d at 906. Evidence that the plaintiff was unable to obtain other employ-
ment, id. at 908, was vital to the success of her action. The Tenth Circuit has adopted
the view that there is no infringement of the liberty interest without actual foreclosure of
future employment. See, e.g. Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist. R-J-1, 530 F.2d
1335 (10th Cir. 1976).
,408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Record, vol. 3, at 424-26.
"Id.
See note 50 supra.
" Since the appellate court agreed that the school board members were entitled to a
qualified immunity, 564 F.2d at 914, it is not clear what remedy would be provided for
the denial of procedural due process. Reinstatement is not the appropriate remedy when
a teacher's contract is terminated for cause. See Unified School Dist. No. 480 v. Epperson,
551 F.2d 254 (10th Cir. 1977) which held that denial of procedural due process is not
enough in itself to justify reinstatement; see also Hostrop v. Board of Jr. College Dist. No.
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d. The substantive due process claim
The appellate court ruled that it was not error to refuse to
submit the substantive due process claim to a jury since there is
no basis fo such a claim independent of a liberty or property
interest. However, the court did assert that the allegations of
arbitrary and capricious action could be considered on remand in
determining whether or not a liberty interest was implicated.
e. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit offers no firm guidelines for determining
those instances in which procedural due process must be afforded
in order to protect the liberty interest. The United States Su-
preme Court has stated that termination by itself does not affect
the liberty interest when no stigma attaches that substantially
forecloses future employment." The Tenth Circuit has held that
injury to reputation is not a sufficient deprivation of a protected
liberty interest so as to invoke due process protection. 7 The opin-
ion does little to clarify the extent of job foreclosure necessary
before due process is required, although the court has stated in
prior opinions that the foreclosure must be more than a
"disadvantage in obtaining other employment."-" Until the mat-
ter is further clarified, employers who discharge employees with-
out procedural due process run the risk of being charged with the
responsibility for a stigma imposed by others.
2. Integration: Fitzpatrick v. Board of Education5
On this appeal by black elementary school students, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court decision that the Enid,
Oklahoma, Board of Education had not violated the Civil Rights
Acts of 1866 and 1871."
The action arose over the closing of an elementary school in
a predominantly black neighborhood.6 ' The specific issues in dis-
515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975).
' 408 U.S. at 573.
" Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1976).
530 F.2d at 1339. For a general discussion of prior cases involving the rights of
teachers' rights upon terminiation, see Rights of Governnment Employees on Termina-
tion: Recent Tenth Circuit Cases, 54 DaN. L.J. 128 (1977).
578 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1978).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1976).
" The closure of Roosevelt Elementary School was in response to a notice received
from HEW that the decision in Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 269 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
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pute were 1) the board's failure to keep open any schools in the
predominantly black neighborhood of Southern Heights; 2) the
bussing of a higher ratio of black students than white; and 3) the
board's failure to employ more black faculty and staff. 2
The court cited six factors to be considered in determining
whether an integration plan passes constitutional muster, but
noted that no one factor was determinative in itself." Citing Brice
v. Landis" in support, the Tenth Circuit framed the issue as
follows: "[Tihe key question . . . [is] whether the school dis-
trict's plan is a good faith, reasonably adequate plan . . . and
whether the district considered available alternative options and
courses of action."" Noting that the initial burden of proving
discrimination falls on the plaintiffs, the court held that the
plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the defendants had abused
their discretion in closing the schools." Having found that the
board had ample nonracial justification for the school closings,67
the court reiterated the Brice holding that "the bussing of negro
children to achieve integration . . . is not in itself discrimina-
tion."6 8 Finally, the court found that there was overwhelming
evidence of the board's good faith efforts to attract minority
teachers and staff and that their lack of success was attributable
to outside factors over which the board had no control .
6
prohibited a 20% disproportion in any school. 578 F.2d at 859. Since only 6% of the district
students were black, Roosevelt school, with 45.5% black students, was in violation of the
stated guideline. The appellants argued that the school board should have bussed in a
sufficient number of white students to bring the school into comformity with the guideline.
This alternative would have necessitated the acquisition of 3 portable classrooms and 2
busses to transport 102 white students. The closure of the school required the bussing of
only 25 students, 13 white and 12 black. 578 F.2d at 860.
I Id. at 861.
Id. at 861-62. The factors cited were as follows: 1) The existence of valid nonracial
factors mandating closure; 2) the condition and adequacy of the school being closed; 3)
the adequacy of the school to which transfer is made; 4) whether the primary or sole reason
for the closure is the fear of "white flight"; 5) whether the entire or primary burden of
integration is placed on the minority; and 6) whether the school board considered the
alternatives prior to closing the subject school.
" 314 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
0 578 F.2d at 862.
" Id.
SId.
Id. (quoting Brice, 314 F. Supp. at 977-78).
n The factors noted were "the generally lower wages available in Oklahoma and the




3. Color of Law. Ve-ri-tas, Inc. v. Advertising Review Coun-
cil of Metropolitan Denver, Inc. 0
The plaintiffs brought suit against the Better Business Bu-
reau (BBB) and various merchants alleging that the defendants
had acted under color of law to violate rights of the plaintiffs
protected by the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution. On
the record, it is clear that the defendants were exchanging infor-
mation with official agencies of the state on a regular basis.7' The
plaintiffs argued that complaints filed by the agencies were the
direct result of this symbiotic relationship, rather than the result
of the independent judgment of the agencies." Although noting
that the relationship closely approached the public function
line,73 the appellate court affirmed the lower court decision that
the defendants were not an "arm of official enforcement" and
were not acting under the color of law.7'
B. Employment Discrimination and Title VIP
1. Race: Higgins v. Gates Rubber Co.7
The action was brought under a provision of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act which makes it unlawful to discharge an employee on
account of race." In a brief opinion, the appellate court affirmed
the lower court decision that plaintiff's discharge had not violated
the Act.
Employed by Gates in 1949, the plaintiff in 1962 was trans-
ferred to a predominantly white department. From that time
7- 567 F.2d 963 (10th Cir. 1977).
11 Id. at 964.
72 Id.
" The appellate court found it significant that the BBB reported to the official agen-
ies ,nly those nonmembers who on request refused to comply with BBB standards. The
misdeeds of a nonmember who responded to the threats of the BBB were not reported.
The court stated that "[tihis reporting or non-reporting takes much of the luster from
the image of a 'good citizen' reporting a transgression." 567 F.2d at 965.
11 Id. The court noted that the official agencies did not use the BBB as an intergral
part of their official functions, but rather initiated their own investigations and filed
complaints only on the basis of these investigations.
SCivil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). Title VII was drafted specifically
to provide a remedy for employment discrimination.
578 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1978).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual . . . because
of such individual's race .... "
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until the 1971 incident which caused his dismissal, plaintiff was
"occasionally teased, ridiculed, and harrassed" by white cowork-
ers."5 However, the appellate court approved the trial court hold-
ing that there was no evidence that Gates itself was aware of or
condoned such conduct.7' On May 6, 1971, plaintiff wore a new
cap to work; two white coworkers ridiculed him and tried to knock
the cap off his head. When they persisted after plaintiff Higgins
warned them to stop, Higgins picked up a metal bar and struck
one of them over the head.ss As the result of the incident, plaintiff
was discharged and the assaulted white worker was suspended for
two weeks. The sole issue of the action was whether this disparity
in penalties was the result of racial discrimination. '
In affirming the trial court, the Tenth Circuit stated that
they were "not prepared to accept plaintiffs argument that an
employer must mete out a sanction for emotional . . .harass-
ment that is equal to its sanction for the infliction of serious
bodily injury."' The court found that the variance in sanctions
was attributable to the difference in conduct rather than to any
radical factor" and that the reasons given for firing the plaintiff
were not mere pretexts.8
" 578 F.2d at 282.
" Id. at 282, 283. There was evidence that the plaintiff had complained of his work
environment to his foreman and that another foreman had been reprimanded for telling
a racial joke in the plaintiff's presence. However, neither the trial court nor the appellate
court felt that this knowledge should be imputed to the defendant employer. The Tenth
Circuit implicitly approved the lower court conclusion that an employer "cannot be an
insurer against all racial insults and racial incidents" and cannot be expected to provide
a workplace free of racial prejudice. Id. at 283 (citing the Record, vol. 5, at 8-9).
" Employees witnessing the attack restrained the plaintiff to prevent his continued
assault. 578 F.2d at 282.
,I Id. at 283. Although the appellate court ruled that the issue of a discriminatory
workplace need not be considered on appeal because the issue was not set forth in the
pretrial order, it is clear that the court was "aware" of the issue: "Absent a finding that
Gates was or should have been aware of this unfavorable atmosphere, we cannot hold that
the trial court erred. . . ." Id.; see also note 79 supra.
0 578 F.2d at 284.
" Id. The court distinguished McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U. S. 273
(1976). The court observed that in McDonald employees engages in the same conduct had
been sanctioned solely on the basis of race.
U 578 F.2d at 284. The court noted that the plaintiff had submitted statistical evi-
dence of discrimination and stated that such evidence is not conclusive on the issue of
discrimination. The defendant had also submitted a statistical compilation to refute the
statistics provided by the plaintiff and the appellate court ruled that it was the province
of the trial court to weigh such conflicting evidence. Id. at 284-85.
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2. National Origin: Subia v. Colorado & Southern
Railway5
Plaintiff, a former employee of the defendant, brought suit
alleging that the company had discriminated against her in refus-
ing her request for a leave of absence and in refusing to rehire her.
The trial court held that the "plain facts" of the case were that
the plaintiff had failed to comply with a long established leave
policy of the company and that the defendant's refusal to rehire
the plaintiff was justified by legitimate business reasons. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed.
The appellate court noted the lower court's recognition that
the plaintiff had established a primi facie case of discrimination
as defined by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 81 but sustained
the finding that the defendant had effectively rebutted the plain-
tiff's case. 7 Observing that the strict leave policy had been justi-
fied and that it had not been implemented discriminatorily," the
court found that the evidence showed that the plaintiff was not
rehired "because of the manner in which she personally termi-
nated her employment. . .. "u The court stated further that it
was not the intent of either Title VII or of the decisions construing
it to force an employer to rehire an employee solely because of the
employee's national origin."
3. Former Employees: Rutherford v. American Bank of
Commerce"
The most interesting of the Title VII cases involved the issue
of whether the statute gives any protection to former employees
" 565 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1977).
" 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Subia met the McDonnell Douglas standard by showing that
1) she applied for and was qualified for an available job; 2) she was a member of a racial
minority; 3) her application was rejected; and 4) the job applied for remained available.
565 F.2d at 661.
" 565 F.2d at 663. The court also stated that the plaintiff had failed to prove either
discriminatory intent or impact.
There was testimony by Subia's former supervisor that no exceptions had been
made to the leave-of-absence rules during the past 30 years. The court also noted that "all
leaves of absence, including Subia's, have been consistently controlled by . . . the bar-
gaining agreement since its adoption on July 1, 1954." 565 F.2d at 661.
Id. at 662.
"Id. at 663. The court stated that the primary purpose of Title VII was to assure
employment equality by eliminating discriminatory practices. Id. at 662 (quoting Teams-
ter v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 (1977)).
" 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977).
1979
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
or whether only present employees are protected. The Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed the lower court decision that protection under sec-
tion 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 extends to former
employees even though the statute does not expressly grant such
protection.'
Plaintiff Rutherford was a female loan-officer trainee of the
defendant American Bank (American) who resigned her employ-
ment rather than accept certain clerical duties, the assignment
of which she considered to be a demotion. Following her resigna-
tion, the plaintiff filed an unsuccessful sex discrimination suit
against American." Before she filed that suit, Phil White, a vice
president of American, gave the plaintiff a glowing letter of rec-
ommendation.
In the course of seeking other employment, Rutherford ap-
plied for a position with the Citizens Bank. When contacted by
Citizens Bank, White, having learned of the sex descrimination
suit, volunteered information thereof to Citizens Bank which sub-
sequently denied employment to the plaintiff. 5 In later applying
for a job with Frontier Air Lines, Rutherford requested from
American an updated letter of recommendation, at which time
White informed her that any new letter would carry information
as to her prior suit. Rutherford then brought the instant suit
alleging that American's retaliatory actions violated 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a).
The main issue on appeal was whether, even assuming retal-
iatory action, there was any violation of the statute which
expressly protected only present employees. The Tenth Circuit
approved the trial court's rejection of American's contention that
former employees were entitled to no statutory protection, stating
that "[a] statutue which is remedial in nature should be liber-
ally construed."" In support of its conclusion, the appellate court
0 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976).
0 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) provides that "[it shall be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has
made a charge. . . under this subchapter."
" Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, No. 74-1313 (10th Cir. Jan. 27, 1975)
(Not for Routine Publication).
" The question arises as to whether the conveyance of such information on the
request of the prospective employer would constitute an unlawful practice under the
statute.
" 565 F.2d at 1165.
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cited Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Shop" and Hodgson v. Charles
Martin," cases which "liberally construed" the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act" in a similar manner. By its decision, the Tenth Circuit
extended Section 2000e-3(a) to protect former employees from
retaliation by employers resentful of the fact that a suit has been
filed against them.' ®
III. STATUTORY CHALLENGES
A. 18 U.S.C. § 1696:"'1 United States v. Black"1
2
Defendants were charged with knowingly and unlawfully es-
tablishing a private postal express for the conveyance of letters.
They admitted by stipulation that they were in violation of the
statute0 3 but challenged its constitutionality. The trial court
found that the statute was constitutionality valid and convicted
the defendants; the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
The defendants contended that the private express statute
was beyond the power granted Congress by the Constitution. The
appellate court answered this argument by stating that "the
proposition . . . is at odds with judicial precedent."''0 Citing two
ancient cases,' 05 the Tenth Circuit held the statute constitutional
and stated that the plain intent of the statute was to grant the
federal government a monopoly in the delivery of letters.' The
court took the position that the statute implemented the consti-
tutional mandate that Congress establish and maintain post off-
ices and post roads.'0 7
" 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977).
459 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1972).
" 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1976).
"* The court reiterated the holdings of Dunlop and Charles Martin in support of its
conclusion that the possibility of such retaliation is very real unless former employees are
given such protection. 565 F.2d at 1166.
"' 18 U.S.C. § 1696 (1976).
569 F 2d 1111 (10th Cir.), cert. denied. 435 U.S. 944 (1978).
'1 18 U.S C. § 1696 (1976).
569 F.2d at 1112.
' Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877); Blackham v. Gresham, 16 F. 609
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883).
" 569 F.2d at 1112. The court observed further that "[i]f private agencies can be
established, the income of the government might be so reduced that economy might
demand a discontinuance of the [federal] system .... " In the court's view, this discon-
tinuance would be undesirable because a private system might exclude from service those
localities which were unprofitable. Id. at 1112-13.
'C' U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 7.
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B. Federal Obscenity Statutes: United States v. Blucher 05
Quoting at length Justice Brennan's dissent in Hamling v.
United States,'" the Tenth Circuit reluctantly"* upheld the con-
stitutionality of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1461"' and 18
U.S.C. § 3237.'
Defendant Blucher, the distributor of certain questionable
materials, resided in Oregon, a state under whose "community
standards" the materials would not be adjudged obscene." 3 Per-
haps frustrated by his inability to stem the tide of the defendant's
publications and motivated by a desire to obtain a venue with a
more restrictive community standard, an Oregon postmaster
asked a Wyoming postmaster to solicit materials from the defen-
dant. Over a three-year period, the Wyoming postmaster solicited
the materials under a false name. On three occasions, the defen-
dant mailed allegedly obscene materials to Wyoming and sent
advertisements for similar materials seventeen times. Based on
these contacts, initiated solely by federal postal authorities, de-
fendant was indicted on twenty counts of violating 18 U.S.C. §
' 581 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1978).
' 418 U.S. 87 (1974). For a discussion of the holding, see note 111 infra.
" This reluctance is obvious from the tone of the entire opinion; e.g., the court
statement that "so long as Ham ling is the law, publishers and distributors everywhere who
are willing to fill subscriptions are subject to the creative zeal of federal enforcement
officers who are .. .free to shop for ...venue . ..with the most restrictive views
..... " 581 F.2d at 245-46 (citations omitted). This writer shares the court's distaste for
this decision, even though it is amply supported by legal authority.
" 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976) prohibits the mailing of obscene materials. In Smith v.
United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977), the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of section 1461 against an allegation that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague, stating as follows:
Our construction of the statute flows directly from the decisions in Hamling,
Miller, Reidel, and Roth. The possibility that different juries might reach
different conclusions as to the same material does not render the statute
unconstitutional (citations omitted). We find no vagueness defect. . . at-
tributable to the fact that federal policy with regard to distribution of ob-
scene material through the mail was different from Iowa policy ....
431 U.S. at 308-09.
i2 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (1976).
113 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), held that there was no uniform national
standaid for determining whether or not materials were obscene; obscenity was to be
determined by local community standards. Hamling held that the Miller "local com-
munity standard" was to be applied in federal prosecutions and that "the fact that
distributors. . . may be subjected to varying community standards in. . .various federal
judicial districts .. .does not render a federal statute unconstitutional because of the
failure of application of uniform national standards of obscenity." 418 U.S. at 106.
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1461. The defendant pled guilty to one count and reserved an
appeal on the constitutionality of the statute; the Government
dismissed the remaining counts. The action was brought in Wyo-
ming under 18 U.S.C. § 3237 which allows prosecution in the
federal district from which obscene materials are mailed, the dis-
tricts through which the materials pass while enroute through the
mails, and the district in which the materials are received.
On appeal, the defendant alleged that the liberal venue pro-
visions of section 3237, in combination with the Hamling rule that
local community standards should be applied to determine
whether materials are obscene, violated his right to due process.
Although noting that the validity of section 3237 was not an issue
in Hamling,"4 the Tenth Circuit took the view that the majority
opinion in Hamling mandated their affirmance of the defendant's
conviction." 5 In support of its decision, the court also observed
that "lower federal courts . . have unaimously concluded that
it is both permissible and logical to try a defendant in the district
to which he . . .mailed obscene materials."'
Frances P. Crosby
581 F.2d at 245 n.4.
"' See note 111 supra.




I. FOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Use of Electronic Tracking Device.
In United States v Clayborne,' the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered whether evidence found during a warrant search of a clan-
destine amphetamine laboratory was tainted by the warrantless
use of an electronic tracking device or "beeper" ' attached by
Federal Drug Enforcement Administration agents to a drum of
chemicals purchased by one of the defendants.
With permission of the vendor, DEA agents attached the
beeper to a drum of ether ordered by one of the defendants from
a chemical supply house. Thereafter, they observed the defen-
dant's purchase of the chemicals and followed him to his home
where they saw him unload the drum and take it into the house.
Periodically, they monitored the beeper's presence to ensure that
the drum was not moved. Contact with the beeper was lost and
eventually reestablished when its signal was located at a commer-
cial premises where DEA agents noted covered windows and de-
tected the smell of ether. A search warrant was obtained and
executed, and the search produced methamphetamines together
with materials and paraphernalia for their manufacture. The de-
fendants sought to suppress this evidence on the ground that their
fourth amendment rights were violated by the DEA's initial fail-
ure to obtain a warrant for use of the beeper.'
The court commenced its analysis of the question by refer-
ence to the justifiable or reasonable expectation of privacy stan-
dard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States.'
In Katz, F.B.I. agents, acting without a warrant, attached a lis-
584 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1978).
2 "The electronic beeper sends out periodic radio signals which allow its location to
be established and monitored." Id. at 348. The operational aspects of such beepers are
briefly described in United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en
banc by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976). See also, 29 VAND. L. Rv.
514, 514 n.5 (1976).
584 F.2d at 348.
389 U.S. 347 (1967). The "reasonable expection of privacy" standard was proposed
by Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Katz. Many lower courts have adopted
Justice Harlan's approach and the Supreme Court itself has appeared to endorse it. See,
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) and Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364,
368 (1968). A listing of lower federal court decisions adopting this view is found in Peebles,
The Uninvited Canine Nose and the Right to Privacy: Some Thoughts on Katz and
Dogs, 11 GA. L. Rav. 75, 80 n.19 (1976).
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tening device to the outside of a public telephone booth in order
to monitor the suspect's conversations. 5 The Supreme Court held
that such nontrespassory eavesdropping constituted a search and
seizure under the fourth amendment because it "violated the
privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth . ". .. In rejecting the notion of
"constitutionally protected areas,"7 the Court stressed that the
fourth amendment protects people, not places, and that that
which a person exposes to the public may be the subject of fourth
amendment protection, whereas that which he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may enjoy
constitutional protection.'
Many courts have considered the beeper question under
varying fact circumstances, primarily relating to drug investiga-
tions.9 One of the cases cited by the Tenth Circuit was United
States v. Hufford,10 which focused upon the circumstances sur-
rounding the attachment of the device. In Hufford,11 the Ninth
Circuit found that if the installation of the beeper is legal, as
where the beeper is legally placed on the property before it comes
into the suspect's possession, its continuing presence on the prop-
erty does not violate the fourth amendment, even though attach-
ment subsequent to acquisition might have been an unreasonable
search. 2 In a dictum, the Clayborne court rejected this approach,
adopting instead the First Circuit's treatment of the issue in
United States v. Moore." The Tenth Circuit indicated that were
'389 U.S. at 348.
'Id. at 353. The Supreme Court had heretofore limited fourth amendment protection
to those searches which involved an actual trespass and to those seizures which comprised
the taking of material objects. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). This
"trespass doctrine" required the physical intrusion to be in a "constitutionally protected
area," as in a house or office. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1960).
389 U.S. at 351.
Id. at 351-52.
For an exhaustive listing of the beeper cases, see Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy,
and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALu L.J. 1461, 1462 n.5 and 1463-69 [hereinafter cited
as Tracking Katz).
"539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976).
With consent of a chemical manufacturer, a beeper was installed in a drum of
caffeine prior to its delivery to the defendants. The Ninth Circuit held that the defen-
dant's reasonable expectation of privacy had not been invaded, notwithstanding that the
beeper was employed in a "probing, exploratory quest for evidence." 539 F.2d at 33. See
also, United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 863 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976).
"1 Tracking Katz, 86 YAaw L. J. at 1465-66.
"3 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978). In Moore, federal
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the point seriously argued, it would hold, as did the First Circuit
in Moore, that the fact that the defendants initially had no rights
in the chemicals was not of significance because they later ob-
tained lawful possession, after which the agents sought to use the
electronic device already in place."
Another line of beeper cases measures the intrusiveness of
the attachment according to the nature of the item to which the
beeper is attached. 5 This mode of analysis was used by the Tenth
Circuit in United States v. Shovea,6 a case where a beeper was
used for purposes of tracking a car to a clandestine drug labora-
tory. The theory of Shovea was that there is a minimal expecta-
tion of privacy in an automobile along a public road. 7 This analy-
sis has also been applied with respect to contraband, where courts
have found that the illegality of possession eliminates any reason-
able expectation of privacy.' 8
The Tenth Circuit in Clayborne focused its inquiry on the
nature of the places where the drum containing the beeper was
stored. Citing its Shovea decision and the First Circuit's decision
in Moore, the court approved the warrantless use of the beeper
for monitoring the drum of chemicals while they were being trans-
ported via automobile from the vendor's premises to the defen-
dant's home. 9 However, the court was careful to point to the First
Circuit's holding in Moore that although electronic surveillance
of an automobile may be conducted without a warrant, the same
is not true of a home." The court saw the crucial fact of the
agents installed a beeper in a container of chemicals which had been ordered by the
defendants. When delivery was taken, a second beeper was attached to their van and the
agents followed them, partially by means of the beeper, to a house. The beeper in the
container was subsequently used to monitor the presence of the chemicals in the house
and a search warrant was later obtained. The court held that the evidence derived from
the use of the beeper while the container was in the house had to be suppressed.
"584 F.2d at 349.
Tracking Katz, 86 YAL L. J. at 1466.
, 580 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1978).
" The court cited United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1046 (1977) where use of a beeper on a car was approved in connection with an
ongoing kidnap plot.
" United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 888 (1st Cir. 1976) (cocaine).
' 584 F.2d at 350. For the view that the warrantless installation of a tracking device
on a motor vehicle to trace its movement constitutes a search in violation of the fourth
amendment, see United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en banc by
an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976).
584 F.2d at 350.
1979
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present case to be that the beeper surveillance evidence within
the home and that within thb laboratory did not come together
as a single connected transaction, inasmuch as the agents lost
contact with the device following its movement from the house,
and contact was reestablished only after an independent search
by airplane picked up the beeper signal at the laboratory.2' Seem-
ingly, then, if the movement of the drum of ether had been traced
directly from the house to the laboratory, the Tenth Circuit would
have suppressed the evidence on the basis that the warrantless
presence of the beeper within the defendant's home violated his
reasonable expectation of privacy pursuant to Katz.
The court had to resolve one final issue before deciding that
under the circumstances presented, the evidence in the labora-
tory had not been obtained by means of an illegal search. It
phrased that issue as follows: "Given the proposition that the
home cannot be invaded without a warrant, does it follow that a
clandestine laboratory in which amphetamines are likely to be
manufactured enjoys the same protection?"22 The court resolved
this issue by examining the defendant's expectation of privacy
with respect to a commercial building such as the building where
the laboratory was located. It found that strict privacy as in a
home was not to be properly expected in this type of setting,
differentiating the case from Katz on the basis of a comparison
of the size and extent of the intrusion. It concluded:
We consider the electronic beeper as a substitute for persistent ex-
tensive visual effort. We do not say that the laboratory stands on the
identical footing as the automobile, and clearly it is not the same
as (defendant's] home, which the Fourth Amendment protects
from invasion. We are persuaded by the fact that the intrusion of
the clandestine laboratory was slight. Also, it is not to be argued
that defendant-appellant had a justifiable or reasonable expectation
that there would not be any disturbance of privacy. Also, the use of
the beeper within the laboratory was vastly different from the use
of the recording device in the telephone booth in Katz. The invasion
in Katz was of great magnitude in comparison with the intrusion
here. =
Accordingly, the court held that the warrantless use of the beeper
was not invalid under the fourth amendment."
11 Id. at 349-50.
n Id. at 350.
2 Id. at 351.
2Id.
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B. Use of Canine to Detect Illegal Drugs.
Another case in which the Tenth Circuit applied the princi-
ples of Katz" was United States v. Venema,2 where the court
held that the warrantless use by the police of a cannabis sniffing
canine did not violate the defendant's fourth amendment rights.,,
Venema was under surveillance by local New Mexico drug
agents because of his association with a person previously con-
victed of possession of marijuana. Venema was observed entering
a locker at a storage company and returning with a box which
appeared to be much heavier than when he had carried it into the
locker. The following day, the agents returned to the storage com-
pany with Chane, a dog trained and certified to detect the pres-
ence of either marijuana or heroin, and, with permission of the
owner of the storage company, Chane "worked" the side of the
building where Venema's locker was located. On three occasions
Chane "alerted" in front of Venema's locker,8 indicating to the
dog's handler that the locker contained either marijuana or her-
oin, or that such substances had very recently been in the locker.,
On the basis of Chane's reaction, a state district court judge
issued warrants authorizing search of the defendant's locker,
truck, and residence, where quantities of marijuana, hashish, and
LSD were found. The defendant was convicted on charges relat-
ing to possession of the drugs with intent to distribute. On appeal,
he contended that use of Chane to "sniff out" his locker consti-
tuted a search and was not based on probable cause. He argued
that inasmuch as the ensuing searches of his locker, truck, and
home were fruits of the poisonous tree, they should have been
suppressed at his trial.3
The Tenth Circuit rejected these arguments, finding that the
defendant had no justifiable expectation of privacy in the area-
way in front of his locker which was semi-public in nature.3' This
finding was buttressed by testimony that when the defendant
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
563 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1004.
The dog's handler testified that the dog "alerts" by changing direction and pawing
whenever he smells either marijuana or heroin. Id. at 1004-05.
11 Id. at 1005.
30 Id.
11 Id. at 1005-06.
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initally rented the locker he was warned by the manager of the
storage company that from time to time she permitted the police
on the premises for purposes of using dogs to sniff out marijuana
and that should he store marijuana in his locker, he did so at his
own risk.32
Even absent these special circumstances, it is likely the court
would have reached the same conclusion, for it went on to note
several cases in which other circuits and an Arizona state court
have held that the use of marijuana-sniffing dogs was not an
unreasonable search violative of the fourth amendment.3 How-
ever, with exception of the Quatsling state court case, the Tenth
Circuit failed to analyze the underlying rationale of these cases,
thus refusing to grapple with some of the difficult issues pre-
sented by the use of canines to detect the presence of illegal
drugs.3 In addition, the precedential value of United States v.
Fulero,35 one of the cases relied upon by the court, is limited
because the District of Columbia Circuit provided no discussion
I d. at 1006.
3 United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976) (use of dogs to sniff air outside
a semi-trailer parked at the rear of a filling station was not an "unreasonable" search);
United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976)
(sniffing, nipping and biting by a "canine cannabis connoisseur" at a suitcase in the
baggage area of an airport terminal did not constitute a search or seizure); United States
v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (canine allowed to sniff the air around a footlocker
in a bus depot); and State v. Quataling, 24 Ariz. App. 105, 536 P.2d 226 (1975) (dog trained
to detect explosives "reacted" in front of defendant's storage locker; subsequent search of
the locker was not violative of the locker renter's constitutional rights).
31 As an example, the court cited without discussion United States v. Bronstein, 521
F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), as authority for the proposition that use of a marijuanasniffing
dog does not constitute a search. An analysis of Bronstein reveals that the Second Circuit
there relied upon the "plain smell" doctrine, which is an extension of the "plain view"
doctrine. The central concept of that doctrine is that if an officer sees evidence or contra-
band while in a place where he has a right to be, he has not conducted a search within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
The Bronstein court reasoned that because the marijuana was within the dog's "plain
smell," the defendant's fourth amendment rights were not violated. 521 F.2d at 461.
However, as pointed out by one commentator, the Second Circuit cited no case law to
support this view. The commentator further notes that "the major conceptual problem
with this conclusion is that the officers themselves could not have detected the odor of
the marijuana," and that when analagous detection aids, such as magnometers and x-ray
machines, are used by police officers, they are held to be a search and must therefore be
reasonable in order to satisfy the fourth amendment. Search and Seizure-Marijuana
Sniffing Dogs, 42 Mo. L. Rzv. 331, 332 (1977) (citing United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d
942, 946 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972);
United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972)).
" 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See note 33 supra.
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or citation of authority for its flat rejection of the defendant's
contention that the use of a marijuana-sniffing dog was a search
in violation of the fourth amendment.
One commentator has cautioned that if the use of a
marijuana-sniffing canine is not a search within the fourth
amendment, then under the "plain smell" doctrine" law enforce-
ment agencies may use the dog's sense of smell indiscriminately
without any fourth amendment limitations as to reasonableness,
so long as the officer is in a place where he has a right to be.37
Another commentator, recognizing the danger in placing the un-
invited canine nose outside the protection of the fourth amend-
ment, has suggested that the courts have adopted a methodology
similar to that enunciated by the Supreme Court in Terry v.
Ohio,3' which would recognize that the government engages in
activity subject to the fourth amendment's proscriptions when it
utilizes dogs to detect contraband, but that this usage does not
necessarily constitute a full search.3' Professor Peebles continues:
"The reasonableness of such a subsearch would be gauged by a
balancing process in which the primary considerations would be
the individual's expectations of privacy on the one hand and both
the degree of the intrusion and the circumstances occasioning
that intrusion on the other."' 4 Use of this approach, Professor
Peebles believes, would result in more effective judicial control
over surreptitious, sense-enhancing police investigative tech-
niques such as the uninvited canine nose than the formula man-
dated by Katz."
One can only hope that the Tenth Circuit will at least con-
sider this approach in deciding future cases where the defendant
possesses a more justifiable expectation of privacy than was pres-
ent under the facts of this case.
C. Search and Seizure Within a Prison.
In United States v. Ready," the Tenth Circuit considered the
See note 34 supra.
Search and Seizure- Marijuana Sniffing Dogs, 42 Mo. L. REv. 331, 334 (1977).
3' 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See notes 86-90 and accompanying text infra.
31' Peebles, The Uninvited Canine Nose and the Right to Privacy: Some Thoughts on
Katz and Dogs, 11 GA. L. Rav. 75, 94 (1976).
I d. at 95.
"Id. at 103-04.
" 574 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1978).
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applicability of the fourth amendment to a prison search.
It appears from the court's recital of the facts that the defen-
dant Ready had been imprisoned following his conviction for in-
come tax fraud and was interned at the Leavenworth Peniten-
tiary honor camp. Shortly before the indictment with respect to
the charges forming the subject matter of the present case, the
security supervisor of the prison directed that Ready be moved
from the honor camp to the prison. During the customary inven-
tory of Ready's property at the honor camp prior to his transfer,
various items of correspondence were taken to the security super-
visor based on his earlier instructions. He and another prison
official searched through the property and found certain tax
forms filed by Ready and a notebook containing references to tax
matters which were subsequently turned over to Internal Revenue
Service agents. This material was entered into evidence at
Ready's trial, and he was convicted on eight counts of income tax
fraud. On appeal, he contended that the warrantless search and
seizure of papers in his honor camp room at the time of his trans-
fer to the main penitentiary was in violation of his fourth amend-
ment rights and that the papers should have been suppressed.
3
The Tenth Circuit briefly reviewed the few cases dealing with
the issue of a prisoner's right to privacy and fourth amendment
protection while incarcerated. It pointed out that despite the
Supreme Court's dicta in Lanza v. New York" to the effect that
the claim of fourth amendment protection while one is in a public
jail is "at best a novel argument," the Court has since held that
prisoners do not give up all constitutional rights while in prison."
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit noted that Mr. Justice Stevens,
while a circuit judge, had invoked the fourth amendment, holding
that a prisoner enjoys its protection "at least to some minimal
extent," to support, along with due process grounds, relief for a
prisoner who had a trial transcript taken from his cell in a war-
rantless shakedown search." On the other hand, the court pointed
13 Id. at 1011-13.
370 U.S. 139, 143 (1961).
" Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975). See also, United States v.
Dawson, 516 F.2d 796, 806 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975) (sufficient showing
of justifiable purpose required); United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1974) (some justifiable purpose of imprisonment or
prison security must be demonstrated); Inmates of Milwaukee Co. Jail v. Peterson, 353
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to its own recent decision permitting rectal searches of prisoners
under sanitary and nonhumiliating conditions as "a necessary
and reasonable concomitance of appellants' imprisonment",7 and
the Ninth Circuit's per curiam opinion holding that it is not
reasonable for a prisoner to consider his cell private, and therefore
a cell search did not violate the fourth amendment. 8
The Tenth Circuit then disposed of the defendant's fourth
amendment claims in two short paragraphs, the first of which
stated:
Certainly in a federal prison the authorities must be able to search
the prisoners' cells without notice and at any time, for concealed
weapons and contraband which threatens the security or legitimate
purposes of the institution. This is done routinely at Leavenworth
when a prisoner is transferred from the honor camp outside the
walls, back inside, for obvious reasons."
Of course there are many legitimate governmental security inter-
ests that may restrict prisoners' fourth amendment rights, but it
appears that the Tenth Circuit has in this case "merely intoned
the phrase 'prison security' as the basis of its holding without any
further examination." ° The court at the very least could have
inquired into the "security" justification for a detailed, content-
oriented search of the defendant's notebook and tax forms when
a cursory search of such materials would have sufficed to detect
the presence of contraband or weapons. The court, however, dis-
posed of the issue by stating:
It is virtually impossible for the Court to ascertain motives of prison
officials, e.g., here whether the transfer back inside prison was to
impede an escape which the prisoner might attempt if he learned of
the investigation, or whether it was to provide an excuse to look
through his papers. If the search procedure is routine and reasonably
designed to promote the discipline of the institution, we will not
require a search warrant . . . . This situation clearly meets that
test."
F. Supp. 1157, 1168 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (probable cause required).
Daugherty v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292, 295 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973).
United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
916 (1973).
' 574 F.2d at 1013.
Giannelli & Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures: "Locking" the Fourth Amend-
ment out of Correctional Facilities, 62 VA. L. Rxv. 1045, 1071 (1976). The authors opine
that many courts have taken this somewhat perfunctory approach. Id. at 1071 n.173-74.
" 574 F.2d 1014 (citing Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919)). The court's
reference to the motives of prison officials relates to the motivational analysis applied by
some courts in determining whether the activity of government agents constitutes a search
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Presumably, the facts supported a finding that an intensive ex-
amination of notebooks and documents such as tax forms was
"routine" in these circumstances, but one may wonder how a
content-oriented examination of tax forms bears any rational re-
lationship to the legitimate governmental objective of preserving
discipline in a penal institution."
D. Consent Search.
In United States v. Seely,5 the Tenth Circuit held that a
valid search occurred when police officers, knowing that a search
warrant had been issued and was in transit to the site, searched
the defendant's automobile following his invitation to do so. Spe-
cial circumstances existed which supported the court's finding of
voluntariness of the consent in this case: prior to the search the
police officers advised the defendant of his constitutional rights"
and undertook the search only after consent was renewed follow-
ing the defendant's receipt of legal advice in a telephone consulta-
tion with his attorney." The court also noted that there was no
hint that voluntariness was overcome by threat of a non-available
search warrant."
E. "Misplaced Trust" Exception to Warrant Requirement.
United States v. Oakes" presented the issue whether the pres-
or seizure. Under this approach, only if their purpose is prosecutorial do the actions of
law enforcement officials constitute a search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. Conversely, if the objective is not prosecutorial, there is no search. See Giannelli &
Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures, 62 VA. L. Rav. 1045, 1052 (1976).
n For a less mechanical model for determining the fourth amendment rights of prison
and jail inmates, see Giannelli & Gilligan, supra note 50, at 1064-77.
570 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1978).
, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973), the Supreme Court adopted a totality of circumstances test to determine
whether consent to search is voluntarily given. Knowledge of the right to refuse the police
request is only one factor of the test and is not dispositive of the voluntariness of the
consent. Id. at 227. The Court thus refused to engraft a Miranda-type warning of the right
not to consent as an additional requirement to the consent exception. See Williams,
Institute on Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement under the Fourth Amendment, 29
OLA. L. Rzv. 659, 672-74 (1976).
0 The defendant was advised by his lawyer that because the only authority for the
search was his consent, he could terminate it at will. 570 F.2d at 323.
" Id. (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)). Inasmuch as the sole
authority for the search was the defendant's voluntary consent, the court was not faced
with the difficult problems presented by searches authorized by issued but undelivered
warrants. See United States v. Woodring, 444 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1971).
'" 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977).
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ence of a Treasury Department agent in the defendant's home,
with consent of the defendant, for purposes of gathering evidence
of illegal possession of firearms was a violation of the fourth
amendment. The Tenth Circuit noted that the defendant had an
arguable fourth amendment claim because the amendment
reaches violations "by guile as well as by force." s The court,
however, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v.
United States" which involved a similar fact situation, held that
the defendant's fourth amendment rights had not been violated
because the agent, although posing as a firearms dealer who was
supplying weapons to domestic political groups, "entered the
house by invitation and took away nothing that was not voluntar-
ily given or sold by appellant."" The court rejected the appel-
lant's attempt to distinguish the facts of the Lewis case from
those at bar, stating that it was immaterial that the agent in
Lewis was specifically invited into the home for the illegal pur-
pose of purchasing marijuana whereas the agent in the instant
case came only to investigate and no firearms changed hands
until the third visit." The court concluded:
We do not believe that the purpose of either the defendant in ex-
tending the invitation, or the agent in accepting it is the critical
factor. The fact is that the agent entered only at the defendant's
invitation and removed only that which was freely offered. "What a
person knowingly exposes to the public even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." 2
The Tenth Circuit summarily dismissed the defendant's
claim that his prosecution for illegal possession of an unregistered
machine gun was violative of his second amendment right to bear
Id. at 386 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966)).
" 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
564 F.2d at 386. In Lewis, an undercover narcotics agent was invited into the
defendant's home for the purposes of buying marijuana. The Supreme Court found that
the agent's seizure of the drug did not violate the fourth amendment, stating that the case
"presents no question of the invasion of the privacy of a dwelling; the only statements
repeated were those that were willingly made to the agent and the only things taken were
the packets of marijuana voluntarily transferred to him." 385 U.S. at 212. Other cases in
which the Supreme Court has upheld warrantless searches when based on misplaced trust
are: Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963); and On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
" 564 F.2d at 386.
2 Id. at 386-87 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). Ironically,
the Katz Court had cited Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) for this proposition.
1979
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arms.s The court stated that even though the defendant was
technically a member of the Kansas state militia, he had not
demonstrated that the unregistered firearm kept at his home bore
any connection to the militia. 4
F. Probable Cause.
The Tenth Circuit considered an arrest and seizure without
warrant in United States v. McLemore,15 an appeal of convictions
for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation
of federal law." Following receipt by federal agents of a tip from
the operator of the rental agency, the marijuana was seized from
an airplane rented by the defendants. The operator had proved
in the past to be a reliable informant. Further investigation by
the agents prior to the arrest revealed several facts which
strengthened the agents' suspicions that the defendants were
using rented airplanes to pick up and deliver quantities of mari-
juana. 7
At the outset the court noted that unless the search was
incident to a lawful arrest, the large quantity of marijuana taken
from the defendants, which formed the entire foundation for their
conviction, would be inadmissible under the exclusionary rule of
Weeks v. United States." The inquiry thus focused upon whether
the officers had probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest."'
The court used the customary totality of the circumstances
4 "A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed." U.S. CoNer. amend. H.
" Citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), the Tenth Circuit stated that
the purpose of the second amendment was to preserve the effectiveness and assure the
continuation of the state militia. 564 F.2d at 387. The defendant was a member of the
Kansas militia by virtue of KArs. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, which provides that the state
militia includes all "able-bodied male citizens between the ages of twenty-one and forty-
five years. . . ." 564 F.2d at 387.
" 573 F.2d 1154 (10th Cir. 1978).
0 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
" 573 F.2d at 1155-57.
"' 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Weeks Court held that evidence secured by federal agents
through an illegal search and seizure was inadmissible in a federal prosecution.
" In Peck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964), the Supreme Court said that probable cause
rests upon "whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the] knowledge
[of the police officers] and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was
committing an offense." See also, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949),
where the Supreme Court stated that probable cause relates to the "factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal techni-
cians, act .... "
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test in determining whether the arrest was in fact based on proba-
ble cause.70 It found that although a possible explanation consis-
tent with innocence existed for each separate fact or circumstance
cited by the government as the agents' basis for probable cause,
the "totality of the evidence" in the context reasonably appearing
to the experienced officers supported the lower court's finding
that probable cause existed for the warrantless arrest.7' Hence,
the seized material, which was within the immediate control of
the defendants at the time of their arrest, was properly admitted
into evidence.1
2
Another case in which the existence or absence of probable
cause was crucial to the defendants' fourth amendment claims
was United States v. Rumpf.73 In Rumpf, the majority opinion
reciting the following chain of events in support of its decision
that federal Drug Enforcement Administration agents had proba-
ble cause to believe a felony was being committed which, in view
of the exigent circumstances, justified their warrantless arrest
and search of the defendants: 7 DEA agents learned that a load
of marijuana being flown from Mexico would land on a state
highway south of Grants, New Mexico; the defendants were ob-
served driving into the area in vehicles having prior connection
with marijuana transactions; the vehicles spent the night in the
area and were seen the next morning emerging from the state road
onto the interstate highway; the agents followed the vehicles
eighty to ninety miles to a farm near Moriarty, New Mexico,
observing that the camper trailer pulled by one of the vehicles
was heavily loaded, inasmuch as it swayed from side to side
whenever the camper changed lanes; when the agents arrived at
the farm they entered it and found marijuana in plain sight in the
barn and smelled it in the trailer in the barn. 5
The majority disposed of the defendants' fourth amendment
claims in one short paragraph:
70 537 F.2d at 1157.
71 Id.
" Id. at 1158. For an examination of the Burger Court's approach to the permissible
scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest, as well as the timeliness thereof (the so-called
contemporaneous requirement), see Lewis, Mannle & Allen, The Burger Court and
Searches Incident to a Lawful Arrest: The Current Perspective, 7 CAP. L. REv. 1 (1977).
Is 576 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1978).




The record demonstrates that there was probable cause for the ar-
rests and the search. The whole train of events, the prior connection
of the vehicles with marijuana transactions, and the information
that a plane would arrive were sufficient. The need to follow the
defendants, and to take action immediately revealed exigent cir-
cumstances.. . . We have held that smell alone is sufficient proba-
ble cause for a search."
Judge McKay penned a potent dissent, arguing that the war-
rantless arrests, searches, and seizures in this case were not based
upon probable cause." Judge McKay elucidated the "prior
connection of the vehicles with marijuana transactions" cited by
the majority as a crucial factor in finding the existence of proba-
ble cause: John Rumpf, known to be the driver of the Chevrolet
van, once rented a storage locker which, sometime subsequent to
his abandonment thereof, was discovered to contain an ounce of
marijuana."' Judge McKay concluded: "The arrests and searches
conducted here were based upon mere suspicion, not facts and
circumstances that would warrant a man of prudence and caution
in believing that the offense had been or was being committed."',
Judge McKay also criticized the majority's reliance on the
plain view and plain smell doctrines, which he pointed out are
applicable only when the observing officer has a right to be in a
position to have that view or smell.80 On the other hand, he con-
tinued, where officers trespass on private property in order to
secure the view or smell, the courts have held that search unrea-
sonable and in violation of the fourth amendment."1 Judge
McKay noted that the Tenth Circuit has previously sanctioned
fourth amendment protection of the curtilage of private homes,
2
and that the marijuana discovered in this case was therefore inad-
missible because "[tihe views and smells came only after the
agents had trespassed the protected area of the curtilage ...
" Id.
" Id. (McKay, J., dissenting).
Id. at 828.
"Id. (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 414 (1969); Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493, 497 (1958); and Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46 (1933)
for the proposition that although probable cause does not contemplate guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, it must rise above the level of mere suspicion).
N Id. at 829 (citing Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968)).
91 576 F.2d at 829.
n Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432, 434-35 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
830(1968).
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The evidence was not perceived by the eye or nose of an officer
'who [had] a right to be in the position to have that view [or
smell],' but was uncovered by an unreasonable search.""
Judge McKay was particularly forceful in cautioning his col-
leagues on the court not to permit the fruits of an unlawful search
to color their hindsight judgment of probable cause, noting that
"[tihe tendency to evaluate the lawfulness of a search by the
evidence it produces is especially strong in a case like this where
1500 pounds of marijuana are staring at the court.""4 Expressing
concern that many judges have developed special rules on proba-
ble cause in drug cases, Judge McKay agreed with Judge Richey
of the District of Columbia District Court that "[tihe battle to
rid society of illicit drugs must be won within the framework of
our Constitution lest we achieve a pyrrhic victory. The streets
must be rid of the pusher, but not at the expense of justice, nor
by the compromise of individual liberty."'
G. Stop and Frisk under Terry v. Ohio.
In United States v. Mireles,81 the Tenth Circuit was called
upon to decide the validity of a "stop and frisk" search as mea-
sured by the quidelines of Terry v. Ohio."1 In Terry, the Supreme
Court ruled that a police officer may temporarily detain a person
and conduct a protective pat-down search for weapons on grounds
of less than probable cause18 Under Terry, the validity of a stop
and frisk is governed by a bifurcated "reasonable suspicion" test
directed at determining (1) whether the facts confronting the
officer justified the initial intrusion, and (2) whether the officer's
actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
prompting the interference.8' To justify his actions under either
prong of this test, "the police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences" reasonably warrant the officer's belief that the de-
tained person was involved in criminal activity0 or that the
93 576 F.2d at 829 (citing Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968)).
" 576 F.2d at 829-30.
" Id. at 830 (citing United States v. Costa, 356 F. Supp. 606, 609 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 479
F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
- 583 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1978).
- 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
" 392 U.S. at 27, 29.
0 Id. at 20-21.
" Id. at 21.
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frisked person was armed and dangerous."
Curiously enough, at the beginning of its opinion the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction for possession of an
unregistered sawed-off shotgun in violation of federal law' 2 on the
basis that the officer had probable cause to seize the weapon."
However, the court later stated that the case comes within the
rule of Terry v. Ohio, which was decided according to a less de-
manding standard than that of probable cause.
The facts of Mireles were as follows: A uniformed Albuquer-
que, New Mexico, police officer on routine patrol one evening
stopped at the Rio Bravo Lounge, noted for its incidents of fights,
stabbings, and shootings. While outside the lounge, the officer
noticed that the defendant, who was wearing a long trench coat
and a stocking cap, appeared to be overdressed for the weather.
As the defendant entered the lounge, the officer observed a no-
ticeable and suspicious bulge or lump behind the defendant's
right shoulder, which the officer believed to be a bottle of liquor
being secreted into the bar in violation of state law. In passing
the defendant from the rear for the purpose of questioning him,
the officer felt the bulge in Mireles' trench coat, and this act of
touching convinced him Mireles was carrying a concealed weapon
of some sort. The officer then opened Mireles' trench coat and
saw a sawed-off shotgun, which he grabbed from a sling hanging
from Mireles' neck."
Mireles contended that the warrantless seizure of the shot-
gun from his person violated his fourth amendment rights. In
particular, he argued that the officer should have engaged him in
some preliminary conversation before he touched, from the out-
side, the lump in Mireles' trench coat. The Tenth Circuit rejected
this argument, stating that a preliminary conversation was not
required by Terry:
" Id. at 29. See Terry Revisited: Critical Update on Recent Stop-and-Frisk
Developments, 1977 Wi. L. Rzv. 877, 878-79 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Terry
Revisited). After studying the post-Terry cases, model codes, and police manuals, the
commentator concludes that there are six primary variables which, alone or in combina-
tion, are increasingly relied upon in determining the validity of Terry stops: appearance,
conduct, criminal record, environment, police purpose, and source of information. Id. at
885-92.
- 26 U.S.C. It 5861(d), 5871 (1976).
" 583 F.2d at 1116.
mId.
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The Supreme Court in Terry stated that the rea-
sonableness of any search and seizure must be as-
sessed in light of the particular circumstances
against the standard of whether a man of reason-
able caution is warranted in believing that the ac-
tion taken was appropriate. Reasonableness, then,
cannot be determined through the use of a set for-
mula. It depends upon the total picture. 5
Inasmuch as the initial suspected criminal activity in this
case was the mere possession of liquor unlawfully brought onto
the premises, this decision may be subject to the same criticism
as that directed by Mr. Justice Brennan at the majority's decision
in Adams v. Williams." Justice Brennan quoted with approval
those portions of Judge Friendly's dissent to the Second Circuit's
decision in Adams," where Judge Friendly had asserted that
Terry was intended to operate only in situations involving crimes
of violence, and was especially inappropriate authority for cases
involving mere possessory offenses." Justice Brennan shared
Judge Friendly's fear that the extension of Terry's fourth amend-
ment probable cause exception to alleged possessory crimes
might result in "too much danger that instead of the stop being
the object and the protective frisk an incident thereto, the reverse
will be true."" It appears from the Tenth Circuit's recitation of
the facts in Mireles that the officer's initial touching of Mireles
was inadvertent. However, if the initial touching was in fact in-
tentional, Justice Brennan's fears have come to pass, for in that
" Id. at 1117.
407 U.S. 143 (1972). Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) had held inadmissible
the fruits of a limited search undertaken pursuant to a stop made on suspicion of narcotics
possession. The Supreme Court in Adams expanded the scope of stop and frisk to encom-
pass criminal activity of a mere possessory character. Terry Revisited, 1977 Wis. L. Rv.
at 884.
17 407 U.S. 143 (1972)(Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d
30, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1971)(Friendly, J., dissenting)).
11 Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38-39 (Friendly, J., dissenting). Professor LaFave
has also taken this position. See LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution:
Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MicH. L. Rav. 39, 65-66 (1968). See also, United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. 873, 888-89 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
" 407 U.S. at 151 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30,
38 (1971)(Friendly, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's Adams dissent echoed this fear by
emphasizing that the officer's sole purpose in stopping the defendant was to make the
frisk-that the search was in no way a protective measure undertaken to facilitate an
investigative detention. 407 U.S. at 155-56 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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event the frisk was indeed the object of the stop, rather than the
incident thereof.
H. Limitation of Habeas Corpus for Fourth Amendment
Claims.
In McDaniel v. State'" and Johnson v. Meacham, "0 the
Tenth Circuit faced questions requiring the application of princi-
ples established by the Supreme Court in Stone v. Powell. 10 The
Stone Court held that when a state has provided an "opportu-
nity for full and fair litigation" of a fourth amendment claim, a
state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief
on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at trial.'0 In both McDaniel and
Johnson, the Tenth Circuit was asked to decide the question of
what constitutes an "opportunity for full and fair litigation."
The habeas corpus claim raised in McDaniel arose out of the
Oklahoma state trial court's receipt into evidence of a pocket
knife seized during a warrantless search of the defendant's parked
car following his arrest. The federal district court denied his peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus, and on appeal the Tenth Circuit
affirmed.'"
The Tenth Circuit pointed to the facts that (1) McDaniel had
objected to introduction of the knife at trial; (2) the court had
admitted the evidence over his objection; and (3) he subsequently
presented this issue on direct appeal to the Oklahoma Criminal
Court of Appeals. In addition, this issue was considered in a full
evidentiary hearing conducted by the state court on his applica-
tion for post-conviction relief, and the denial of his application
- 582 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1978).
570 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1978).
w 428 U.S. 466 (1976).
- Id. at 494. This decision effectively removes state search and seizure cases from
the ambit of federal habeas corpus. See Green, Stone v. Powell: The Hermeneutics of the
Burger Court, 10 CRnmawro L. Rrv. 666 (1977). Professor Green traces the history of
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction and asserts that Stone has fashioned a judicial excep-
tion to that jurisdiction for search and seizure claims which is not supported by either the
language of the statute or its history. Id. at 668. He concludes that
ihe decision in Stone creates an exception to the broad language of the
Habeas Corpus Act of the type one would expect to find in a proviso to a
statute. The policy arguments amassed in the case are the type which would
support limiting language in the Act. However, no such limitation appears
in the statute. Id. at 677.
See also, id. at 676 n.100.
m 682 F.2d at 1243.
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was affirmed on appeal to the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Ap-
peals. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit of the federal district
court's denial of habeas corpus, his primary contention was that
the Oklahoma high court had skirted his fourth amendment
claim by holding that there was substantial evidence apart from
the pocket knife from which a jury could have found the defen-
dant guilty, and that the introduction of the pocket knife was
therefore harmless error.'°0
The Tenth Circuit rejected McDaniel's argument, noting
that Stone v. Powell itself presented the question of whether the
state court's ruling of harmless error with respect to the defen-
dant's fourth amendment claim was reviewable by the federal
district court pursuant to its habeas corpus jurisdiction.'" 6 Noting
that under those circumstances the Supreme Court had found an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of petitioner Powell's fourth
amendment claim, the Tenth Circuit had no qualms about deny-
ing McDaniel's petition for habeas relief. It also pointed to a
recent Sixth Circuit case where a harmless error ruling was held
to preclude federal habeas relief under the Stone standard.'17
A closer question was presented by Johnson v. Meacham,'°0
where the Tenth Circuit had to decide whether the defendant
Johnson had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his fourth
amendment claim where the Wyoming Supreme Court refused to
review that claim due to his failure to make a timely motion to
suppress or a timely objection at trial.'09
Had the Tenth Circuit faced this question prior to the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Wainwright v. Sykes,"l0 it would
have been forced to choose between two conflicting circuit court
interp, tations of the "full and fair opportunity for litigation"
standard mandated by Stone v. Powell. The Second Circuit in
Gates v. Henderson"' had concluded that a federal habeas court
,0 Id. at 1243-44.
10 In Stone, the California state court "found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality
of the arrest and search because it concluded that the error, if any, in admitting the
testimony . ..was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967)." 428 U.S. at 470.
'' Moore v. Cowan, 560 F.2d 1298, 1300 (6th Cir. 1977).
,# 570 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1978).
i" Id. at 919.
, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977).
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should apply the Supreme Court's Townsend v. Sain" test; thus
under the Second Circuit's view unless a petitioner intentionally
waives an opportunity to raise his fourth amendment right, a
state court must decide his constitutional claim on the merits."
3
The Fifth Circuit in O'Berry v. Wainwright, "I on the other hand,
held that an opportunity for full and fair litigation is provided
even though a state court never decides a petitioner's constitu-
tional question because the petitioner has failed to comply with
a state procedural requirement."'
The Tenth Circuit, adopting the Fifth Circuit's O'Berry v.
Wainwright reasoning without so much as mentioning the Second
Circuit's contrary ruling in Gates v. Henderson, stated:
[Wle hold that where Johnson presented his Fourth Amendment
claim to the Wyoming Supreme Court, where the Wyoming Su-
preme Court applied an adequate procedural ground in refusing to
reach the merits of that claim, and where Johnson's claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel is not related to this issue, habeas review
of the Fourth Amendment claim is barred."'
The Tenth Circuit probably felt confident in ignoring the
Second Circuit's Gates v. Henderson theory because of the Su-
preme Court's recent ruling in Wainwright v. Sykes,"7 which held
that the defendant's failure to contemporaneously object to the
admission of a confession at trial constitutes an independent
state procedural ground which precludes habeas review."' The
Sykes court expressly rejected the sweeping language of Fay v.
Noia,"' which had been the foundation of the Second Circuit's
12 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Townsend provides a test by which a federal habeas court
determines whether a state court has granted a petitioner a full and fair evidentiary
hearing. The Townsend test incorporates the "deliberate bypass" or "knowing waiver"
rule of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). For a good discussion of Townsend, Fay, and the
early lower court decisions applying Stone v. Powell, see Note, Circuits Split over Applica-
tion of Stone v. Powell's "Opportunity for Full and Fair Litigation," 30 VA". L. Rzv. 881
(1977).
10 See Note, Circuits Split over Application of Stone v. Powell's "Opportunity for
Full and Fair Litigation," supra note 112 at 881.
1 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977).
I See Note, Circuits Split over Application of Stone v. Powell's "Opportunity for
Full and Fair Litigation," supra note 112 at 881.
11' 570 F.2d at 920.
"' 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
" Id. at 86-87.
" 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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decision in (rates v. Henderson.2 Fay had rendered a state's
timely-objection rule ineffective to bar review of underlying fed-
eral claims in federal habeas proceedings unless the defendant
had deliberately bypassed the right to so object. 2' Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Sykes court, believed the "deliberate
bypass" rule accorded too little respect to the state timely objec-
tion rule, which he praised as contributing to the finality of crimi-
nal litigation. In contrast, he stated that-the Fay rule may encour-
age defense lawyers to take their chances on a verdict of not guilty
in a state trial court, intending to raise their constitutional claims
in a federal habeas court if their initial gamble fails. 1 The Sykes
majority instead adopted a rule which would bar federal habeas
review in all cases where the defendant fails to timely object
under a state contemporaneous objection rule, unless the defen-
dant shows cause for the noncompliance and also shows actual
prejudice. 
2
Although the Tenth Circuit cited Wainwright v. Sykes in
support of its decision to deny habeas relief in Johnson,'24 it cu-
riously stopped short of applying the "cause" and "prejudice"
tests announced by Sykes. However, the court indirectly ad-
dressed those issues in at least one respect by noting that John-
son's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not related to
his fourth amendment claim.'2
II. FIrTH AMENDMENT
A. Double Jeopardy
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided four cases in
which appellants' double jeopardy claims predominated. Al-
though the court ultimately found all four claims to be without
'2 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977). See notes 111-13 and accompanying text supra.
433 U.S. at 87.
I" d. at 88-89. Justice Rehnquist noted that a state timely objection rule also
achieves other laudable objectives: it enables the record to be made with respect to a
constitutional claim when witnesses' recollections are freshest, and it enables the trial
judge who observed the demeanor of witnesses to make the factual determinations neces-
sary for properly deciding the federal question. Id. at 88.
I'* Id. at 90-91. In enunciating this rule, the Court followed its earlier decision in
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), where the defendant had failed to make a
timely objection to the makeup of a grand jury.
l" 570 F.2d at 920.
'2 Id. See text accompanying note 116 supra.
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merit, one of the double jeopardy issues provoked an interesting
and unusual split of opinion within the court.
In United States v. Rumppf the Tenth Circuit rendered its
decision on a case of first impression: the appealability of the
denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy
grounds. The appellants' first trial on a charge of conspiracy to
possess marijuana with intent to distribute ended in a declaration
of mistrial. When they moved for dismissal in the second trial on
double jeopardy grounds, their motion was denied. The appel-
lants immediately lodged notices of appeal from this denial. The
second trial commenced later the same day, resulting in appel-
lants' convictions. On appeal, appellants urged that their notices
of appeal from the denial of the motion divested the trial court
of jurisdiction to proceed with the second trial.
In resolving the issue of the appealability of the motion's
denial, the Tenth Circuit looked to Abney v. United States, 127 a
Supreme Court case decided during the pendency of the appeal.
The Supreme Court in A bney held that the district court's
pretrial order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the indict-
ment on double jeopardy grounds was a "final decision,"'n sub-
ject to immediate appeal. In support of this holding, the Supreme
Court stressed the importance of protecting the defendant from
exposure to the additional emotional strain and expense occa-
sioned by a second trial before determination of the double jeop-
ardy issue.'"
The applicability of the A bney decision to the facts in Rumpf
caused a split opinion in the Tenth Circuit case. The majority
held the pretrial protection made possible under Abney inapplic-
able, since Rumpf's second trial was over before Abney was de-
cided. 30 The majority stressed the fact that the appellants made
no special effort to "perfect" the appeal either prior to or during
the second trial.'' Since Abney was held inapplicable, Rumpf's
second trial was not barred by the double jeopardy prohibition,
and the convictions were upheld.
576 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1978).
"' 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
' Id. at 662.
IB d. at 661.
" 576 F.2d at 821.
'Id. at 822 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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In his dissenting opinion, Judge McKay addressed the spe-
cific issue raised by the appellants: did the appellants' notice of
appeal divest the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed with the
second trial? Generally, a trial court is divested of jurisdiction
when there is a valid appeal from an appealable order; thus,
Judge McKay's opinion analyzed what constitutes a valid appeal
and an appealable order. He concluded: (1) that under the Abney
holding orders rejecting double jeopardy claims are final deci-
sions, i.e., appealable orders;' and, (2) that since changes in the
law are given effect when the case is on direct review,'3 A bney
should apply to the Rumpf case. In contrast to the majority opin-
ion, Judge McKay determined that there was no need to
"perfect" the appeal; the timely filing of the notice of appeal *as
sufficient regardless of the fact that the trial court was proceeding
as though the order were nonappealable.'" In finding that the
valid appeal taken from an appealable order terminated the trial
court's jurisdiction, Judge McKay concluded that the second trial
was a nullity and consequently that the judgments entered
against the appellants should be vacated.'3
The other three double jeopardy cases decided by the Tenth
Circuit involved much more traditional issues and consequently
received more summary treatment from the court.
In United States v. Nelson, 136 the defendant was convicted of
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute after a mistrial had
occasioned the need for a second trial. The defendant alleged that
the second trial was both without manifest necessity and the
result of prosecutorial overreaching.
In rejecting the defendant's first claim, the Tenth Circuit
stressed that the mistrial was declared upon the express motion
of defense counsel." 7 Furthermore, the court deemed the trial
judge's -evaluation of the effect of improper comment on the im-
partiality of the jury to be worthy of the "highest degree of re-
spect."'' 38 In response to defendant's claim of prosecutorial over-
1N Id. at 825.
13 Id.
11 Id. at 826.
I3 Id.
"' 582 F.2d 1246 (10th Cir. 1978).
"31 Id. at 1248.
1" Id. at 1249. The court relied on Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
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reaching, the court held that the double jeopardy clause is in-
tended to protect defendants from prosecutorial actions inten-
tionally designed to provoke a request for a mistrial."' In Nelson's
case, there was no evidence indicating the presence of any such
prosecutorial scheme, especially since the prosecution's case was
not materially strengthened by the one-day delay resulting from
the declaration of mistrial."10 Therefore, the court concluded that
defendant's double jeopardy claim was without merit.
In United States v. Wagstaff,"' the Tenth Circuit considered
the applicability of the double jeopardy bar to a prosecution fol-
lowing the dismissal of an indictment alleged to be insufficient
for failure to cite the statute violated by the defendant. The de-
fendant claimed that the dismissal was tantamount to a resolu-
tion of the cause in his favor.
Relying on Lee v. United States, 2 the court of appeals dis-
tinguished those rulings based on procedural or drafting inade-
quacies from those based on the merits, and ruled that the former
are not tantamount to a merits resolution in the defendant's
favor."8 Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that a dismissal on
formal or procedural grounds does not constitute sufficient jeop-
ardy to bar reprosecution."
4
The indictment, to be sufficient, must state those facts
which describe the essential elements of the offense so as to suffi-
ciently apprise the accused of the nature of the offense."15 When
these basic requirements are met, as they were in Wagstaff, the
omission of the citation of the statute violated is not so significant
as to justify dismissal."' Therefore, the court ordered the indict-
ment reinstated."W
In United States v. Martinez, " the Tenth Circuit addressed
the applicability of the double jeopardy bar to successive indict-
ments in two different jurisdictions. In Martinez, the defendants
1" 582 F.2d at 1249. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976).
'682 F.2d at 1249.
' 572 F.2d 270 (10th Cir. 1978).
aa 432 U.S. 23 (1977).
* 572 F.2d at 272.
Id.
I ld. at 273.
, See Fa. R. Cmm. P. 7 (c)(3).
" 572 F.2d at 273.
*" 562 F.2d 633 (10th Cir. 1977).
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were first indicted in Texas for conspiracy to possess marijuana
with intent to distribute, but were granted a directed verdict of
acquittal after suppression of certain evidence. Subsequently, the
defendants were indicted in Oklahoma on a very similar conspir-
acy charge which encompassed some of the same agreements and
transactions which had formed the basis of the Texas indictment.
The defendants argued that (1) the Texas indictment was merely
a "slice" of the more comprehensive Oklahoma indictment; (2)
the various agreements and transactions were part of one continu-
ing conspiracy; and, (3) therefore the double jeopardy clause
mandated dismissal of the Oklahoma indictment.
The Tenth Circuit discussed two tests in passing on the mer-
its of defendants' double jeopardy claim. In determining whether
or not the offenses charged were so identical in law and fact as to
allow attachment of a double jeopardy claim, the court of appeals
relied on the test enunciated in Robbins v. United States:'
49
whether the facts alleged in one offense, if offered in support of
the other offense, would sustain a conviction.'15 The court ruled
that there was an insufficient connection between the agreements
and dealings in the two indictments to satisfy the "identical"
requirement.' In treating the specific issue of the degree of same-
ness of the conspiracies, the court recalled the test used in
Bartlett v. United States:'52 whether evidence supporting the
criminal agreement in one indictment would likewise establish
the criminal agreement in the other indictment. 15 Under this test
the court held that the defendants had not established that the
agreements embraced by each indictment were equivalent to one
overall conspiracy."' The court buttressed its denial of the double
jeopardy claim by emphasizing that sameness of parties and simi-
larity of transactions do not combine to prove that the two con-
spiracies are the same.'
1' 476 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1973).
" Id. at 32.
"' 562 F.2d at 637.
52 166 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1948).
,' Id. at 931.





In United States v. Revada,'5 the government appealed the
trial court's dismissal of an indictment for illegal possession of a
shotgun on the basis of a twenty-one month delay between the
discovery of the weapon and the issuance of the indictment. The
Tenth Circuit enunciated principles governing the legal conse-
quences of pre-indictment delay with reference to two recent
United States Supreme Court cases.
In United States v. Marion"' the Supreme Court suggested
a two-pronged test for determining the propriety of dismissal of
an indictment: (1) the delay must cause substantial prejudice to
the defendant's right to a fair trial; and (2) the delay must have
been merely a device used to gain tactical advantage over the
accused.I" The Tenth Circuit had previously construed Marion as
requiring the satisfaction of both tests in order to establish a
definitive due process violation.1 9 The Supreme Court confirmed
this interpretation in United States v. Lovasco, '0 a recent deci-
sion refining the principles announced in Marion.
Revada alleged that the lengthy delay dimmed recall of his
activities during the period of time surrounding his arrest, and
that this impairment of recall impeded his ability to defend on
the charges. The government responded that the delay was un-
avoidable in light of the need to conduct further investigations.
In addressing these contentions, the Tenth Circuit relied on the
Marion and Lovasco decisions. Marion indicated that the possi-
bility of loss of accurate recall does not so conclusively demon-
strate denial of a fair trial as to justify dismissal of the indict-
ment.' 16 Lavasco develops the other prong of the Marion test
by excluding preindictment investigative delay from the realm
of maneuvers undertaken chiefly to gain an advantage over the
accused.6 2 In view of the trial court's failure to consider and
apply the standards set out in Marion and reaffirmed in Lovasco,
the appellate court remanded the case for determination of the
574 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1978).
404 U.S. 307 (1971).
'Id. at 325.
5 674 F.2d at 1048. See United States v. Beitscher, 467 F.2d 269, 272 (10th Cir. 1972).
W 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
"'404 U.S. at 325-26.
431 U.S. at 795-96.
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actual prejudice and justifiable delay issues.
In Von Atkinson v. Smith, 63 the defendant was charged with
violating a sodomy statute which was repealed before the defen-
dant had pleaded guilty or been sentenced. The new statute re-
categorized the original offense as a misdemeanor and simulta-
neously created the new crime of forcible sodomy. The practical
effect of the change on the defendant was simply to reduce his
sentence for a crime with which he had not been technically
charged and to which he had not pleaded guilty. The defendant
alleged that such sentencing for an uncharged crime constituted
a strict violation of his due process rights. The district court
discharged defendant from custody pursuant to defendant's peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus.
The Tenth Circuit not only affirmed defendant's discharge
from custody, it also stressed that the new statutory provision
for a lesser sentence was entirely irrelevant to the due process
deprivation which necessarily arises when one is convicted and
sentenced for an uncharged crime."' The court concluded:
"[Djue process does not permit one to be tried, convicted or
sentenced for a crime with which he has not been charged or
about which he has not been properly notified.'
'' 5
C. Privilege Against Self Incrimination
In United States v. DiGiacomo,'" the Tenth Circuit dis-
cussed the necessity for and adequacy of Miranda warnings deliv-
ered during an interrogation. Four secret service agents detained
the defendant in the parking lot of a restaurant. They separated
the defendant from his companion and advised him that they
wished to talk to him about his alleged passing of counterfeit
money. Prior to any actual questioning, the agents advised the
defendant that he had a right to remain silent, that whatever he
said could be used against him, and that he had a right to have
an attorney with him during questioning. There was disputed
testimony regarding the advisement of his right to have an attor-
ney appointed should he be unable to afford one. During the
'u 575 F.2d 819 (10th Cir. 1978).
I' Id. at 821.
"' Id. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S.
329, 334 (1941); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937).
1- 579 F.2d 1211 (10th Cir. 1978).
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course of the questioning the agents referred to the possibility of
immediate arrest and the defendant made certain inculpatory
statements. The following morning the defendant went to the
secret service office for further questioning, but while there he
refused to sign a waiver form. In urging reversal of the order
suppressing the defendant's statement, the government argued
that the Miranda warnings were unnecessary, or, alternatively,
sufficient.
In Oregon v. Mathiason, "7 the Supreme Court interpreted
the requirement that Miranda warnings be given whenever the
defendant is "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."'' Distinguishing the Mathiason situation' from the
DiGiacomo facts, the Tenth Circuit held that the agents' separa-
tion of the defendant from his companion and their implied
threats of arrest and general suspicions were sufficiently equiva-
lent to an arrest to require the giving of Miranda warnings. 70 The
court further held that the omission of the advisement of the right
to appointed counsel rendered the warnings fatally deficient. " ,
Since the warnings were deficient, the defendant's inculpatory
statements made in the parking lot were not voluntary. 2 With
regard to the statements made in the secret service office, the
court ruled that the defendant's refusal to sign a waiver and his
reluctance to respond to subsequent questions prohibited the
finding of a valid waiver. 73 Therefore, the trial court's suppres-
sion of the defendant's statements was proper.
Dissenting Judge Barrett took issue with the majority's inter-
pretation of the applicability of Mathiason. He reasoned that a
coercive environment does not in itself mandate Miranda warn-
ings, and that the agents' "requests" for cooperation in the park-
ing lot did not deprive the defendant of his freedom in any signifi-
cant way.' 7' He also indicated that the trial court erred in ruling
that there was any uncertainty surrounding the alleged omission
',1 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
0 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
'0 Mathiason came voluntarily to the police station and his freedom to depart was
not restricted. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495.
"S 579 F.2d at 1214.
1 Id.
I Id. at 1215.
iSId.
Id. at 1217 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
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from the warnings of the right to appointed counsel. "5 He con-
cluded his dissent with a lengthy advocation of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, especially section
3501.178
The issue of voluntariness arose again in United States v.
Bambulas.7  Defendant claimed that prosecutorial coercion al-
legedly occurring during a plea bargain stripped his guilty plea
of the requisite voluntariness. 8
In ruling that defendant's contention was without merit, the
Tenth Circuit emphasized that the defendant's prior denial of
any coercion with respect to his guilty plea should be regarded as
conclusive absent a contrary showing of coercion.' 9 In so holding,
the court also tendered its support for a properly conducted plea
bargaining arrangement. 80
In United States v. Blakney, "I defendant was convicted of
transporting a counterfeit check in interstate commerce. Hand-
writing exemplars were ordered, not to support this charge, but
to support certain of defendant's prior, uncharged offenses. The
defendant refused to comply with the order, and his refusal be-
came the subject of subsequent commentary. The defendant at-
tempted to justify his refusal by arguing that under these circum-
stances the order violated his privilege against self-incrimination.
In rejecting defendant's argument, the Tenth Circuit first
enunciated the general rule that handwriting exemplars are iden-
tifying rather than testimonial evidence, thus lying outside the
scope of the privilege. 82 The court then refused to recognize any
reason for not applying the general rule where, as here, the exem-
I" Id.
' This section favors an evaluation of the voluntariness of the incriminating state-
ments rather than a mechanical application of the Miranda formula. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501
(1976).
571 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1978).
The defendant also alleged that the involuntariness of his plea was further sub-
stantiated by the denial of his right to a speedy trial. In response, the court stated that
pre-indictment delay does not constitute a due process violation absent actual prejudice
and an intention to gain a tactical advantage over the accused. 571 F.2d at 527. See text
accompanying notes 156-62 supra.
"1 571 F.2d at 526.
"0 Id. The court noted that the Supreme Court has recognized the potential benefits
of the plea bargaining system in Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
581 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1978).
Id Id. at 1390. This rule was enunciated in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67
(1967).
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plars were ordered to substantiate uncharged crimes.' The
court further held that since the exemplars were unprotected, no
prejudice could attach to the comments illuminating the defen-
dant's refusal to comply with the order. 84 The court thus distin-
guished the commentary in this case from that made upon a
defendant's exercise of clearly established privileges." 5
In United States v. Nolan, " the defendant had been con-
victed in 1966 of conspiracy to use and actual use of interstate
facilities to carry on an unlawful gambling business, and had first
appealed his conviction in 1970. During the trial, several persons
referred to defendant's possession of a Federal Wagering Tax
Stamp. Counsel for defendant made no objection to these refer-
ences. On his second appeal the defendant requested an order
vacating his sentence on the grounds that the trial references
violated his privilege against self-incrimination, and that the law
of waiver had changed during the years intervening between his
first and second appeal. The defendant had registered his initial
appellate claim in the light of two United States Supreme Court
cases1 holding that the assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination would provide a complete defense to the failure to
comply with statutory requirements to file for or to pay wagering
taxes.'9 On his second appeal, defendant urged that the retroac-
tive application of these holdings should inure to his benefit.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed. First, the court confirmed its
previous observation that defendant's counsel, while fully aware
of the pending Marchetti and Grosso decisions, had failed to ob-
ject to the tax stamp references. Such failure amounted to a
knowledgeable waiver of the privilege.'" Secondly, the court re-
fused to endorse retroactive application of the Marchetti and
Grosso holdings because appellant's conduct was not immune
"1 581 F.2d at 1390. In support of this position the court referred to United States v.
Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973), in which the Supreme Court allowed the grand jury to see
exemplars linking the prospective defendant with the crime under investigation.
IU 581 F.2d at 1390.
IR Id. at 1391.
' 571 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1978).
" Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39 (1968).
I" Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. at 64-72 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. at 60-61 (1968).
1" 571 F.2d at 531.
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from punishment under those holdings.Im Therefore, the trial
references forming the basis of the defendant's second appellate
claim did not constitute a violation of his privilege against self-
incrimination.
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. Right to Counsel
Six Tenth Circuit cases in the past term involved issues con-
cerning a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. The
decisions can be grouped into four distinct aspects of that right:
(1) the right to counsel generally; (2) the right to appointed coun-
sel; (3) the right to counsel of defendant's own choosing; and (4)
the right to effective assistance of counsel.
1. Right to counsel generally
In Robinson v. Benson,"' defendant appealed from a district
court order denying habeas corpus relief. While awaiting parole
on conviction of interstate transportation of stolen securities, de-
fendant was arrested on charges of attempting to pass a bad
check. At a hearing before the jail's disciplinary committee, and
again at his parole rescission hearing, "' defendant was informed
that he had no right to counsel, but could be represented by a
staff member of the institution. On appeal, defendant raised the
question of what due process rights, including the right to coun-
sel, must be afforded in parole rescission hearings."
3
The Tenth Circuit rejected defendant's contention that he
had an absolute right to counsel in parole rescission hearings. The
court noted that in parole revocation hearings appointment of
counsel is discretionary,"' and then ruled that in the rescission
'" Id. at 532.
"' 570 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1978).
192 On August 1, 1976, defendant Robinson was informed by the disciplinary commit-
tee that probable cause had been found for rescission of his parole. The final rescission
hearing was held on December 14, 1976, even though the bad check charge had been
dismissed on October 13. Robinson's parole grant was rescinded at the December 14
hearing. Id. at 922.
In Id. The Fifth Circuit had considered what due process rights must be afforded a
defendant in parole rescission hearings in two cases, but neither case specifically ad-
dressed the right to counsel. MacIntosh v. Woodward, 514 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1975); Sexton
v. Wise, 494 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1974).
" 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) (1976) provides that in parole revocation proceedings, a
defendant may be furnished representation of counsel where the interests of justice so
1979
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context there was likewise no right to counsel, at least where
defendant had agreed to be represented by a staff member.'95
The court did not decide whether the constitution requires
any representation at all. Here, Robinson was represented by a
staff member-nothing more was required.
2. Right to appointed counsel
The case of United States v. DiGiacomolll is one of the rela-
tively rare Tenth Circuit cases in which the government appealed
an adverse ruling of the trial court.'17 Defendant was indicted for
possessing and passing counterfeit money with intent to de-
fraud.' The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress
a counterfeit bill seized from defendant and statements made by
defendant to government agents.'
The testimony at the suppression hearing conflicted as to
what Miranda2 rights had been given to defendant by any of the
four government agents who stopped defendant in a restaurant
parking lot. The trial court ruled that the government had failed
to establish that defendant was properly advised of his right to
appointed counsel and of his right to terminate questioning at
any time.3 '
The Tenth Circuit agreed, ruling that "the right to appointed
counsel is a significant right which cannot be excluded from the
advisement.1 2 2 The court further ruled that, although proper
warnings were given the next morning, no waiver would be pre-
require and defendant is financially unable to afford such representation. See also Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783-91 (1973).
570 F.2d at 923.
579 F.2d 1211 (10th Cir. 1978).
" 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) allows a government appeal to the court of appeals from
any decision of the district court suppressing or excluding evidence, if the United States
attorney certifies that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence
is material.
1- 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1976).
'0 For a discussion of the fifth amendment aspects of DiGiacomo, see text accompa-
nying notes 166-76 supra.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472-73 (1966), specifically required that an
indigent defendant be advised that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed
for him: "Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with
counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if
he has one or has funds to obtain one." Id. at 473.
' 579 F.2d at 1214.
m'Id.
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sumed. Once defendant refused to sign the waiver form, proof of
waiver of his rights could be shown "only by the strongest evi-
dence." 12 0 Therefore, exclusion of the evidence was proper.
Dissenting Judge Barrett, relying on the Supreme Court's
decison in Oregon v. Mathiason,1"4 concluded that the parking
lot questioning was not custodial and did not require Miranda
warnings at all "5 Even assuming the necessity of such warn-
ings, Judge Barrett stated, all Miranda warnings had been given
with the "possible exception" of defendant's right to appointed
counsel.2
The dissent seems to imply that the right to appointed coun-
sel may be excluded from the advisement without affecting its
validity. The Supreme Court's ruling in Miranda, however, that
the advisement must include the "express explanation" of an
indigent's right to appointed counsel,m is directly contrary to the
dissenting position.
3. Right to counsel of defendant's own choosing
In two cases during the last term, defendants questioned the
trial court's denial of their right to counsel of their own choosing.
In one case, the preferred attorney was sick, and in the other case,
the attorney had been disbarred by another state.
In United States v. McCoy,2" defendant was charged along
with seven other defendants with conspiring to import marijuana
into the United States from Mexico.2w Defendant entered a nolo
contendere plea and was sentenced. On appeal, defendant alleged
that the nolo plea was taken in violation of her right to be repre-
sented by counsel of her own choosing.
Defendant was represented by two attorneys, one from Chi-
20 Id at 1215.
ml 429 U.S. 492 (1977). In Mathiason, the Supreme Court held that defendant's
voluntary appearance at the police station obviated the necessity of Miranda warnings,
and that the half-hour interrogation was proper without warnings because defendant's
freedom to depart was not restricted in any way. Id. at 495.
2m Judge Barrett noted that the government agents did not require defendant to
remain in the parking lot, but only requested that he remain until other agents could ask
some questions. 579 F.2d at 1217 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
= Id.
m Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966).
- 573 F.2d 14 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3073 (1978).
IN 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1976); 21 U.S.C. § 960(a)(1) (1976).
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cago and the other a local attorney from Albuquerque. On the
night before defendant was to enter her plea, her Chicago counsel
became too ill to attend court, and the Albuquerque attorney
expressed a reluctance to proceed.2 10 The trial court indicated its
desire to proceed, and defendant and her attorney agreed to do
so.
The Tenth Circuit, after carefully reviewing the trial court's
questioning of defendant as to the voluntariness of her nolo plea,
ruled that defendant had not been denied counsel of her own
choosing. The record showed that, at the time of sentencing sev-
eral weeks after defendant entered her plea, neither defendant
nor her counsel, an associate of her Chicago counsel, "gave any
indication that they did not want to persist in the nolo contendere
plea. 21' Nor was any dissatisfaction expressed after sentence was
imposed. Thus, despite the fact that the plea was entered without
her Chicago attorney, defendant persisted in that plea, and had
adequate representation at all pertinent times.
2 12
Defendant in United States v. Grismore2 13 alleged denial of
his sixth amendment right to counsel because the trial court had
denied his request that Jerome Daly, a disbarred Minnesota law-
yer,214 be permitted to represent him. When the trial court ap-
211 573 F.2d at 16. The Albuquerque attorney's reluctance was based on the possibility
of a conflict of interest. One of McCoy's codefendants was also his client, and that codefen-
dant might have been called as a witness against McCoy. Id. The court rejected any claim
of a possible conflict because the record indicated that McCoy did not intend to proceed
to trial. Id. at 17.
211 Id.
"I Id. The court looked to the "totality of (the] circumstances that prevailed during
all the pre-trial and trial proceedings." Id. (quoting McHenry v. United States, 420 F.2d
927 (10th Cir. 1970)).
"1 564 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1586 (1978). The court noted
that the real thrust of defendant's appeal was not a sixth amendment claim, but rather
"a tirade against the Federal Reserve System, the Internal Revenue Service, the federal
judiciary, and lawyers." 564 F.2d at 930. The court also noted that defendant's attacks
were based on religious and political views, and ruled that the claims merited no discus-
sion. Id.
211 See In Re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 189 N.W.2d 176 (1971). Daly was disbarred for
intentionally disregarding a court order prohibiting him and a justice of the peace from
further proceedings in a declaratory judgment action which the Minnesota Supreme Court
had ruled was beyond the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace.
Grismore apparently sought Daly's assistance in representing him because Daly
sought to attack the constitutionality of the monetary system of the United States-the
same attack Grismore raised before the Tenth Circuit. See note 213 supra. The Minnesota
court rejected Daly's position, and entered judgment of disbarment.
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pointed local Utah counsel instead of the disbarred attorney, de-
fendant chose to represent himself against charges of uttering and
dealing in counterfeit obligations of the United States. 15
The Tenth Circuit rejected defendant's sixth amendment
claim, noting that "the appointed lawyer was available through-
out the trial to assist the defendant but his services were neither
requested nor used."2 6 Citing its earlier decision involving the
same defendant and the same issue, 2 1 the court ruled that defen-
dant was not deprived of any sixth amendment right to counsel.
4. Right to effective assistance of counsel
The Tenth Circuit ruled in two cases decided during the last
year that one who claims a deprivation of adequate assistance of
counsel faces a heavy burden of proof. In both of last term's cases,
the court held that defendant had failed to meet that burden.
In United States v. Nelson,"' the defendant appealed from
his conviction for possession wih intent to distribute heroin. 2 ,
Defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial when the prosecution
elicited a prejudicial statement from the agent who had arrested
defendant to the effect that defendant was a "major trafficker"
of drugsY0 The second trial commenced the following day, and
resulted in defendant's conviction. On appeal, defendant urged
that his attorney's failure to file a motion to dismiss the indict-
ment on double jeopardy grounds' 1 was the "most glaring exam-
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 472, 473 (1976).
21 564 F.2d at 931.
"' United States v. Grismore, 546 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1976). In this earlier opinion,
the court ruled that a disbarred lawyer was the equivalent of a lay person and that the
sixth amendment right to counsel did not include a lay person. The court then concluded:
"Even in those instances where it has been held to be permissible for a lay person to
represent a criminal defendant, it is within the discretion of the trial judge to disallow
such representation." Id. at 847.
21 582 F.2d 1246 (10th Cir. 1978).
"' 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
582 F.2d at 1248. Defense counsel cross-examined federal officers extensively about
the involvement of Carl Arico, an intermediary between defendant and federal agents who
had not been indicted. The prosecutor responded by asking why charges had not been
brought against Arico, to which the agents responded that their main goal was to prose-
cute the "major traffickers." Id.
21 On appeal, defendant alleged two arguments in support of his claim that the
second trial violated the double jeopardy clause: 1) the mistrial was declared by the court
sua sponte, and without manifest necessity; and 2) the mistrial resulted from judicial or
prosecutorial overreaching. Id. The Tenth Circuit rejected both arguments. Defendant,
not the court, had moved for mistrial, and, although the prosecutor had erred in eliciting
1979
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pie" of ineffective assistance.
Having ruled that the prosecutor's error in eliciting the state-
ment was not made in bad faith," the Tenth Circuit ruled that
the failure to file such a motion did not deprive defendant of his
right to effective representation. Nor did any other retrospective
criticism of counsel merit reversal:
One who claims such a deprivation faces a heavy burden. Adequacy
of legal representation is measured neither by hindsight nor suc-
cess .... The standard of adequacy of counsel in this circuit is that
a defendant will be considered to have had adequate counsel unless
counsel's representation at trial was of such a substandard level as
to render the trial a mockery of justice and a sham.2
The court concluded that defendant might criticize some of the
tactics employed at trial, but such criticism was not sufficient to
meet his heavy burden of proof.
In United States v. Seely,2 2the Tenth Circuit held that trial
counsel's death during a recess in the midst of trial did not sup-
port defendant's claim that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel. The court noted that defendant's attorney died of a heart
attack on Thursday afternoon, and that the trial had been contin-
ued until the following Monday when an associate of the deceased
counsel took over. 5 The record reflected both that no further
continuance was requested and that the substitute counsel was
familiar with much of what had already transpired. The court
concluded that defendant's mere allegation that the conviction
may have resulted from substituted counsel's inexperience was
insufficient to meet his burden of showing ineffective assis-
tance.26
the statement, defendant failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor acted in bad faith. Id.
at 1248-49.
2 See note 221 supra.
w 582 F.2d at 1250 (citations omitted).
2 570 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1978).
" Defendant's argument hinged on whether "inexperienced" counsel could be pro-
perly substituted for "seasoned" counsel, without prejudice to defendant. Although the
court did not address the issue directly, it did adopt the "inexperienced" versus
"seasoned" language, and then ruled that defendant was not prejudiced by the substitu-
tion. Id. at 323-24.
2 Id. See Ellis v. Oklahoma, 430 F.2d 1352, 1356 (10th Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1010 (1971).
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B. Right to Confront and Cross-examine Witnesses
In United States v. Lamb,'" four codefendants were con-
victed of numerous charges, including armed robbery, kidnap-
ping, and transportation of stolen vehicles across state lines.
Among the arguments raised on appeal, n 8 three codefendants
urged that the fourth defendant's assertion of his fifth amend-
ment privilege on cross-examination denied them their right to
confront him as a witness against them.
The Tenth Circuit rejected defendants' claim, ruling that the
record reflected that neither the Government's questions nor the
one defendant's responses implicated the other three in any man-
ner. Nor did any of the three defendants request the opportunity
to cross-examine: "Thus, where coappellants had the opportunity
to cross-examine [the fourth defendant] if they desired to do so,
there appears to be no denial of the Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation. ' ' 30
In Robinson v. Benson,21 the Tenth Circuit ruled that the
opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses is not absolutely
essential in a parole rescission hearing. The court noted that
the right to call witnesses is conditional in the context of a prison
disciplinary proceeding, 32 and that the opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses was not absolutely required in parole revoca-
tion matters. m Thus, confrontation in the context of a parole
rescission was not an essential constitutional right.23
- 575 F.2d 1310 (10th Cir. 1978).
21 Various defendants argued violation of their fifth amendment privilege against self
incrimination, the admissibility of prior convictions, and the admissibility of prior crimi-
nal activity. One interesting, if not noteworthy, ground for appeal was that one of the
defendants had been ordered to shave his beard because he had been clean-shaven at the
time of the robbery. On appeal, that defendant claimed that the order was violative of
his fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination. The court disagreed, ruling that
such an order required defendant only to give non-testimonial evidence. Id. at 1316.
"" Defendant Clary had elected to testify in his own defense, and then exercised the
privilege on cross-examination. Id. at 1314.
"I Id. See United States v. Troutman, 458 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1972). The court in
Lamb refused to speculate on what might have happened if the other defendants had
chosen to cross-examine the fourth defendant. 575 F.2d at 1314.
-' 570 F.2d 920 (lOthCir. 1978). For other aspects of this case, see text accompanying
notes 191-95 supra.
*" 570 F.2d at 922 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)).
570 F.2d at 922 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)).
0 570 F.2d at 923. It should be noted that this decision is based more on the due
process clause than on the confrontation clause. Both of the Supreme Court decisions
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C. Right to Speedy Trial
In United States v. Grismore,5 defendant asserted violation
of both the Speedy Trial Act236 and his sixth amendment right to
a speedy trial. Defendant was originally indicted on June 17,
1975, and arraigned on July 15, 1975. Trial did not begin until
March 11, 1976,2r and defendant appealed his conviction because
of the delay.
First, the Tenth Circuit addressed defendant's alleged viola-
tion of two sections of the Speedy Trial Act. The court ruled that
one provision, section 3161,m was not applicable to indictments
handed down before July 1, 1976. Moreover, Utah's interim plan
adopted pursuant to section 3164 2 was also inapplicable because
defendant was tried within the 180 day time period following the
effective date of the rule. 20
Second, the court addressed defendant's allegation that he
was denied his constitutional right to speedy trial. The court
reviewed the four pertinent factors announced by the Supreme
Court in Barker v. Wingo:"4 "length of delay, the reason for the
delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant."24 2 The court noted that the nine month delay be-
tween indictment and trial was caused in large part by the diffi-
relied upon by the Tenth Circuit in Robinson (see text accompanying notes 232 and 233
supra) address the applicability of the due process clause to analogous factual situations.
Robinson is nonetheless included here because defendant asserted his right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses at his parole rescission hearing.
m 564 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1586 (1978). For other aspects
of this case, see text accompanying notes 213-17 supra.
= 18 U.S.C. § 3161-3174 (1976). SubsectionUc) of section 3161 provides generally that
the arraignment of a defendant must be held within 10 days of the indictment or informa-
tion, and that trial must commence within 60 days thereafter.
23 The case was assigned to Judge Anderson who recused himself. The case was
reassigned to Judge Powell who died. The third judge, Judge Ritter, recused himself, and
the case returned to Judge Anderson. On January 29, 1976-seven months after indict-
ment-the case was assigned to Judge Brimmer. Trial commenced two months later. 564
F.2d at 932.
23 See note 236 supra.
18 U.S.C. § 3164 (1976) provides that each district shall place into operation an
interim plan-until the effective date of § 3161, i.e., July 1, 1976-"to assure priority in
trial or other disposition" of cases. The Utah plan discussed in Grismore became effective
September 29, 1975, and defendant was tried approximately five months later. 564 F.2d
at 932.
' See note 239 supra.
uI 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
U42 Id. at 530, quoted in United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d at 932.
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culty in obtaining a judge."' The record, however, reflected no
request by the defendant for trial, nor any prejudice caused by
the delay. Under such circumstances, the court ruled, defendant
had a fair trial and was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial
under the sixth amendment. " '
IV. TRLAL MATrERS
A. Pretrial Matters
1. Transcript of Preliminary Hearing
United States v. Vandivere2 5 was a case of first impression
discussing the sufficiency of furnishing an indigent defendant
with a tape recording of the preliminary hearing in lieu of a writ-
ten transcript. The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in
Britt v. North Carolina2 4 as establishing two controlling guide-
lines for determining whether an indigent defendant must be pro-
vided a transcript: " '(1) the value of the transcript to the de-
fendant in connection with the appeal or trial for which it is
sought, and (2) the availability of alternative devices that would
fulfill the same functions as a transcript.' ",247
The district court judge ruled that the defendant should be
given access to a full tape recording of the preliminary examina-
tion, and the appellate court accepted his determination that a
transcript "or its equivalent"2 would be of value to defendant in
the preparation of his case.
The opinion centered primarily on whether a tape recording
of a preliminary hearing is an alternative device "equivalent" to
a transcript. The court noted that the presumption should be that
indigent defendants in criminal cases are entitled to transcripts
of any preliminary examination.24 This presumption appears to
be based on the language in United States v. Jonas-althoughan
informal alternative substantially equivalent to a transcript is
available under Britt, in the "overwhelming majority of cases
• ..tape recordings or judicial notes will [not] suffice."0 Rule
24 See note 237 supra.
1,4 564 F.2d at 932.
2- 579 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1978).
2U 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
"1 404 U.S. at 227, quoted in United States v. Vandivere, 579 F.2d at 1242.
2 579 F.2d at 1242.
2,, Id. at 1243.
540 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1976); FED. R. Cram. P. 5.1.
1979
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5.1 adopted in the aftermath of Britt, provides the method for
securing tape recordings and written transcripts of preliminary
hearings. The purpose of the rule is to eliminate the delay and
expense of written transcripts where listening to a tape recording
would be sufficient.
Given the authority to evaluate the expediency of a tape
recording as an alternative, the Tenth Circuit seemed to focus on
the complexity of the proceeding as the determinative factor of
the tape's sufficiency The court in Vandivere stressed the sim-
plicity and brevity of the trial, and that the government agent's
testimony did not vary between the hearing and the trial. The
facts in Jonas were distinguished: there had been two trials sepa-
rated by two and one half months, and different attorneys had
represented the defendant at each trial."'
While brevity and simplicity may be desirable ends, the re-
sult of the Vandivere analysis may contribute to a premature
determination of simplicity that could foreclose or diminish the
defendant's ability to develop and prepare a legitimately complex
defense. Certainly both Jonas and Vandivere caution that the
presumption that a defendant is entitled to a written transcript
should not be lightly discarded.
2. Stipulation
United States v. Haro 2 illustrates the potential danger of
stipulation in a criminal case, since the government is thereby
relieved of the burden of proving that element of the crime. Haro
was convicted of possessing unregistered grenades. 2s At the con-
clusion of the government's case-in-chief, the parties stipulated
that the grenades were devices as described in the indictment and
subject to the applicable statute. Haro entered into the stipula-
tion unaware that the grenades had been prepared by the govern-
ment witness as exemplar devices in an unrelated trial. On appeal
defendant argued that the stipulation was the only evidence es-
tablishing the destructive character of the grenades, 254 and that
"' 579 F.2d at 1242.
V2 5"3 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 156 (1978).
26 U.S.C.A. §§ 5845, 5861 (1954).
"' The essence of defendant's motion for dismissal was that the government had
failed to show that the weapons were characteristically destructive within the meaning of
the statute, thereby alerting him of the need for registration. 573 F.2d at 663.
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counsel would not have entered into the stipulation had he known
that the grenades were exemplar devices.n5
The Tenth Circuit ruled that nondisclosure by the govern-
ment witness did not give rise to reversible error and that Haro
could not be afforded relief from his stipulation.25 Furthermore,
the court noted that even if the witness' nondisclosure had
amounted to prosecutorial misconduct, Haro would not be af-
forded relief because he failed to establish that knowledge of these
facts would have led to a different result on retrial.
25
1
The court's opinion suggests that the criminal defendant
risks a crucial concession when he enters into any stipulation, and
that even when the stipulation is a product of government mis-
conduct the defendant will have the onerous burden of showing
precisely how his case has been damaged as a result of the stipula-
tion.
3. Motion to Supress-Chain of Custody
In Edwards v. Oklahomau the Tenth Circuit voted to reverse
a defendant's conviction. The reversal was predicated on an inad-
equately explained break in the chain of custody as a result of
destruction of the evidence by its custodian. Defendant Edwards
was arrested for drunk driving. He was given the standard breath-
alyzer test, and the ampoule was subsequently destroyed by the
operator pursuant to the rules and regulations of the Board of
Chemical Tests.Y
Although the Tenth Circuit expressly refused to pass on the
constitutionality of non-malicious destruction of breathalyzer
ampoules, it .ruled that the summary treatment of the issue by
the state court denied defendant the right to a "full hearing." M
The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing with instruc-
tions that: (1) specific inquiry should be made into the particular
breathalyzer test given Edwards; (2) the pertinent statute per-
mitting immediate destruction should be submitted as evidence
UId. at 665.
The court noted that one grenade had been detonated almost immediatly following
Haro's sale to the agent and that it was a high quality destructive device, and that the
three exemplar grenades were identical in all pertinent respects. Id.
m Id. (citing United States v. Grismore, 546 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1976)).
- 577 F.2d 1119 (10th Cir. 1978).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, §§ 751-759.
U 577 F.2d at 1121.
1979
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accompanied by a detailed explanation of the ampoule itself; and
(3) most significantly, the government should offer an explana-
tion of the need for such destruction.
4. Petite Policy
211
In United States v. Thompson20 2 and United States L). Fritz"3
the Tenth Circuit addressed the Justice Department's so-called
"Petite Policy." As stated in the United States Attorney s Man-
ual, it is departmental policy that after a state prosecution there
should be no federal trial for the act or acts unless there are
compelling federal interests, in which case prior approval from
the Attorney General is to be obtained as a prerequisite to prose-
cution.24 Both cases held that: (1) the Petite policy is merely an
internal, self-regulatory departmental policy that creates no en-
forceable right in the defendant to avoid federal prosecution fol-
lowing a state conviction for the same acts; and (2) the United
States Attorney's failure to obtain prior approval from the Attor-
ney General had no effect on the validity of the prosecutions.
B. Admissibility of Evidence
1. Foundation
In this age of rapid technological advance, products which a
few years ago would have been considered novel in design have
become commonplace and the accuracy of such products is gener-
ally recognized. Given the orientation it was not surprising that
the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Foster215 took judicial notice
"' The Petite policy is a product of the tension created in a dual sovereign system
between the right to avoid double jeopardy and the ability of both state and federal courts
to prosecute a defendant for the same act. Under the policy, federal prosecution is disfa-
vored once the state has acted. But the existence of the doctrine does not expand a
defendant's rights. The Petite line of cases is interpreted to mean that promulgation of
the policy by the Department of Justice confers no rights on the defendant, and that a
defendant may not invoke the Petite policy to avoid federal prosecution unless the
government agrees. The doctrine takes its name from a factually inapposite situation,
however. Petite involved two federal prosecutions in different circuits. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court granted the Attorney General's motion to vacate the second federal
judgment, indicating that policy dictated by fairness disfavors multiple prosecutions.
However, the essence of the doctrine is the federal policy of avoiding dual prosecutions
by the federal government when the state has already acted. Petite v. United States, 361
U.S. 529 (1960).
- 579 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1978).
263 580 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1978).
'1 Id. at 374.
580 F.2d 388 (1978).
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of the reliability and general acceptance of telephone company
equipment used to discover an unlawful device depriving it of
revenue.21 The majority ruled that the nature and extent of the
foundation which must be laid for introduction of tapes produced
by electronic equipment is largely discretionary, and that the
trial court's admission of the evidence was clearly within its au-
thority. The court then went beyond the trial court in taking
judicial notice of the accuracy of the phone company's detection
equipment.26 7
In United States v. Shields-5 the Tenth Circuit addressed the
admissibility of expert testimony on signature comparison when
none of the documents used for comparison were identified at
trial, admitted in evidence, or found by the trial court to contain
the genuine signature of the defendant. The court held the ex-
pert's testimony admissible under rule 703261 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence which provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known
to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data used need not be admissible in
evidence. "o
Moreover, the court noted that the defendant never challenged
the genuineness of the inadmissible document. He had merely
objected to the expert's testimony on the ground that the samples
were not originals.27
The court's application of rule 703 placed this defendant in
a dilemma. To challenge the authenticity of the comparative
documents he would have had to offer them into evidence,
Id. at 390. Defendant was using a multi-frequency signal generator "blue box" to
circumvent charges on long-distance phone calls. Alerted by the frequency and duration
of toll-free calls placed by defendant, the phone company had an employee monitor
defendant's phone with a detection device described as "Hekimian equipment." No at-
tempt was made to qualify the employee as an expert in the use of Hekimian equipment,
but the evidence was undisputed that the device used at trial functioned properly and
produced results identical to those produced by the equipment used on defendant's phone.
Id. at 389.
2" Id. at 390.
Ml 573 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1978).
N FED. R. Evm. 703.
211 573 F.2d at 21 (emphasis in court's opinion).
"' See FED. R. EVmD. 1002, the so-called Best Evidence Rule.
1979
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thereby waiving his right to have such prejudicial evidence de-
clared inadmissible. Yet, by failing to challenge the documents,
the expert's testimony stood uncontradicted in the instant case.
2. Rule 404
In United States v. Carleo 2 the Tenth Circuit applied rule
404(b)2 3 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in upholding the trial
court's admission of evidence of uncharged crimes and acts as
proof of motive or intent. Defendant Carleo was a bar owner being
investigated for gambling and bookmaking activities. One of his
employees, Hull, discovered the operation and had been told to
keep quiet and leave town. Hull became a government informer,
and Carleo was convicted of conspiracy to obstruct a criminal
investigation 4 and obstruction of justice.2 7Both statutes require
proof of defendant's specific intent to obstruct. To satisfy this
element the prosecution offered evidence that defendant had
beaten another suspected informer in Hull's presence as an
"example" and had tried to intimidate Hull by references to a
well-known informer who had been shot the year before.Y'
The court ruled the government's evidence admissible under
rule 404(b).2 7 More significantly, it commended the manner in
which the trial court had handled the offer of proof and introduc-
tion of the evidence:
[The trial court here acted with the sensitivity and caution that
considerations of other crimes evidence requires [sic]. The court
called a recess in order carefully to consider the nature and purpose
of the proffered evidence outside the presence of the jury before it
was introduced. Moreover, the jury was instructed immediately
prior to the introduction of the testimony that it was "being re-
ceived for the very limited purpose of shedding what light it may,
if any, on the motive and intent of the defendant in the [jury's]
consideration of the charges made against him in this case." Rec-
ord, vol. 3, at 41. The court also cautioned the prosecution not to go
into the details of Dickinson's beating, and the government did not
" 576 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1978).
rn Fzre. R. Evm. 404(b) provides in pertinent part that: "Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts . . . may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity. intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident."
v, 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (1976).
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976).
' 576 F.2d at 849.
See note 273 supra.
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attempt to go beyond the scope of the inquiry delineated by the
court. " '
United States v. Westbo,2' concerned the introduction into
evidence of a separate, uncharged crime by way of cross-
examination. The evidence had been excluded from the govern-
ment's case-in-chief during an in camera conference. Westbo was
convicted of wire fraud;2 the fraud itself involved defendant's
breach of his fiduciary duty as broker for the Bankers Union Life
Insurance Company (BULIC). For financial reasons BULIC
needed to sell a block of mortgages within a short time. At the
last minute, Westbo's negotiations with the expected buyer fell
through so he agreed to purchase the mortgages himself for $2.4
million. He then sold the mortgages to another for $2.7 million.2'
During the course of the trial a BULIC committment letter,
allegedly forged by defendant, was discovered. The government
sought to introduce the letter under rule 404(b)2 2 to show that
defendant had consistently taken advantage of the hectic situa-
tion at BULIC in the months prior to the mortgage fraud. Be-
cause the court would not permit introduction of the letter as
substantive evidence, the government displayed the document
and cross-examined two witnesses about it without actually intro-
ducing it into evidence.
The Tenth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction, ruling
that the trial court had abused its discretion in not declaring a
mistrial when the jury was exposed to this evidence. That conclu-
sion had two distinct aspects.m
First, in spite of the fact that the trial judge had excluded
that evidence, the government's manner of presentation elicited
the inference that defendant had forged the letter, although there
was absolutly no attempt to prove the forgery:
In effect, then, the forbidden evidence was put before the jury by
unavoidable inferences drawn from answers given by these prosecu-
tion witnesses. Compounding these prejucidial inferences was the
fact that defendant was then in the dilemma of having evidence of
576 F.2d at 849-50.
P 576 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1978).
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
576 F.2d at 288.
' See note 273 supra.
2 576 F.2d at 292.
1979
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other crimes effectively before the jury but being unable to negate
these inferences without waiving his objection to this inadmissible
evidence.2"'
Second, the Tenth Circuit sought to interpret the trial
court's intent in excluding the letter as substantive evidence The
court concluded that the evidence had been properly excluded
under rule 4032 which provides for exclusion of any evidence in
which the probative value is substantially outweighed by the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice. The trial court's ruling was intended to
prohibit any reference to the letter; the government's "egregious
conduct" violated the clear intent of the court's ruling and denied
Westbo an opportunity to defend.
3. Rule 801(d)(2)
United States v. Blumenthal 6 illustrates the broad scope of
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2).187 Blumenthal was originally
charged with distribution and conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
The trial court dropped the conspiracy charge and defendant was
convicted of distribution. m As part of the premise for its holding
that there was sufficient independent proof of the existence of the
conspiracy to make the hearsay statements of the co-conspirators
admissible, the court noted in dictum that rule 801(d)(2)(E)
recognizes statements of co-conspirators as an exception to the
prohibition against hearsay even when no conspiracy is
chargedY'" As applied in Blumenthal, the dismissal of the con-
spiracy charge against defendant had no effect on the admissibil-
ity of extrajudicial statements by co-conspirators.
Admission of inculpatory statements by a co-conspirator was
m Id.
m FEa. R. Evm. 403.
m 575 F.2d 1306 (10th Cir. 1978).
:8 FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is
(A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity
or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning
a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the
existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
575 F.2d at 1310. See note 287 supra for text of FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(E).
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a basis for appeal in United States v. Davis.,' In Davis, defen-
dant's co-conspirator was acquitted by the jury. Defendant
argued that the acquittal rendered her inculpatory statement ret-
roactively inadmissible. The court ruled that defendant's reliance
on the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Ratcliffe29 was
misplaced because a co-conspirator's statements are retroactively
inadmissible only if the declarant is acquitted as a matter of law,
and that the distinction between court and jury acquittal rests on
the requirements that admission of any co-conspirator's state-
ment requires an independent prima facie showing of declarant's
involvement in a conspiracy. When a declarant is acquitted as a
matter of law there is no such independent proof of the existence
of the conspiracy; therefore, the statements become inadmissible.
The intriguing aspect of Davis is the court's suggestion that
a timely request from defendant that the jury be instructed not
to consider the hearsay statement as evidence against Davis if
they found his co-conspirator not guilty might have been effec-
tive. " 2 Davis makes it apparent such an instruction would not
ordinarily come from the court sua sponte; the defense attorney
should request such an instruction whenever appropriate.
C. Interpretation of Federal Rules
1. FED. R. Cfnm. P. 12.1
In United States v. Fitts2 3 the Tenth Circuit refused to find
an abuse of discretion in the exclusion of defendant's alibi wit-
nesses under rule 12.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure,29' despite the fact that failure to comply with the g6vern-
ment's demand for a list of alibi witnesses under 12.1(a) n5 was the
578 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1978).
' 550 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1976). In Ratcliffe, the Ninth Circuit ruled that where
evidence is insufficient for submission to the jury and the court acquits an alleged co-
conspirator, prior out-of-court statements of the acquitted become inadmissible and a new
trial is required. Id, at 433.
Ut 578 F.2d at 281.
03 576 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1978).
M Fwn. R. CmiM. P. 12.1(d) provides in part: "Upon the failure of either party to
comply with requirements of this rule, the court may exclude the testimony of any undis-
closed witness offered by such party."
U FED. R. CaM. P. 12.1(a) provides in part:
Upon written demand of the attorney for the government. . . the defendant
shall serve . . . a written notice of his intention to offer a defense of alibi.
Such notice by the defendant shall state specific place or places at which the
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result of defense counsel's inexperience. Although the court indi-
cated that the 12.1(d) sanction probably should not have been
imposed under these rather extreme circumstances, such pro-
cedural elimination of Fitts' defense did not render the trial a
"mockery of justice."296
2. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20
In interpreting rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Herbst"7 adopted
the Singer rule 98 that the defendant may waive the right to be
tried in a particular district court, but may not compel transfer
of the case to another district.2"
Herbst was indicted in Kansas and in Wisconsin. The dis-
trict of Kansas moved to join all charges for a single Wisconsin
disposition pursuant to rule 20,20 but the proceeding was
dropped when the Wisconsin court refused the transfer. After he
was convicted in Wisconsin, defendant was tried in Kansas, con-
victed of interstate transportation of forged securities,30' and
given a sentence running consecutively with the Wisconsin term.
He argued that he had pled guilty in Wisconsin with the under-
standing that all outstanding charges against him were to be
combined, and that Wisconsin's refusal to include the Kansas
indictment and the subsequent abandonment of the proceeding
by Kansas without notice were violative of his due process rights.
The court held that absent a bargain in which the transferor
court had agreed to carry out a rule 20 transfer, the gravamen
of the rule was mutual consent by the district attorneys. Such a
defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the
names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely to
establish such alibi.
576 F.2d at 839.
565 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1978).
n Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965), cited in United States v. Herbst, 565
F.2d at 642.
2" 565 F.2d at 642.
3n FeD. R. Clm. P. 20(a) provides in part:
A defendant arrested, held, or present in a district other than that in which
an indictment or information is pending against him may state in writing
that he wishes to plead guilty or nolo contendere, to waive trial in the district
in which the indictment or information is pending, and to consent to disposi-
tion of the case in the district in which he was arrested, held, or present,
subject to the approval of the United States attorney for each district. ...
30 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976).
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transfer was a matter of discretion rather than right, and failure
to notify the defendant of initiation or subsequent abandonment
of such proceeding was "not significant."
3. FED. R. CRM. P. 29
United States v. Lopezm included an interesting discussion
of the defendant's dilemma when his rule 29(b) motion for ac-
quittal has been denied.' If the defendant presents evidence
following the denial, his objection and ability to appeal the
denial are automatically waived and he assumes the risk that his
evidence will supply the missing elements of the prosecution's
case.
In Lopez, the Tenth Circuit noted recent criticisms of the
waiver rule3 and the opinion seems to suggest a willingness to
modify the rule. However, the court found the Lopez situation
factually inapposite and refused to confront the rule 29 question.
D. Statutory Interpretation
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1955
In United States v. Quarry- the court interpreted 18 U.S.C.
§ 1955, a federal gambling statute which requires participation by
at least five persons. At the close of the evidence the trial judge
gave an "all or nothing instruction" that all five defendants must
be found guilty to sustain any single guilty verdict. Because the
jury returned guilty verdicts against only four of the five defen-
dants, the judge acquitted all five. The government appealed the
judge's action,w maintaining that the trial judge had improperly
interpreted the five or more requirement of section 1955 and that
the section required only a showing that "five or more persons
conducted, financed, managed, supervised, directed or own all or
part of such business."
* 565 F.2d at 643.
576 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1978).
Under rule 29, defendant automatically waives his objection to a denial of his
motion for acquittal if he thereafter presents testimony himself, although he may move
again at the close of all evidence. FED. R. CriM. P. 29.
M See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 869, 864 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 846 (1976); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 903 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1120 (1975).
- 576 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1978).
i Cf. United States v. Calloway, 562 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1977) (discussing the govern-
ment's authority to appeal from the trial judge's error of law).
3 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1) (1976).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
The Tenth Circuit, agreeing with the government, ruled that
the trial judge's interpretation was inconsistent with both the
statute and the weight of authority A" The court reinstated the
jury's verdict of guilty as to the four defendants, ruling that al-
though the trial judge's instructions had been erroneous, the jury
had been provided with a copy of section 1955 and had correctly
interpreted it.
2. Jencks Act
In United States v. Heath ' the Tenth Circuit held that the
government had violated the Jencks Act,31" ' which requires that
the prosecution disclose statements of a government witness to
the defense. 2 On appeal the government asserted a good faith
defense based on the statutory language which compels produc-
tion only of statements "in possession" of the United States, ' "
and contended that the witheld statements were in state rather
than federal hands.
314
The Tenth Circuit refused to permit the government to adopt
this hypertechnical interpretation of "in possession," ruling that
any government witness' testimony is property subject to the




Conceding that the government had indeed violated the
Jencks Act by failing to produce the statement, the court noted
that the trial court had found no bad faith on the part of the
prosecutor, 3 1 and that the statements were eventually disclosed
1 576 F.2d at 833. See United States v. Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1973).
310 580 F.2d 1011 (10th Cir. 1978). The Heath case involved six defendants convicted
of a conspiracy to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 952 (1976). The
case was originally brought as a fourteen count indictment against twenty individuals
alleged to be members of a grand conspiracy. The case is an indicator of the potency of
the conspiracy charge and, according to the dissent, of the ability of the government to
wield the "sweeping net" of conspiracy to its advantage.
" 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976) is entitled "Demands for production of statements and
reports of witnesses."
3 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) provides in part: "After a witness called by the United States
has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the
United States to produce any statement . which relates to the subject matter as to
which the witness has testified."
1i3 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a).
31, 580 F.2d at 1018.
315 Id.
"I The dissent's analysis of the pattern of prosecutorial misconduct came to the
opposite conclusion; the pattern of requests, denials, and assurances transferred any gov-
ernment "inadvertance" into deliberate or at least negligent supression. Id. at 1030.
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with full opportunity for defendants to conduct a second cross-
examination. Even more significantly, the defense had not made
a motion to strike the testimony, nor did it affirmativly demon-
strate prejudice as a result of the violation. The court concluded
that no mistrial was required; defendant's conviction was upheld.
Judge McKay dissented, stating that the Act required the
court to strike the government witness' testimony"7 and to reverse
unless it was "perfectly clear" that the defense was not preju-
diced by the violation. Even when the government ultimately
produced the statements, the statute placed the burden on the
prosecution to make a clear showing that defendant was not prej-
udiced by the violation. t5
E. Post-trial Matters
1. Sentencing
The 1977-78 Tenth Circuit cases pertaining to sentencing
reaffirm the well-established rule that such matters are within
the sound discretion of the trial court. Watson v. United States'"
involved the resentencing procedure under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 when
a prior sentence has been declared invalid because invalid convic-
tions were considered in assessing the sentence. Defendant Wat-
son was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to a fifteen
year term. He initiated a section 2255 attack, contending that the
trial judge had considered a prior invalid conviction in setting the
term. The trial judge ruled that the first sentence was invalid, but
resentenced defendant to an identical term. On appeal, defen-
dant argued that he should have been resentenced by a new
judge, relying on a Ninth Circuit decision,32 which required fresh
", 18 U.S.C. § 3500(d) (1976): "If the United States elects not to comply . ..the
court shall strike from the record the testimony of the witness . (Emphasis sup-
plied).
" 580 F.2d at 1029 (McKay, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Missler, 414
F.2d 1293, 1303-04 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970)).
The requirements of the Jencks Act are intended to provide defendants in
federal prosecutions with an opportunity for thorough cross-examination of
government witnesses, making the constitutionally guaranteed right of con-
frontation more meaningful. Violations of the statute are necessarily at-
tended by the danger that this precious right will be impaired. For this
reason, and also because it is ordinarily difficult upon review of a cold record
to ascertain the value to the defense of a statement witheld, violation of the
Act is excused only in extraordinary circumstances.
' 575 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1978).
" Farrow v. United States, No. 74-2429 (9th Cir., filed Sept. 24, 1976) (case reopened
1979
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resentencing conducted by a new judge without consideration of
invalid prior convictions.
The Tenth Circuit rejected defendant's argument, holding
that the new sentence, even if identical, will be upheld if it ap-




The appeal in United States v. Thomas3 22 centered on what
the court termed a "misunderstanding" in a plea bargaining situ-
ation. Thomas was charged with possessing the contents of a
parcel stolen from the United States mails. 32 Defendant pled
guilty on the basis of a promise that the judge would not impose
the sentence until all charges were accumulated. He was sen-
tenced by a different judge however, and two days after sen-
tencing, defendant was indicted on numerous other charges. 32'
Thomas moved to dismiss the newly returned indictment on the
ground that the government had reneged on representations pre-
viously made which defendant had relied on to his detriment.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's dismissal, and
remanded the case for trial. In its view, the trial judge's bargain
in no way constituted an agreement by the government that fur-
ther indictments would not be returned. Rather, the "promise"
was construed simply as an agreement that defendant would not
be sentenced until all existing indictments had been returned. 32
Moreover, the court of appeals indicated that the subsequent
indictments were not filed in bad faith. Therefore, the court sug-
gested two alternatives to be pursued on remand: (1) that defen-
dant be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to the original charge;
or (2) that defendant's sentence be vacated without a withdrawal
of the guilty plea and the new indictments be processed before
imposing a sentence.32
Apr. 14, 1977 to be considered by the court en banc).
n 575 F.2d at 810.Arcord, United States v. Radowitz, 507 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1974);
United States v. Gaither, 503 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1974).
m 580 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1978).
m 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1970).
' The new indictment included violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 495, 1708, 2314, and 371.
580 F.2d at 1037.
580 F.2d at 1038.
mId.
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Barker v. United States'" also involved plea bargaining, spe-
cifically a defendant's right to withdraw his plea of guilty prior
to sentencing. Barker was convicted of receipt by a previously
convicted felon of a firearm transported in interstate commerce.so2
While awaiting trial his apartment was searched and several in-
criminating items-a sawed-off shotgun and some marijuana-
were seized. After a full hearing pursuant to rule 11(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Barker pled guilty, and
the government agreed not to oppose defendant's release
bond until sentencing and not to attempt to make use of any
evidence found in the apartment. Further, Barker was found to
be mentally competent and represented by adequate counsel dur-
ing the entire proceeding, and his guilty plea was deemed free and
voluntary. 2 ' One week before sentencing however, Barker at-
tempted to withdraw his guilty plea, contending that he had been
coerced into the bargain. The trial court ruled that the coercion
argument was without merit.m"
On appeal Barker distinguished between pleas withdrawn
before and after sentencing, urging that the proper test before
sentencing was "fairness and justice. " 11 Defendant argued that
the trial court improperly employed the more stringent post-
sentencing standard .
2
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the trial court's use of the words
"mandate" and "require"'s did not indicate application of the
improper standard. Such terms only expressed the court's recog-
nition that withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an absolute right,
but rather one resting solidly in the discretion of the trial court.m
579 F.2a 1219 (10th Cir. 1978).
I 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1976).
- The pleas were held to be in full compliance with FeD. R. CanM. P. 11(d). 579 F.2d
at 1224.
Id. at 1222.
I' d. at 1223.
- The more stringent test after sentencing, withdrawal of a guilty plea only in cases
of manifest injustice, is found in FRn. R. Cwm. P. 32(d).
s Barker based his argument on the language in the trial court's memorandum
denying his withdrawal motion: "We are not convinced that he would have presented legal
ground sufficient to mandate allowance of his motion for withdrawal. . . .There is no
situation here which would require us to allow withdrawal of the guilty plea." (Emphasis
in opinion). 579 F.2d at 1223.
sm579 F.2d at 1223.
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Therefore, the trial court's refusal to allow defendant to withdraw
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OVEvVIw
I. STATUTES OF LMITATIONS IN CIVL RIGHTS CASES
A. Zuniga v. AMFA C Foods, Inc.'
In an action invoked under the jurisdiction of 42 U.S.C. §
1981,1 plaintiff Zuniga alleged he was discriminately refused
"bumping rights" by the defendant; these rights would have ena-
bled plaintiff to continue working and retain his seniority. Plain-
tiff further averred that subsequent to termination of employ-
ment, he was wrongfully refused reinstatement. 3 The action
was dismissed by the district court on limitations grounds.'
The issue for the purposes of appeal was which statute of
limitations should be applicable to federal employment discrimi-
nation actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in Colorado's fed-
eral district courts.' The three statutes mentioned in the district
court's statement, and later discussed in the court of appeals'
opinion, were the two-year "federal action" statute,' the three-
year "residuary" statute,' and the six-year statute governing spe-
'580 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1978).
Equal rights under the law. All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punish-
ment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to
no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
580 F.2d at 381-82.
d. at 381. The district court found the action barred by the statutes of limitation
under Cow. Rev. STAT. §§ 13-80-106 and 13-80-108(1)(b) (1973). For text of the statutes,
see notes 6&7 infra.
580 F.2d at 381.
Cow. Rzv. STAT. § 13-80-106 (1973).
Actions under federal statutes. All actions upon a liability created by a
federal statute, other than for a forfeiture or penalty for which actions no
period of limitations is provided in such statute, shall be commenced within
two years or the period specified for comparable actions arising under Colo-
rado law, whichever is longer, after the cause of action accrues.
The relevant portion of Cow. Rzv. STAT. 0 13-80-108 (1973) states: "Actions barred
in three years. (1) The following actions shall be commenced within three years next after
the act complained of and not afterwards: . . .
(b) All other actions of every kind for which no other period of limitation is provided
for by law."
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cifically mentioned contract and tort actions.'
The court of appeals determined that a two-step approach
would be in keeping with prior decisions,9 stating that "the an-
swer to our limitations question requires analysis of the essential
nature of the federal claim and comparison to similar state ac-
tions."10
Although both the "federal action" statute and the
"residuary" or "catch-all" statute are available to the plaintiff of
a federal civil rights claim, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
under Colorado's statutory scheme another longer statute must
be utilized if also applicable." The reasoning in Jackson v. Conti-
nental Oil Co.12 persuaded the court of appeals that "'[i]n an
employment discrimination case such as this, the facts will most
closely resemble either a contract or a tort suit.' "13 Therefore, the
longer six-year limitation would govern."
First, to sustain their holding that the case at bar related to
a contract action, the Tenth Circuit relied on the Supreme
Court's broad construction of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc. 1' In Johnson, the Court resurrected
42 U.S.C. § 1981 to provide an alternate legal remedy to Title VII
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-110 (1973) states:
Actions barred in six years. (1) Except as otherwise provided in section 4-2-
725, C.R.S. 1973, the following actions shall be commenced within six years
after the cause of action accrues, and not afterwards:
(d) All actions of assumpsit, or on the case founded on any contract or
liability, express or implied;
(g) All other actions on the case, except actions for slander and for libel.
The court of appeals relied on Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180 (1976); Auto
Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-05 (1966); and O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S.
318, 324 (1914). In Runyon, the silence of Congress as to statutes of limitations under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 was interpreted to mean that federal policy would approve adoption of the
local limitation laws. Auto Workers previously had stated this concept as it applied to the
Labor Management Relations Act. O'Sullivan characterized civil rights actions by an
individual as remedial in nature and not penal. Therefore, the federal limitation governing
actions for civil fines, penalties, or forfeitures was inapplicable.
' 580 F.2d at 384.
Id. at 384-85, 387.
, No. 74-F-1209 (D.Colo. Nov. 9, 1976).
" 580 F.2d at 385 (quoting Jackson v. Continental Oil Co., No. 74-F-1209 (D.Colo.
Nov. 9, 1976)).
", 580 F.2d at 385.
Is 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,11 stating that 42 U.S.C. § 1981
"on its face relates primarily to racial discrimination in the mak-
ing and enforcement of contracts."'" The Tenth Circuit noted
that the plaintiff in Zuniga had averred breach of the collective
bargaining contract and denial of "bumping rights." Discrimina-
tory acts dealing with enforcement of contract rights had there-
fore been alleged and the six-year limitations statute was applica-
ble. 1
Secondly, the Tenth Circuit stated that the cause of action
also sounded in tort since employer discrimination interferes with
the personal right to contract; thus, the action would be "for the
tort growing out of the contract."" The plaintiff in Zuniga had
alleged injury because of his national origin and the court of
appeals held this to be "in effect and by nature, an action in tort
for trespass on the case." ' Again, the six-year limitations period
would control.
2'
Because the plaintiff's complaint asserted "tortious discrimi-
natory acts infringing contractual rights, and denial of contrac-
tual rights as well,"" the action was timely under the broad provi-
sions of the six-year statute of limitations. The motion to dismiss
was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.2
42 U.S.C. § 200e-5 (1976). For criticism of 01981 as an alternative remedy, see
Note, Filing of an Employment Discrimination Charge Under Title WI as Tolling The
Statute of Limitations Applicable To A 1981 Action: The Unanswered Questions of John-
son v. REA, 26 CAsz W. Rzs. L. Rsv. 889, 940-43 (1976), where the author argues that the
rebirth of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 has not remedied the existing problems of TitleVII, has instead
overburdened the judicial system, and that the individual's remedies should be returned
to pre-Johnson status. However, in Larson, The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy
for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 IHv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rzv. 56, 102
(1972), the author concludes that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 should be used as a remedy in conjunc-
tion with Title VII and that the problems relating "primarily to statutes of limitations,
exhaustion of remedies, the applicable substantive law, and scope of available remedies"
can be resolved by the courts.
" 421 U.S. at 459.
580 F.2d at 386.
Ahart v. Sutton, 79 Colo. 145, 148, 244 P. 306, 307 (1926). In-Ahart, the six-year
limitation was utilized in an action for fraud in real estate contracts.
0 580 F.2d at 386-87 (quoting from Wolf Sales Co. v. Randolf Wurlitzer Co., 105 F.
Supp. 506, 508 (D.Colo. 1952)). In Wolf, a two-year statute of limitations for a federal
antitrust claim was held to be discriminatory and therefore the six-year statute of limita-
tions governed actions on the case. See 580 F.2d at 387 n.8, for a discussion of trespass
on the case (damage suffered for a wrong committed without force).





B. Which Analogies Should Be Utilized in the Application of
Statutes of Limitations to Civil Rights Acts?
In the course of the decision to apply a six-year statute of
limitations to Zuniga, the Tenth Circuit considered various Colo-
rado statutory periods which would bar a federal civil rights ac-
tion,21 i.e., the "federal action" statute, the "residuary" statute,
and the contract/tort statute. The major problem is, however,
that the Tenth Circuit has inconsistently applied the conflicting
limitation statutes." Therefore, neither party can foresee which
analogy will be utilized by the court. The plaintiff cannot accur-
ately predict whether his cause of action will be barred at the
outset solely on procedural grounds; and the defendant is exposed
to a claim until the running of the longest limitations statute
which could conceivably apply to a federal civil rights claim.
The problem is not unique to the Tenth Circuit." Other stat-
utes in addition to those discussed by the Tenth Circuit have
been considered; a court is limited only by the types of provisions
on the states' books. At least three types of statutes not argued
in Zuniga have been determinative in other federal civil rights
" The Tenth Circuit also rejected AMFAC's argument that the six-month statute of
limitations under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act of 1957 (CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-
34-307 (1973)) should apply. 580 F.2d at 384 n.5.
" Circuit Judge Holloway, in Zuniga, cited examples of Tenth Circuit federal civil
rights litigation which had been decided on the basis of each of the three statutes:
1. CoLO. Rsv. STAT. § 13-80-106 (1973). McKinney v. ARMCO Recreational Products
Co., 419 F. Supp. 464 (D. Colo. 1976) (Statute applicable to claims under 42 U.S.C. §§
1981 and 1985); Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220 (D.Colo. 1966) (Statute applicable to
litigation under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Longer limitations periods were not consid-
ered); Ray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 75-W-459 (D.Colo. May 19, 1978), app. pending,
(suit under §§ 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983 was barred by this statute); Castro v. Patterson,
No. 74-M-1189 (D.Colo. Oct. 1, 1975).
2. CoLO. Rav. STAT. § 13-80-108(1)(b)(1973). Solano v. Sears Roebuck and Co., No.
75-A-931 (D.Colo. Aug. 24, 1976) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 action barred); Evans v. Dow Chemical
Co., No. 74-A-1210 (D.Colo. May 11, 1976) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim not brought within
limitation of statute).
3. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-80-110(1)(d) and (g) (1973). Jackson v. Continental Oil Co.,
No. 74-F-1209 (D. Colo. Nov. 9, 1976) (statute applied to claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5).
" See Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 1976 Asuz. ST. L.J.
97. The Seventh Circuit has more consistently applied one limitations period, the resi-
duary statute, to its federal civil rights claims. See Rinehart v. Locke, 454 F.2d 313 (7th
Cir. 1971)(42 U.S.C. § 1983); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427
F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970) (42 U.S.C. § 1981); Baker v. F&F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th
Cir.) (42 U.S.C. § 1982), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970). But see Duncan v. Nelson, 466
F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972).
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claims in several circuits; and these also have been applied incon-
sistently."
Various remedies have been suggested to alleviate the confu-
sion, including: enactment by Congress of a federal limitations
statute, development of principles by the Supreme Court which
lower courts could follow, consistent application of the existing
statutes, and utilization of statutes based on concepts other than
contract or tort analogies (since these are based on common law,
rather than statutory foundations).N
The Tenth Circuit has not followed any of the available
suggestions. Instead, as evidenced by the Zuniga ruling, it has
continued the confusion and unpredictability already present in
the area of limitations periods as applied to federal civil rights
claims.
II. JURISDICTION
A. Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction
The discretionary power of the federal district courts to exer-
cise pendent jurisdiction of state claims (over whom there is no
basis for independent jurisdiction) was affirmed by the Tenth
Circuit in Transok Pipeline Co. v. Darko.29 Even though the fed-
eral defendants settled before trial, the federal claim was sub-
stantial, and jurisdiction was reserved overthe state claim.s
The court of appeals found that ancillary federal jurisdiction
can be accorded to general water adjudication claims even though
many of the claimants have no rights under any federal statute.
State limitations provisions not mentioned in Zuniga are:
1. Statutes governing actions for injuries to the person or rights of the person.
E.g., Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1972); Jones v. Bombeck, 375 F.2d 737 (3d
Cir. 1967); Wilson v. Hinman, 172 F.2d 914 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 970 (1949).
2. Those governing actions upon a liability created by statute. E.g., Rosenberg v.
Martin, 478 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1973); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962).
3. Special statutes for refiled actions after a dismissal other than on the merits, if the
case were deemed a refiled action. E.g., Crosawhite v. Brown, 424 F.2d 495 (10th Cir.
1970).
" Statutes of Limitations in Federal i ation, 1976 Amz. ST. L.J. 97;
Note, Filing of an Emploiment Discrimination Charge Under Title VII as Tolling the
Statute of Limitations Applicable to a 1981 Action: The Unanswered Questions of Johnson
v. REA, 26 CAsE W. Has. L. Rav. 889 (1976).
" 565 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1876 (1978).
" Another consideration besides the substantiality of the federal claim was that
considerable time and energy had been expended in the case. 565 F.2d at 1155.
1979
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In Reynolds v. Molybdenum Corp. of America,"' the United
States had, at first, been a named defendant. The federal govern-
ment subsequently filed a complaint "in intervention," request-
ing jurisdiction "under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 which grants federal
jurisdiction over actions commenced by the United States."32 The
court of appeals looked to the principal purpose of the suit, deter-
mined that a general water adjudication was similar to an inter-
pleader, realigned the United States as a plaintiff, and granted
federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345.
B. Subject Matter and Personal Jurisdiction
In Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Markets, Inc.,33 the Tenth
Circuit ruled the "minimum contacts" test 34 for in personam ju-
risdiction was satisfied even though the contract action did not
arise "out of an act done or transaction consummated in the
forum state,"' and even though the initial solicitation was made
by the plaintiff." The controlling fact was that the defendant had
acted affirmatively on the plaintiff's telephone contract orders;
therefore, the transaction of business provision of the Kansas
long-arm statute applied.1
7
The Colorado statutory provision pertaining to the service of
process on a foreign corporation, 39 not the long-arm statute, was
pertinent to the decision in Budde v. Kenton Hawaii, Ltd . 31 The
court recognized the general rule that the activities which are the
basis of the action need not arise in the state as long as the in-
state service of the corporation's agent is proper.'"
3' 570 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1365.
567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977).
24 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
567 F.2d at 937.
KA. STAT. § 60-308(b)(1) (Supp. 1975).
1 CoLO. Rav. STAT. § 13-1-124 (1973).
565 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1977). As discussed in Budde, two actions by the plaintiff,
who had been injured in a jeep accident in Viet Nam, had already been dismissed on
limitations grounds. Budde v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 511 F.2d 1033 (10th Cir. 1975);
Budde v. Insurance Co. of N.A., 502 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1974).
" 565 F.2d at 1149. Other cases decided by the Tenth Circuit in keeping with general
jurisdictional rules were United States v. Blackwood, Nos. 78-1358, 78-1359, and 78-1360
(10th Cir. Aug. 28, 1978) (issue not raised at district court cannot be raised upon appeal);
Stewarts Sec. Corp. v. Guaranty Trust Co., No. 76-2067 (10th Cir. 1978) (dismissal based
on lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the merits even though dismissal order
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C. The Law Applied Under Diversity Jurisdiction
Oklahoma state law prohibits declaratory judgments which
would determine the liability of insurers," but the Tenth Circuit,
in Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance Co. 6. Jones," ruled that
this does not bar a similar suit in the federal courts. One of the
federal policies underlying the Federal Declaratory Judgments
Act43 is that insurers should be provided a forum in which their
liability can be declared. The Declaratory Judgments Act is
thereby viewed as procedural." Based on the doctrine of Erie v.
Tompkins,4 and federal policies, 8 the Tenth Circuit allowed the
federal interpleader action.
III. FEDERA RULES OF CIML PROCEDURE
A. Discovery
Three major cases discussed the power of the district courts
to order a party to produce documents and persons for deposition
under rule 3447 and impose sanctions under rule 37.48
Judge McWilliams' opinion in In re Westinghouse Electric
Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation" stated that district courts
did not state whether it was to be with or without prejudice); Monks v. Hetherington, 573
F.2d 1164 (10th Cir. 1978) (possibility of federal defense to a state claim does not confer
federal jurisdiction); Korgich v. Regents of N.M. School of Mines, No. 77-1932 (10th Cir.
Aug. 16, 1978) (dismissal of action based on eleventh amendment is final disposition of
the case and appealable).
" OA. STAT. tit. 11 § 1651, (Supp. 1975).
, 570 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1978).
13 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976).
" 6A Mooa's FEDwEAL PuAcr c § 57-23, at 57-237 (1974).
"0 304 U.S. 64'(1938). Under this doctrine, the federal court must apply the same
substantive law that a state court would apply but must apply federal procedural law.
4 The Erie rule concerning substance versus procedure is not correctly applied in
the instant case. The better rule was stated in Castro v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 562
F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1977). "Since Erie, the federal courts have undertaken to determine
whether a matter is subject to state or federal law and a state pronouncement as to
whether a question is substantive or procedural is not binding." Id. at 624.
"Fm). R. Civ. P. 34 allows a party to serve a request on any other party to inspect
and copy any designated documents.
" Ftn. R. Civ. P. 37 allows a party to apply for an order' compelling discovery.
, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977). As part of its discovery for the cause of action by the
same name in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, de-
fendant Westinghouse caused a subpoena to issue in Utah on Rio Algom Corp., which
operates a uranium mine in Utah. The major issue in the Virginia trial is whether the
increase in the price of uranium, which allegedly caused Westinghouse to breach its
contracts for the delivery of uranium, was caused by the price fixing of a uranium cartel.
1979
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
do have the power to require production of foreign documents and
production of foreign persons for depositions. But whether or not
the district court may impose sanctions when the production may
also impose criminal sanctions in the foreign country calls for a
"balancing" approach on a case-by-case basis. 0 The Tenth Cir-
cuit relied heavily on Societe Internationale Pour Participations
Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers5 and section 39 of
the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States. Upon consideration of the facts of Westinghouse, the
court of appeals found that it was not unreasonable for Canada
to refuse to enforce letters rogatory when compliance would have
violated Canadian public policies as expressed in uranium infor-
mation securities regulations. Further, there was no evidence to
suggest that the Canadian government or the Canadian court
had not acted in good faith. Instead, it was determined that Can-
ada had a legitimate interest in the nondisclosure of information
which was based in Canada.52 The Tenth Circuit vacated the
district court's order holding the defendant in contempt and im-
posing sanctions."
A similar set of facts regarding documents in a foreign coun-
try was encountered in Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co.5" Citing
In re Westinghouse, the Tenth Circuit ruled that Andersen had
not acted in good faith and the balancing test was on Ohio's
side.s
In a companion case to the above uranium litigation,
Rio Algom had complied with most of the subpeona, but it refused to produce certain
documents in Canada and to produce the company president for further depositions.
' 563 F.2d at 997.
" 357 U.S. 197 (1958). In Societe, the Supreme Court found that the failure of the
petitioner to produce documents was not because of circumstances they could control nor
because of their conduct.
11 563 F.2d at 998-99.
Judge Doyle dissented (563 F.2d at 1000). He felt there were enough reasons to infer
that the Canadian regulations were promulgated solely to protect Canada's uranium
industries from insufficient prices. Given the importance of discovery, Judge Doyle would
only accept certain privileges as an excuse for noncompliance.
570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1978). In Ohio, Arthur Andersen & Co., after being served
with a request for production of documents, raised the "foreign law" issue regarding
documents in Switzerland. Six months after the district court ordered Andersen to specify
the applicable foreign secrecy laws with "great particularity and specificity," Andersen
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Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Adams,K the Tenth Circuit ruled
that a party could be relieved from an improvident stipulation
regarding discovery. Citing the strong policy factor for discovery,
the court held that it would be inequitable to enforce the stipula-
tion against further questioning of Mr. Adams by Westinghouse
once potentially critical events came to light. 7
B. Intervention-Rule 24
In National Farm Lines v. ICC, 5 an association representing
regulated common carriers sought to intervene under Rule 24(a).59
The plaintiff National Farm Lines was an unregulated agricul-
tural cooperative testing the constitutionality of certain ICC rul-
ings. The rulings had been promulgated to protect the regulated
carriers from unregulated competition." Reversing the district
court's decision, the Tenth Circuit allowed the association to in-
tervene based on two arguments. First, the court held that it is
difficult for a government agency to adequately protect the inter-
est of the public as well as the right of the private petitioner in
intervention. Secondly, the petitioner in intervention possessed
experience and access to facts about a complex area of business
which the government may not have had.'
In the certified class action of Shump v. Balka, 6 2 plaintiffs
were seeking relief against the Topeka Housing Authority under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1402 and 1437, whereby rentals and payments of
public housing tenants are controlled. The plaintiffs in a related
action against the officers of the Topeka Housing Authority re-
quested intervention in Shump. This was denied by the trial
570 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1978).
'7 Id. at 902
564 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1977).
FzD. R. Civ. P. 24(a) allows anyone to intervene where there is an interest which
will be impaired or impeded by the disposition of the case unless the interest is adequately
represented by existing parties. (emphasis added).
564 F.2d at 382.
' Id. at 383-84. National Farm Lines was cited as determinative in the subsequent
case of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341, 1345-46 (10th Cir. 1978) (Kerr-McGee and the American Mining
Congress were allowed to intervene in a cause of action determining the necessity for a
New Mexico agency to issue environmental impact statements before issuing licenses for
uranium mines).
- 574 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1978).
0 Id. at 1342.
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court and affirmed by the Tenth Circuit."4 The reasoning was that
the two actions differed because plaintiffs in the related action
were seeking additional relief, and further, failed to produce evi-
dence of collusion in the settlement of the Shump action. "
C. Class Action-Rule 23
In Bowe v. First of Denver Mortgage Investors,"5 the court of
appeals reiterated 7 that denial of class action is interlocutory and
not appealable unless plaintiffs make a showing that the case will
not proceed in the absence of class certification. The plaintiff in
Bowe had declared she would proceed individually with her
claim. The certification denial was therefore not appealable until
final judgment. 8
In Garcia v. Board of Education, School District No. 1, Den-
ver, Colorado,"9 the Tenth Circuit restated that collateral attacks
on class action judgments should be discouraged because the pol-
icy behind a class action suit is to finally determine numerous
claims. 0 The suit was related to Keyes v. School District No. 1,11
and since the problem of whether Hispanic schools should be
included in that desegregation case was adjudicated, and the
plaintiffs of the instant case had adequate representation in
Keyes, it was determined that the issue should not be reopened.72
Jo Anna Goddard
U The Tenth Circuit let stand a district court ruling that the two claims should not
be consolidated. Id. at 1344.
" Id. at 1345.
" 562 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1977).
" See Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 520 F,2d 795 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1051 (1976); Monarch v. Wilshire, 511 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1975).
" 562 F.2d at 644-45.
0 573 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 679. Cf. In Re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974).
71 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970), rev'd in part, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), modi-
fied and remanded, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), on remand, 368 F. Supp. 207 (D. Colo. 1973) and
380 F. Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1974), rev'd in part, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1066 (1976).




The labor cases treated by the Tenth Circuit during the .1977-
78 survey period were of varied importance. Cases of factual inter-
est only will be merely reported. Those of greater legal impact
have received comment to highlight new trends or novel use of
existing principles. The most significant decisions in the labor
law area involved employee benefit trust funds discussed below
in section I(G).
I. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT-LABOR MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS ACT'
A. Concerted Activity
In NLRB v. Empire Gas, Inc., I a driver-salesman, in protest
of a unilateral change in the company bonus payment program,
wrote a letter to his fellow drivers soliciting group support for a
collective refusal to pump gas on certain days. 3 The National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) held that because this was con-
certed activity protected by section 7 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act,' the discharge of the employee also violated the statute.
The Tenth Circuit deferred to the decision of the Board that the
letterwriting itself came within the protection of section 7,5 but
felt constrained to consider whether the partial strike activity, if
carried out, would be unprotected, thereby depriving the em-
ployee of the specific protection of section 8(a)(1) and the remedy
of reinstatement.
Guided by the recent Supreme Court mandate to determine
protected partial strike activities on a case-by-case basis,' the
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-169, 171-188 (1976).
566 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1977).
The letter described seeming deficiencies in the modified plan and advocated that
the drivers demonstrate solidarity by refusing to pump gas on a given day. If no company
response was forthcoming, the letter proposed the same action be taken on two additional
days. Id. at 682.
4 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
1 566 F.2d at 684. In addition to the NLRB determination, the court observed that
several circuits hold that individual action in soliciting group activity is concerted activity
within the purview of the Act. See, e.g., Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407
F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
566 F.2d at 685, 686. In Local 76, Int'l Aas'n of Machinists v. Wis. Employment
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court addressed the instant case in light of the consideration that
work stoppages, unless of a "far-reaching and serious kind," are
generally protected.' After a comprehensive review of court deci-
sions defining protected partial strike activities, the Tenth Cir-
cuit concluded that "[in the context of partial strikes, violence
may well be the dividing line between protected and non-
protected activity."' The-court held that the activity, considered
alone or in conjunction with the proposed action, was protected
and granted enforcement of the Board's order.
B. Unfair Labor Practices
In M.S.P. Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 10 the Board found unfair
labor practices where an employer, immediately following an
election in which the union prevailed, laid off several employees
and reduced the working hours of others. Prior to the election, the
company had followed a consistent "no-layoff policy." The em-
ployer asserted that the change in working conditions was justi-
fied by economic necessity. However, the administrative law
judge weighed conflicting testimony and found that the conduct
of the employer was motivated, in whole or material part, by the
purpose to retaliate against its employees for organizational ac-
tivities. The Board ordered reinstatement of two discharged em-
ployees and awarded those employees, as well as three others,
back pay.
The court of appeals honored the fact findings, except as to
a single employee, and approved the standard used by the Board.
In a lengthy opinion, the Tenth Circuit stated that business justi-
fication does not immunize an employer where there is substan-
tial evidence on the record to support an inference of discrimina-
tion." Further, the court found the employer guilty of retaliatory
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), the Supreme Court held that states may not
regulate partial strike activity, thereby overruling UAW Local 232 v. Wis. Employment
Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
1 566 F.2d at 686 (citing NLRB v. Leprino Cheese Co., 424 F.2d 184 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 915 (1970)).
566 F.2d at 686.
568 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1977).
568 F.2d at 174 (relying on NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 554 F.2d 996 (10th
Cir. 1977) and Bill's Coal Co. v. NLRB, 493 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1974) for the proposition
that economic justification is not a per se defense). The Tenth Circuit rejected q stricter
test requiring that discriminatory motive "predominates." 568 F.2d at 174 n.12. See Stone
& Webster Eng'r Corp. v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1976).
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conduct toward the two discharged employees of whose union
activity the company was unaware. In the opinion of the court,
this specific knowledge is not requisite where the circumstances
-demonstrate that pervasive anti-union animus motivated the
conduct of the employer."
In NLRB v. MFY Industries, Inc.," the Board applied for an
enforcement order after finding the employer had committed un-
fair labor practices" and had refused to bargain with a certified
bargaining representative. 5 Although decided within long-
established principles of labor law, the case was not without its
points of interest. Following a valid recognition strike by five
boiler engineers, the union won an NLRB supervised election and
was certified as the bargaining agent. The employer rehired one
engineer, whom it designated as a supervisor, and then asserted
that under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Board
Act the employer was under no obligation to bargain with a unit
of only one employee, and certainly not with a unit consisting of
none." The administrative law judge, in an opinion adopted by
the Board, held that the evidence supported finding that the
refusal to reinstate the striking engineers lacked the required le-
gitimate business explanation and thus violated the Act. 7
The Tenth Circuit inquiry found substantial evidence on the
record to support the findings of the Board." The court called
attention to evidence that the employer had employed other engi-
neers on a part-time basis in the absence of the striking engineers.
Further, the court observed that compliance with the city me-
chanical code would require a licensed engineer on duty approxi-
mately ninety-three hours a week, a requirement that could
hardly be filled by a single engineer. The court granted enforce-
ment of the Board's order to include reinstatement with make
whole relief and an order to bargain in good faith.
11 568 F.2d at 176. See Majestic Molded Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.
1964); see also NLRB v. Brown-Dunkin Co., 287 F.2d 17 (10th Cir. 1961).
13 573 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1978).
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (1976).
' 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
573 F.2d at 675. See NLRB v. Crispo Cake Cone Co., 464 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1972).
573 F.2d at 675 (citing NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967)).
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), 160(0 (1976).
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C. Interference with Union Activities: The No-Solicitation Rule
In NLRB v. National Jewish Hospital & Research Center,"'
the Tenth Circuit granted enforcement of the Board's orders aris-
ing from the discharge of an employee for violating the employer's
no-solicitation rule. The Board found that the employer's rule,
confining solicitation to "non-work and non-public areas during
non-working time," 20 was overly-broad in violation of the Act.'
Thus, the discharge of the employee for soliciting union support
in public areas of the hospital also violated the Act.
2
1
The Tenth Circuit, observing that it was required to alter a
previously announced view23 which had stressed the public policy
of maintaining a tranquil atmosphere for hospital patients, ad-
hered to the ruling of the Supreme Court recently announced in
NLRB v. Beth Israel Hospital. A In order to strike the necessary
balance between organizational rights guaranteed in the Act and
the medical necessity of controlling solicitation in immediate pa-
tient care areas, the Supreme Court now supports the position of
the NLRB that rigid rules prohibiting solicitation in public areas
of a hospital are illegal. The effect of this decision is that strict
rules against solicitation apply only to patients' rooms, operating
rooms, and places where patients receive treatment, such as
x-ray and therapy rooms.
D. Excluded Class: Agricultural Laborers
In NLRB v. Karl's Farm Dairy, Inc., 5 the Tenth Circuit
rejected the Board's definition of an agricultural worker, and thus
denied protection of the Act 2 to a dairy farm employee dis-
charged for his union activities. The employer owned and oper-
ated a dairy farm and an adjacent retail outlet. The operation
also processed and sold milk from at least one other dairy. The
No. 77-1061 (10th Cir. 1978).
Id. Prior to Dec. 1975, the hospital rule permitted no solicitation without approval
of the hospital administrator. The revised rule precluded solicitation except in employee
only lunchrooms and cafeterias, locker rooms, restrooms and parking areas.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
Id. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (1976).
13 In the past, the Tenth Circuit has denied enforcement of NLRB orders which
permitted solicitation in areas of a hospital to which patients had access. See St. John's
Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1977).
554 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1977), aff'd, 98 S. Ct. 2463 (1978).
570 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1978).
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (1976).
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Board held that, although the employee worked on a dairy farm,
he was not an exempt agricultural worker2 within the meaning
of the National Labor Relations Acts because the employee took
part in processing on the farm of commodities produced by other
dairy farms. Construing the exemption narrowly, in reliance on
previous Tenth Circuit case law,2 the Board maintained that
processing any quantity of foreign milk was sufficient to consti-
tute a "separate commercial operation" and the employee en-
gaged therein nonagricultural30
The court found insufficient evidence in the record before it
that "foreign milk represented more than a de minimus portion
of the company's operation. ",3' In thus denying enforcement of the
Board's order, the Tenth Circuit relied on a broader meaning of
agriculture to draw the distinction between "separate commercial
operation" and "farming" in a primary or secondary sense. When
addressing hybrid operations in the future, the Tenth Circuit will
require substantial evidence on the record that a dairy farm em-
ployee is more than incidentally involved in processing foreign
milk to be characterized as a nonagricultural employee protected
by the Act. 2
E. Remedies
The sole issue addressed by the Tenth Circuit in NLRB v.
Fire Alert Co.,3 was the formula used by the Board for determin-
ing the amount of a backpay award. The facts were uncontested.
27 The NLRA exempts agricultural workers from its cpverage, but contains no defini-
tion of an "agricultural laborer." Since 1960 Congress has directed, by an annual rider to
the Board's appropriation, that Board determinations be guided by the Department of
Labor's interpretation of "agriculture" at § 3(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which
provides definitions. 29 U.S.C. § 203(f) (1976).
= 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976).
" 570 F.2d at 905 (citing NLRB v. Tepper, 297 F.2d 280 (10th Cir. 1961) for the
proposition that certain dairy workers are nonagricultural employees where products han-
dled by them were produced elsewhere than on employer's farm).
m Generally, the NLRB has concluded that workers who divide their time are covered
by the Act if they regularly perform nonagricultural work, irrespective of the amount of
time spent in the performance of each type of work.
' 570 F.2d at 905.
' Id. at 905, 906 (citing Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298 (1977) which
held that truck drivers employed by a poultry farm are "employees" within the coverage
of the NLRA). In the opinion, the Tenth Circuit distinguished the Tepper case, as one
involving a large processing operation which received very substantial amounts of milk
from other farms. Id.
= 566 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1977).
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Following a lawful strike, the union made an unconditional offer,
on behalf of all striking employees, to return to work. The em-
ployer began to recall strikers and to hire outsiders, but failed to
offer reinstatement to two senior employees. The Board held the
employer had discriminated between strikers in violation of the
Act,34 and ordered reinstatement and backpay to the two senior
employees. The Board began to toll backpay from the point in
time when the two senior employees would have been reinstated
to jobs for which they were qualified had the strikers been taken
back in order of seniority. In its challenge to the formula, the
employer maintained that, having no seniority system, it could
reinstate strikers in any order of recall. Further, the employer
maintained that the backpay award predated the first act of dis-
crimination, which the employer asserted was the hiring of out-
siders.
Based on the premise that the discrimination relevant to the
backpay formula was the discrimination between strikers, the
Tenth Circuit upheld the Board's computation of backpay. The
court observed that the employer is allowed to choose among
qualified strikers so long as he acts in a nondiscriminatory man-
ner, such as rehiring based on skill or ability.3 Here, the court
noted, the record contained the underlying suggestion that union
activism was the reason for failure to reinstate. In any event, once
Board proceedings have established that the employer has dis-
criminated between strikers, the court stated the burden is then
on the employer to establish any defenses it may have to the
backpay formula used by the Board.
F. Arbitration
In IBEW v. Professional Hole Drilling, Inc.,31 a building con-
tractor appealed a district court judgment requiring specific per-
formance of an arbitration award made under the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement. The contractor asserted he was
no longer under the jurisdiction of the arbitration committee after
his company terminated operation as a sole contractor and en-
tered a joint venture not signatory to the collective bargaining
agreement. The Tenth Circuit, finding that the joint venture ob-
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (1976).
566 F.2d at 698 (citing NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938)).
574 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1978).
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tained the same subcontract held by the sole contractor, held that
the employer was under a continuing. duty to arbitrate as a suc-
cessor employer, 7 in light of the continuity of its obligations and
work force before and after the change of business identity. Fur-
ther, under the facts of this case, there was an expectation created
by the conduct of the employer.8 At no time was the union noti-
fied of the change of business identity or the termination of the
agreement, and, in fact, the contractor had continued to talk with
the union regarding disputes arising under the collective bargain-
ing agreement after entering the joint venture.
In deciding that the arbitration award was enforceable, the
Tenth Circuit applied the two-part standard of review controlling
in arbitration cases. Initially, judicial inquiry must determine
whether, in fact, the parties did agree to arbitrate. If so, the
decision of the arbitrator on the merits is final. Thereafter, review
is strictly confined to whether the arbitrator interpreted and ap-
plied the collective bargaining agreement so that the award is
rooted in the agreement. 9 The Tenth Circuit, stating that "it
would be difficult to find a better example of an arbitrable dis-
pute," 0 granted the deference due a reasoned arbitration award.
The court observed that although the award may have indirect
3' A successor employer may have continuing obligations under the collective bar-
gaining agreement if there is substantial identity between the old company and the
merged business. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). However,
even in merger situations where the predecessor employer has sufficiently disappeared so
as to relieve the successor of liability under the collective bargaining agreement, courts
find the predecessor retains the duty to arbitrate. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local
Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
"The actions of a party to a contract are to be accorded substantial weight in
determining its rights and duties under the contract." 574 F.2d at 501 (citing Fanderlik-
Locke Co. v. United States, 285 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 860
(1961).
" The standard of review of arbitration cases and the deference accorded the arbitra-
tion award were enunciated in a series of cases known as the Steelworkers Trilogy. United
Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steel-
workers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Essentially,
these cases underline the federal policy to encourage collective bargaining and to foster
the use of arbitration to settle labor disputes arising under the collective bargaining
agreements. 574 F.2d at 503 (citing Campo Machinery Co. v. Local 1926, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists, 536 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1976). See also Butcher Workmen Local 641 v. Capitol
Packing Co., 413 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1969)).
" 574 F.2d at 503.
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consequences for the joint venture, "any tangential effect does
not require interference with the arbitrator's award."',
G. Employee Benefit Trust Funds
In Ader v. Hughes,4" the Tenth Circuit announced its view on
an emerging controversy regarding the role of an impartial um-
pire in trust agreements established under the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (LMRA).11 The LMRA mandates that trust
agreements must provide for a court-appointed umpire "in the
event the employer and employee groups deadlock on the admin-
istration of such [trust] fund."" The issue confronting the court
was whether proposed amendments to the trust agreement must
be submitted to an impartial umpire under circumstances
whereby the governing trustees are evenly divided for and against
the amendments." The Tenth Circuit adopted the position that
amending of a trust agreement is not an act of trust fund
"administration" as the word is used in the LMRA, and thus, a
trust agreement may lawfully provide that disputes over proposed
amendments to the trust are nonarbitrable.11
In the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit, analysis must begin
with the recognition that the relationship between employer and
employee trustees is quasi-adversarial in nature, thereby necessi-
tating a strong employer presence on the board of trustees to
,1 Id.
'2 570 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1978).
29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1976).
The trust agreements had been amended in the past. Here, two proposed amend-
ments to the trust agreements were supported by all union trustees, and opposed by all
employer trustees. One amendment would require that one employer trustee be appointed
by a particular employer association, where presently that appointment is made by an-
other employer association. The other amendment would require an employer to continue
making contributions to the fund after a labor contract expires. 570 F.2d at 305.
" 570 F.2d at 307-09. The trial court found that the trustees had come to an LMRA
deadlock on the amendments. Further, the trial court determined that appointment of an
umpire was required by interpretation of the specific terms of the trust agreement, provid-
ing for appointment of an impartial umpire whenever the trustees come to a deadlock on
"any question" except those "in connection with the interpretation or enforcement of any
collective bargaining agreement." On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the determina-
tion of the trial court based solely on contract interpretation. Although rejecting the
minority view that the court had broad equity jurisdiction over all aspects of LMRA §
302(c) trusts, the Tenth Circuit retained jurisdiction to consider the state contract inter-




safeguard against possible abuses of power by union trustees.47 In
this adversarial setting, the court observed that an impartial
umpire cannot assume the role of a trustee with the power to alter
the relationship of the parties, nor can his impartial judgment
serve as a substitute for the veto of a vigilant employer represent-
ative.
The court noted that the union position, urging a broad
meaning of the word "administration," had been impliedly re-
jected by the Tenth Circuit in Bath v. Pixler,48 which distin-
guished "legal controversy" from the "practical administration of
the trust." In the opinion of the court, permitting an umpire to
decide the legal effect of a particular provision would upset the
balance of rights and duties struck between the employer and
employees, and rewrite the agreement of the parties despite
united protests of employer trustees."9 The court expressed the
view that, under the mandates of the LMRA, an impartial person
must be allowed to assume a trusteelike role only for the limited
purpose of breaking a deadlock on matters of practical trust ad-
ministration so as to permit the trust to go for Aard through im-
passe on ordinary matters.2
In Carpenters and Millwrights Health Benefit Trust Fund v.
Gardineer Dry Walling Co.,5 the Tenth Circuit held that union
membership was immaterial to an employer's contractual obliga-
, Id. at 308 (citing-Asseeiated -Contractors of Essex County v. Laborers Int'l Union
of N. America, 559 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1977)). The NLRB takes the contrary position that
the trustees, unlike collective bargaining agents, are bound to exercise their independent
judgment and act solely in the interests of the fund beneficiaries, not the parties who have
appointed them. Central Fla. Sheetmetal Contractors Ass'n, NLRB LAB. L RzP. (CCH)
19,107 (March 31, 1978). See Toensing v. Brown, 528 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding
that trustees of pension fund have a duty to exercise their independent judgment as
fiduciaries in administering trust funds. The standard for review of decisions made by
trustees then becomes whether decisions can be described as arbitrary and capricious).
283 F.Supp. 632 (D. Colo. 1968).
570 F.2d at 307.
The question remains: Will this opinion affect the decision of the impartial umpire?
In dicta, the court noted that, while the legality of the amendments was not an issue in
this case, the amendment dealing with employer-trustee appointments is an attempt at
union participation in the choice of an employer-representative, participation which has
been forbidden elsewhere as contrary to the scheme of the LMRA. Id. at 309. See Asso-
ciated Contractors, Inc. of Essex County v. Laborers Int'l Union of N. America, 559 F.2d
222 (3d Cir. 1977); Quad City Builders Asa'n v. Tri City Bricklayers Union 7, 431 F.2d
999 (8th Cir. 1970).
51 573 F.2d 1172 (10th Cir. 1978).
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tion to make contributions to several employee benefit trust
funds.12 The employer's construction agreements governed the
"Building Construction Industry" and did not differentiate be-
tween residential and commercial construction employees. The
employer sought to establish that industry practice dictated the
use of separate agreements for residential as compared to com-
mercial building construction employees, with only the latter cov-
ered by the agreements negotiated between the union and the
employer. The appellate court determined that the unsigned
trust instruments referred to in the collective bargaining agree-
ments53 were designed to benefit all employees of all employers
that contributed to the fund. Thus, the Tenth Circuit held the
comprehensive agreements, fixing the employer's obligation to
contribute fully and unconditionally, applied to residential and
commercial construction employees, irrespective of union mem-
bership.14 Further, the court held that the trustees have no duty
to prove damages to the trust. The formula for damages is the
sum of contributions the employer should have made for all its
employees during the period in question."
United Steel Workers Local 2098 v. International Systems &
Controls Corp.," involved the rights of employees following plant
closure to a pension trust fund created under a collective bargain-
ing agreement.57 Language in the pension agreement provided
that employees who had not met the eligibility requirements for
retirement58 had no right or interest in the pension fund. The
Tenth Circuit held that this specific language defeated any claim
asserted by employees to a present vested interest in the fund
prior to actual retirement. The court recognized that the pension
fund was not a mere gratuity but a type of deferred compensa-
u Jurisdiction over this matter was granted by 29 U.S.C. §§ 185, 301 (1976).
" 573 F.2d at 1175-76 (citing Local Nine, IUOE v. Siegrist Constr. Co., 458 F.2d 1313
(10th Cir. 1972), which held that the obligation to contribute arises upon signing of the
collective bargaining agreement and may continue beyond the expiration of the agre
ment).
" 573 F.2d at 1177 (citing Manning v. Wiscombe, 498 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1974),
which held that employer was obligated to make contributions to a trust fund for nonunion
employees who performed work covered by the collective bargaining agreement).
" 573 F.2d at 1176 (citing A to Z Rental, Inc v. Wilson, 403 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1969)).
566 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1977).
"7 Jurisdiction over this matter was granted by 29 U.S.C. §§ 185, 301 (1976).
" Eligibility requirements for the pension were attainment of the age of 65 years with
15 years continuous service. 566 F.2d at 1136.
VOL. 56
LABOR LAW
tion,55 despite the fact that employees made no contribution to
the trust fund, nor did the employer fund the trust until such
time as a given employee became eligible to retire. However, in
the view of the appellate court, the extent of any compensation
owed to employees is limited by the terms of the contract. There-
fore, the court of appeals affirmed the granting of summary judg-
ment to the employer, thereby holding that no employee, prior to
actual retirement under the conditions of eligibility for pension
benefits, had any vested interest in pension benefits or trust cor-
pus either under the agreement, or pursuant to quasi-contract. 0
H. Federal Preemption
In Continental Oil Co. v. State of Oklahoma," the Tenth
Circuit refrained from determining its position on an unsettled
point of law soon to be addressed by the Supreme Court. An
employer sought a ruling that the Oklahoma Employment Secu-
rity Act,' 2 to the extent that it provides for compensation benefits
to employees "locked out" by the employer after a lawful strike,
is in direct conflict with bargaining rights protected by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act" and therefore is void by the doctrines
of federal preemption and the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion.64 The Tenth Circuit declined to reach the merits, but ob-
served that the claim of unconstitutionality falls within the issues
addressed by the Second Circuit in New York Telephone Co. v.
New York State Department of Labor,5 currently before the Su-
69 Id. at 1138 (citing Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1975); Knoll v.
Phoenix Steel Corp., 465 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973); and
Schneider v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 456 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1972)).
" 566 F.2d at 1139. But see Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223
(7th Cir. 1977), cert granted, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978). In this recent Seventh Circuit case,
the appellate court held that a union member's interest in a pension plan was a "security"
for purposes of antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §
77(q)a (1976), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976). The court determined that an employee's right to receive benefits, as a form of
compensation, from an employer-funded pension plan was sufficient to constitute a
"security" even though it would only mature upon the happening of *certain events in the
future.
, 574 F.2d 1016 (10th Cir. 1978).
" OKLA. STAT. Trr. 40, § 215(e)(3) (1971).
' 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976).
U.S. CONST. art. VI. Although federal preemption is a strong doctrine, state regula-
tion of industrial practices is allowable if related to local health and safety. The protection
afforded this species of state legislation may shelter the payments to strikers, as it has
other legislation regulating conditions of employment, such as wage and hour regulations.
6 566 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 941 (1978).
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preme Court on certiorari. In that case, the court of appeals up-
held a New York statute which provided for unemployment bene-
fits to striking workers."
In the Tenth Circuit case, the trial court, noting the em-
ployer's concurrent action in the state court, had dismissed with
prejudice the employer's claim based on the abstention doc-
trine. 7 The appellate court found nothing in the record to warrant
this severe action by the lower court. Thus, the Tenth Circuit
ordered a remand to consider whether the doctrine of abstention
has present application, and if so, to consider the alternative
suggested by the employer that the federal action be held in
abeyance pending determination of the state law question by the
state tribunal. In light of the consideration that two years had
lapsed since the action by the trial court and that both parties
had fully argued the question of constitutionality, the remand
encompassed directions to consider the merits of this claim in
light of current circumstances.
II. LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT 9
In Usery v. District 22, UMW,7 0 the Tenth Circuit denied a
union member's motion to intervene in election certification pro-
U After a lengthy review of legislative history, the Second Circuit concluded that
Congress did not intend to preempt state regulation of genuine employment compensation
to strikers as a form of legitimate social policy. The public policy underlying the New York
statute is declared to be as follows:
"Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, wel-
fare, and morale of the people of this state." 566 F.2d at 393 n.5 (citing N.Y. LAB. LAw
§ 501 (1977)). The Director of the Unemployment Insurance Division of the New York
Department of Labor testified at trial that the three most important objectives of the
statute were: (1) to "cushion the economy" by keeping in circulation money which the
strikers would ordinarily spend on food, housing and the like; (2) to aid the strikers to
pay essential expenses; and (3) to maintain a labor force for the struck employer until
the strike is over. 566 F.2d at 363 n.5.
The First Circuit, which considered the point of law in two cases but found the record
inadequate to decide the issue, considered the critical questions to be: (1) whether the
payments reflect a "deeply rooted state interest;" and (2) assuming such a state interest,
is there too great a frustration of federal purpose to leave the parties as it finds them to
permit the free play of economic forces. Grinnell Corp. v- Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973); ITT Lamp Div. v Minter, 435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971).
6 574 F.2d 1019 (citing England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411 (1964)).
574 F.2d at 1019.
" 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1976).
567 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1978).
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ceedings initiated by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to provi-
sions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA). Seeking to challenge the certification of a supervised
election for union officers," the deposed incumbent asserted
grounds previously investigated by the Secretary and determined
to be without merit.7 3 The Tenth Circuit concluded that certifica-
tion of election results is encompassed within the principle of
limited intervention enunciated in Trbovich v. United Mine
Workers," which governs in election challenges. Thus, the court
ruled, the LMRDA,75 by granting "exclusive" post-election reme-
dies to the Secretary, bars individual union members from initi-
ating by intervention grounds already screened and eliminated by
the Secretary.71 The court observed that the provision for exclu-
sive enforcement bythe Secretary is an important device for elim-
inating frivolous complaints and consolidating meritorious ones,
thereby "avoiding continuous challenges and their attendant de-
lays."" The screening mechanisms established in the LMRDA
cannot be circumvented by a deposed candidate seeking to vindi-
cate his own personal interest, the court of appeals stated.
II. FAIr LABOR STANDARDS ACT
78
In Marshall v. Security Bank and Trust Co., 79 the Tenth
Circuit rejected the standard used by the lower court to deter-
mine whether a bank's pay disparity between sexes violated the
" 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1976). The LMRDA, known as the Landrum-Griffith Act of
1959, regulates the internal affairs of labor unions.
A prior election was set aside as invalid. See Usery v. Local 22, UMW, 543 F.2d
744 (10th Cir. 1976).
567 F.2d at. 973. The court of appeals noted that the challenges by the deposed
incumbent were considered very carefully by the Secretary, and thereafter reviewed by
the district court. The reasons given for the Secretary's determination were held to be
sufficient in light of the controlling criteria (citing Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560
(1975)).
" 404 U.S. 528 (1972). In 7Tbovich, the Supreme Court held that the LMRDA does
not bar a union member from intervening in an election challenge to the extent that the
intervention seeks to present evidence and arguments in support of the Secretary's com-
plaint.
, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1976).
7 567 F.2d at 975, 976.
Id. (citing Brennan v. Silvergate Dist. Lodge 50, IAM, 503 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1974),
and the dissenting opinion of Judge Kalodner in Hodgson v. Carpenters Resilient Flooring
Local 2212, 457 F.2d 1364, 1371-72 (3d Cir. 1972).
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
572 F.2d 276 (10th Cir. 1978).
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equal pay for equal work provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) .8 The trial court found that, although the employer
had no formal training program, the pay differential was appro-
priate as to certain male tellers and supervisors who had extra
and different duties and were being trained in all aspects of the
banking business for future placement in managerial positions."'
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that a training program, if
bona fide, constitutes an exception to the FLSA. 2 However, the
court noted promotional opportunities and subjective employer
evaluations, standing alone, are not equivalent to a "bona fide
training program," and indeed, are immaterial factors in an equal
pay suit." In the absence of a "bona fide training program," the
Tenth Circuit held that the sole issue presented was whether, in
fact, there was unequal pay for essentially equal work. The court
of appeals termed the trial court's findings inadequate and re-
manded with directions to limit the issue as prescribed in the
opinion.
In Usery v. Fisher,I the Secretary of Labor sought to enforce
a consent decree by means of civil contempt proceedings. By the
terms of the consent decree, Fisher had agreed to pay his employ-
ees sums due for past violations of the minimum wage and over-
time compensation provisions of the FLSA."5 The trial court had
denied the Secretary's petition for enforcement, reasoning that
the consent decree was in effect a "money judgment," and that,
by virtue of the federal statute"8 and the provisions of the Colo-
rado Constitution proscribing imprisonment for debt, "7 the trial
29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d)(1), 215(a)(2) (1976).
572 F.2d at 278.
92 29 U.S.C. § 213 provides that definitions will be found in regulations promulgated
by the Secretary of Labor. In the Secretary's interpretation of the provisions relating to
training programs, a "bona fide training program" constitutes an exception to the FLSA.
29 C.F.R. § 800.148 (1978).
10 572 F.2d at 279 (citing Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896 05th
Cir. 1974)).
" 565 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1977).
0 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1976).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2007(a) provides, in pertinent part: "A person shall not be impri,;ole
for debt on a writ of execution or other process issued from a court of the United States
in any State wherein imprisonment for debt has been abolished."
"7 COLO. CONST., art. II, § 12, provides as follows: "No person shall be imprisoned for
debt, unless upon refusal to deliver up his estate for the benefit of his creditors in such




court had no authority to adjudge Fisher in contempt of court for
his default on installments due under the consent decree. The
trial court alternatively concluded that, even if it had discretion-
ary authority to hold Fisher in contempt, it would not do so
because the Secretary had not resorted to execution or garnish-
ment to enforce its money judgment.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that a consent decree,
entered into to resolve violations of the FLSA, is purely equitable
in nature, in light of its dual purpose to remedy economic in-
jury to employees and to correct an offense against the public
interest. "Should Fisher be held in civil contempt and im-
prisoned," the court stated, "it would not be imprisonment for
debt, but rather for his failure to comply with an order of court." 8
Thus, the Tenth Circuit adopted the majority view that district
courts not only have the power but the duty to compel back pay
orders in civil contempt proceedings, the "proper means for en-
suring compliance"'" with the FLSA.
Jan Bernstein




LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OvEvMW
Six of the Tenth Circuit's decisions during the period of this
survey in the area of public lands and natural resources merit
attention. One of them, Utah v. Kleppe,' will be examined at
length since it is sure to have far-reaching consequences. All six
fall within three of the four areas usually addressed in this sec-
tion: public lands, oil and gas, and environmental law. There
were no Tenth Circuit decisions in the area of water law.
I. PUBLIC LANDS
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Utah v. Kleppe merits ex-
tended analysis because of its potential impact economically as
well as legally. The decision in United States v. City of
McAlester2 will also be examined briefly, since its holding and
rationale are strikingly similar to Kleppe. Although the specific
subject matter of the two cases varied greatly, the holdings in
each involved the resolution of apparent statutory conflicts in
favor of parties who were perceived to have a "special status" vis-
a-vis the federal government. The rationale employed in the two
cases suggests the Tenth Circuit will construe statutes involving
public lands so as to prevent any "violation" of the federal gov-
ernment's "special obligations" to such parties.
A. Utah v. Kleppe
The recent Tenth Circuit decision in Utah v. Kleppe may
have opened a way for states to reap profits from mineral lands,
arguably at the expense of the federal government. The case con-
cerned the criteria which govern state selections of lands which
are mineral in character as indemnity for lands of similar charac-
ter which were originally granted under the school land grant
statutes, but were denied to the state because of federal preemp-
tion or private entry prior to survey. 3 The primary issue was how
'586 F.2d 756 (1978).
No. 76-1455 (10th Cir., Nov. 2, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
In the various enabling acts admitting the public land states to the Union, Congress
granted certain sections in each township to the state to be held in trust and administered
for the benefit of the public schools. Title to the school sections vested in the state upon
acceptance of the survey of those sections, but only if the designated lands had not been
appropriated under the public land laws by private parties or the federal government prior
to survey. To compensate the states for those lands lost, Congress granted them the right
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much discretion the Secretary of the Interior (the Secretary) has
in determining whether to approve a state's "in-lieu" selections.
Utah claimed that sections 851 and 852 of the federal statutes
governing land grants to states4 gave states broad discretion in
selecting in-lieu lands. It contended that those provisions limited
the Secretary's function to the ministerial task of determining
whether the selected and original or "base" lands were both min-
eral in character and were of equal acreage.5 The Secretary, in
contrast, claimed that section 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act (TGA)6
had expanded his discretion, authorizing him to go beyond the
criterion of equal acreage and employ the public interest criterion
of equal value in determining whether to approve Utah's in-lieu
selections The court settled the statutory conflict in favor of
Utah, affirming the district court's holding that "the exchange of
school lands lost for 'in-lieu' lands to be selected by Utah is to be
undertaken on the equal acreage basis once it is determined that
the respective lands are 'mineral in character' without regard to
valuation."
The economic significance of Kleppe derives in part from the
patchwork nature of present land ownership patterns and the
growing importance of oil shale in the Rocky Mountain area. This
is evidenced by the fact that Uintah County, Utah, is the site of
all 194 parcels of the Utah indemnity selections at issue, and
Uintah County has also been proposed as a likely site for the first
commercial oil shale project in Utah.' Studies indicate Uintah is
currently a hodgepodge of intermingled federal, state, and pri-
vately owned lands.'0 Although Utah law permits the leasing of
state owned lands for oil shale," the limited size of the present,
isolated, state sections would prevent them from independently
supporting an oil shale development program. 2 The availability
to select "other lands of equal acreage" in lieu of the lands lost. 43 U.S.C. §§ 851, 852
(1976).
43 U.S.C. §§ 851, 852 (1976).
586 F.2d at 760, 762.
43 U.S.C. § 315f (1976).
586 F.2d at 759, 760, 762.
Id. at 767.
See Eliason, Land Exchanges and State In-Lieu Selections as They Effect Mineral
Resource Development, 21 ROCKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 617, 621 & n.10 (1975).
o Id. at 621-26.
" UTAH CODE ANN. § 65-1-18 (1953).
"1 See Eliason, supra note 9, at 619-26 for an excellent discussion of the effect of land
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for oil shale leasing and development of the federal lands inter-
spersed with the state and private holdings is as uncertain as the
federal oil shale policy itself.
Thus, Utah's acquisition of the oil shale lands claimed as
indemnity selections could facilitate early development of the oil
shale, and could give the state a bigger share in the profits from
such development.'
3
Kleppe establishes a new precedent, legally, since no court
has previously determined whether the Secretary's discretion in
determining whether to approve state in-lieu selections under
section 852 was broadened by section 7 of the TGA. In refusing
to construe section 7 as authorizing the Secretary to impose an
equal value limitation on states' in-lieu selection rights under
section 852, the court relied heavily on the premise that the land
grant statutes create a unique "trust" or "compact" relationship,
under which continuing, unalterable obligations are imposed on
both the states and the federal government. It was perhaps neces-
sary for the court to shore up the statutory basis for its decision,
in view of the impact and controversy the decision is bound to
produce. However, one suspects that the rationale, as it extends
the "trust" analogy, goes precariously off on a limb.
1. The Case
Utah, like many other states, lost thousands of acres of enti-
tlement lands, but was reluctant to select non-mineral lands in
lieu of the lost lands which were mineral in character." When
mineral lands were opened to in-lieu selections in 1958, most of
the federal lands in Uintah County became subject to such selec-
tions. Thus,' between 1965 and 1971, Utah made indemnity selec-
ownership patterns on mineral development.
11 As noted in Eliason, supra note 9, at 644-45, the decision in Kleppe will also have
a significant impact on all other states still owning indemnity rights on mineral lands.
For example, Montana filed in-lieu selections in 1974 on lands identified by the U.S.
Geological Survey as having strippable coal deposits. The Bureau of Land Management
suspended action on Montana's application pending the outcome of Kleppe. Id.
" Congress originally excluded mineral lands from school land grants. However, in
1927 it extended the original grants to include lands "mineral in character." Mineral
School Section Land Grants, Pub. L. No. 570, ch. 57, § 1, 44 Stat. 1026 (current version
at 43 U.S.C. § 870 (1976)). Thirty years later it finally granted states the right to select
mineral lands for in-lieu selections, as long as the corresponding base lands lost were also
mineral in character. Act of Aug. 27, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-771, 72 Stat. 928 (amending 43
U.S.C. §§ 851. 852 (1976)).
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tions covering 157,255.90 acres of mineral lands in Uintah
County, using lost mineral lands of equal acreage as the basis.1'5
The Secretary delayed taking any action on Utah's selections
for many years.'" Finally, in March of 1974, Utah instituted suit
against the Secretary. The Tentb Circuit opinion in Kleppe re-
sponded to the Secretary's appeal of a summary judgment
granted by the Utah District Court in favor of Utah, enjoining
him to approve or disapprove Utah's selections by a certain
date. 7 The basic issue on appeal as suggested earlier, was
whether the Secretary's discretion in approving or rejecting such
in-lieu selections is governed by sections 851 and 852 of the land
grant statutes, which favor the states by listing equal acreage as
the selection criterion, or by section 7 of the TGA, which favors
the federal government by allowing use of the equal value crite-
rion. Perhaps in recognition of the significant economic impact
the decision was bound to have, the Tenth Circuit rendered a
carefully reasoned and broadly based series of justifications for its
holding in favor of Utah
2. Analysis
The court's statutory analysis is convincing. Under sections
851 and 852, the equal acreage requirement is the only pertinent
limitation on a state's right to make in-lieu selections. Neither
section makes any reference to the relative value of the in-lieu
and base lands. 8 The TGA, on the other hand, grants the Secre-
tary broad authority to classify lands within a grazing district "in
his discretion," in order to determine if such lands are proper for
acquisition in satisfaction of "any outstanding lien . . . rights or
land grant . . . .'"' The court recognized that all federal lands
" 586 F.2d at 758, 761.
' As the court noted, the Secretary had still not acted with respect to any of Utah's
selections when the instant appeal was heard, even though many of the selections had
been pending for a period in excess of ten years. Id. at 761
I Id. at 758.
" Section 851 simply provides that where deficiencies arise in state school grants,
"other lands of equal acreage are hereby appropriated and granted, and may be selected,
in accordance with the provisions of section 852 . . . by said State in lieu of such as may
be thus taken. ... 43 U.S.C. § 851 (1976). Section 852 provides that "lands appropri-
ated by section 851 . . . shall be selected from any unappropriated, surveyed, or unsur-
veyed public lands within the State," except that mineral lands may only be selected as
indemnity for mineral lands lost. 43 U.S.C. § 852(a), (a)(1) (1976).
1' Section 7 authorizes the Secretary "to examine and classify any lands . . . within
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in Utah are within grazing districts, and that the Secretary is
authorized to utilize public interest criteria, including compari-
tive values, in classifying lands within grazing districts in order
to determine their proper disposition. However, the court placed
great reliance upon the fact that in-lieu selections under the
school land grant statutes were not specifically mentioned in the
TGA. Since both the history and judicial construction of the
school land grants suggest school grant in-lieu selections have a
unique status,20 the court did not feel compelled to "substitute
the general language [of the TGA] for the unambiguous, clear,
and unqualified language" defining rights of the states in sections
851 and 852." It found further support for that conclusion in the
rule of statutory construction which decrees that where an earlier,
special statute and a later, general statute seem to speak to the
same issue, the special remains in effect as an exception to the
general regarding all matters coming within the scope of the spe-
cial, unless absolute incompatibility exists between the two.2
The Kleppe court seemed to realize that its holding might be
too controversial to survive if grounded only in the arguably in-
conclusive wording of the statutes and rules of statutory construc-
tion. It broadened the base of its holding through reliance on two
early Supreme Court opinions, which it claimed "clearly and suc-
cinctly settled the statutory construction conflict presented here
in favor of Utah. '" The two Supreme Court cases relied upon did
severely limit the scope of the Secretary's discretion under section
852. They held that once a state has "accepted" the Congres-
sional "offer" in section 851 by making a selection pursuant to
section 852, the Secretary is restricted to the judicial function of
a grazing district, which are. . . proper for acquisition in satisfaction of any outstanding
lien . . . rights or land grant, and to open such lands to entry, selection or location for
disposal in accordance with such classification under applicable public land laws ....
Such lands shall not be subject to disposition, settlement, or occupation until after the
same have been classified and opened to entry. ... 43 U.S.C. § 315f (1976).
586 F.2d at 758-59, 761, 766.
I d. at 766-67. One fact noted by the court is particularly telling. The legislative
history of Pub. L. No. 89-470, 89th Cong., 2d Seas. (1965) (which amended §§ 851 and
852 in minor fashion) indicates that the Department of the Interior withdrew its proposed
amendment, which would have included an equal values concept with respect to lands
valuable for leasable minerals, in the place of the existing "acre for acre" selection basis.
586 F.2d at 761, citing S. REP. No. 1213, 89th Cong., 2d Seas. 2, reprinted in [1966] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 2323-24.
" 586 F.2d at 768-69.
n Id. at 769.
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"ascertaining whether the selector is acting with the law . . . and
of approving or rejecting the selection accordingly."24 In other
words, they perceived the in-lieu provisions as embodying the
federal government's offer of "a conveyance of the title to those
who accept and fully comply with their terms."'- These holdings
support the Kleppe court's thesis that the school grant in-lieu
provisions, as opposed to most other public land in-lieu provi-
sions, grant broad selective powers to the state-selector, and se-
verely restrict the Secretary's power to reject the selections. How-
ever, the real issue in Kleppe is whether section 7 of the TGA, as
amended in 1936, was intended to alter the Secretary's discretion
regarding selections under section 852. Since both Supreme Court
cases were decided in 1921, they are certainly not controlling on
that issue.
Since neither statutory construction nor case law offers con-
clusive justification for the holding, the precedential strength of
Kleppe may well depend on the perceived validity of the underly-
ing premise that the land grant statutes create a "trust" or
"solemn covenant" imposing bilateral and continuing obligations
on Congress as well as the states. The court's initial development
of the premise is convincing, since it grounds it firmly in the
wording and history of the land grant statutes, as well as in cases
construing them. Since the land-grant states, as opposed to the
original thirteen states, contained huge reserves of non-taxable
federal lands, they lacked an adequate property tax base from
which to generate revenues for schools and other services. Thus,
the school land grants represented the government's attempt to
equalize the status of the original and land grant states: in place
of having additional land to tax, the land grant states were given
sections of land, in trust, to be held and administered for the
perpetual benefit of schools in that state.26 Since the federal gov-
ernment offered the land grants for that purpose in the various
enabling acts, and the states accepted the offer-and its rights
and obligations-in their state constitutions, a compact was cre-
ated. Under that compact, the court argued, states and the fed-
eral government, as well, were required to abide strictly by the
Payne v. New Mexico, 255 U.S. 367, 371 (1921). The other Supreme Court decision
relied upon was Wyoming v. United States, 255 U.S. 489 (1921).
5 Payne v. New Mexico, 255 U.S. 367, 370 (1921).
" 586 F.2d at 758.
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terms of the "trust" and to accept continuing, unalterable obliga-
tions.2" Thus, when a state waives its right to the original grant
and makes an in-lieu selection pursuant to the criteria prescribed
in the statute, it would be "unreasonable" and "contrary to the
solemn covenant of the United States" to hold that the federal
government is not bound by its covenant to approve such selec-
tions under the criteria designated in the statute.28 '
Although the "solemn compact" justification seems both
convincing and "equitable" in view of the original purpose of the
land grant statutes, the subsequent history of those statutes
leaves the validity of the justification in doubt. While the states
have not been able to alter their side of the "compact, "2 Congress
has altered the nature of the government's obligation several
times.30 Indeed, both the appeal and the weakness of the "special
compact" justification are most evident in an analogy the Kleppe
court draws to explain it. The court compared Congress' preferen-
tial treatment of school land grants "to the special preference
and treatment of Indians [recently] recognized [by the Supreme
Court]" '3' in Morton v. Mancari.32 The Mancari Court justified
Congress' allowance of the preferential employment of Indians
in the Bureau of Indian Affairs as "[a] fulfillment of Congress'
unique obligation toward the Indians," just as the Kleppe court
justified the special discretionary status given to states in making
in-lieu selections as a fulfillment of the federal government's
unique obligation to the states under the bilateral compact repre-
sented by the land grant statutes. Unfortunately, if the "prefer-
ential" treatment of Indians by the federal government in re-
sponse to its unique obligation to them is indicative of the treat 7
ment to be accorded states' rights under the land grant statutes,
as suggested by the Kleppe court's analogy, the longevity of the
Kleppe precedent is at best uncertain.
- Id. at 758, 761, 767.
0Id. at 772.
n See, e.g., Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295 (1976); Lassen v.
Arizona, ex. rel. Arizona Highway Dept., 385 U.S. 458 (1967); Ervien v. United States,
251 U.S. 41 (1919).
See note 14 supra and discussion in Kleppe, 586 F.2d at 759-60.
"586 F.2d at 769.




B. United States v. City of McAlester
The Tenth Circuit followed the Kleppe-Mancari "breach-of-
trust" rationale implicitly in one other case decided this year. In
United States v. City of McAlester, it rejected a city's contention
that Congress had authorized condemnation of Indian tribal
lands for municipal purposes in the Curtis Act.34 In holding that
the authorization of condemnation in the Curtis Act was applica-
ble only to allotted Indian lands, as opposed to reservations, the
court noted that if the Act had been intended to provide for
"unabated, unsupervised condemnation of all Indian lands in
general," as the city contended, "there would have been a serious
question of whether the United States had thereby breached its
trust relationship with the Indian tribes.
3 5
McAlester, like Kleppe, concerned an apparent conflict be-
tween two federal statutes. In 1903, a federal territorial court in
Oklahoma had granted McAlester an easement on 2535 acres of
land owned by the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations (the Tribes)
for the purpose of developing and maintaining a municipal water
supply.N The primary issue in the Tenth Circuit opinion was the
validity of that easement.
McAlester contended that the condemnation authority
granted in section 11 of the Curtis Act did not distinguish be-
tween allotted and unallotted lands; it merely declared, in broad
terms, that towns and cities "are hereby authorized to secure, by
condemnation or otherwise, all the lands actually necessary for
public improvements, regardless of tribal lines . . . .,3 The
court concluded that both the full context of the Act and its leg-
islative history indicated the condemnation provision was appli-
cable only to allotted lands. However, as in Kleppe, it chose to
look beyond the wording of the statute and legislative history for
its basic justification. It noted that federal statutes prohibiting
the disposition of interests in Indian lands other than by treaty
or convention have been in effect for 187 years.3" Thus, a valid
Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495.
' No. 76-1455 at 18, (10th Cir., Nov. 2, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
" See City of South McAlester v. The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations of Tribes of
Indians, No. 3293 (C.D. Ind. Terr., 1903), cited in No. 76-1455 at 3.
" Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, § 11, 30 Stat. 495.
'" See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976) for the current version of the prohibition noted. The
initial version of that prohibition was in the first Indian Intercourse Act, Act of July 22,
1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137.
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right to condemn Indian land must be based on express authori-
zation from the United States. It then focused on the federal
government's obligation to the Indians, as established by treaties
and modified by statutes, in determining whether section 11 of
the Curtis Act constituted the necessary authorization.
Looking to history, the court described the gradual diminish-
ment of the Tribes' original lands through a series of treaties in
which the Tribes "agreed" to relinquish lands to the United
States in return for certain other lands. In the Treaty of Dancing
Rabbit Creek,3' for example, the United States granted the Tribes
fee simple ownershp of land which included the acres in dispute.
It later issued a patent confirming the Tribes' ownership of the
land "in fee simple. . . while they shall exist as a nation and live
on it; liable to no transfer or alienation, except to the United
States or with their consent."0
The McAlester court recognized the long-declared "right" of
Congress to alter Indian treaties by enactment of subsequent
statutes. In fact, the Curtis Act, which incorporated an agree-
ment which the Tribes reluctantly signed with the United States
in 1897,"' represented one such alteration, in that it provided for
forced allotment of Indian lands to tribal members and the termi-
nation of tribal affairs. Section 11 provided for those forced allot-
ments and, in the same section, for condemnation of Indian lands
by cities. However, by construing the condemnation provision as
applicable only to allotted lands-lands no longer possessed by
the Tribes as a whole-the McAlester court avoided construing
the provision as a radical departure from the long-standing
"protective stance"'" of the federal government toward Indian
lands, when those lands are claimed by states or private individu-
als.
N 7 Stat. 333 (1830).
0 No. 76-1455 at 16, citing the patent which was issued to the Choctaw Nation on
March 23, 1842.
'The Choctaws and Chickasaws entered the Atoke Agreement with the Dawes Com-
mission on April 23, 1897, "[despite reluctance to do so." Id. at 17.
0 For cases and commentaries reflecting the development of and departures from the
government's "protective stance," see Kelly, Indian Title: The Rights of American Na-
tives in Lands They Have Occupied Since Time Immemorial, 75 COLUM. L. Rav. 655
(1975); Note, Administrative Law: Self-Determination and the Consent Power: The Role
of the Government in Indian Decisions, 5 Am. IND. L. Rav. 195 (1977); M. Plsca, LAw AmD
Tfl AmmCAN INDLAN (1973).
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As noted earlier, the McAlester court went even further, in
dicta, by questioning whether Congress would have the right to
exercise its inherent power to authorize "unabated, unsupervised
condemnation of all Indian lands in general."43 The court's strong
suggestion that such an act would cause Congress to "breach.
its trust relationship with the Indian tribes,"" like the court's
narrow construction of the Curtis Act's condemnation provision,
represents a commendable attempt to restore order to the maze
of legal inequities on which the current relationship between the
federal government and the Indians is based.
II. OIL AND GAS
A. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. FERC'5
The Tenth Circuit decision in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v
FERC expanded the scope of the Natural Gas Act (NGA)I' to
include royalty interests for the first time. However, that expan-
sion was impelled by the much broader expansion of the NGA
established by the Supreme Court the preceding month in Cali-
fornia v. Southland Royalty Co.'7 Thus, insofar as Jicarilla
merely articulates an inevitable extension of Southland's holding,
it is not especially significant. However, the inconsistencies-if
not inequities-embodied in the Jicarilla opinion are significant.
Although those inconsistencies result from the court's reliance on
Southland, they are not resolved or justified by the Southland
rationale. Rather, they serve to illustrate the legal and logical
distortions which must result from Southland's judicial expan-
sion of the jurisdiction of the NGA to persons clearly not within
its intended scope.
Jicarilla addressed an issue which has assumed increasing
importance recently due to the price disparity between regulated
and unregulated markets for natural gas: Can a lessee's sales of
gas in the interstate market under the required "certificate of
public convenience and necessity"'" subject the lessor's retained
,1 No. 76-1455 at 18.
" Id.
,5 578 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1978).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976).
47 98 S. Ct. 1955 (1978).
,1 The NGA requires any person or natural gas company wishing to engage in sales
of natural gas for resale in interstate commerce to first obtain a certificate authorizing
such sales, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1976).
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right to take royalty in kind to regulation by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC)?" Both the wording of the NGA
and its established construction by the courts stress the fact that
the jurisdictional event which triggers imposition of NGA regula-
tory authority on natural gas disposition is the sale of gas for
resale in interstate commerce." Thus, landowner-lessors not sell-
ing gas to that market were not generally held subject to the Act
prior to Southland.5 However, the increasing need to prevent
diversions of gas from the low-priced, high-demand interstate
market into the higher priced intrastate market has been paral-
leled by the increasing tendency of the FERC and some courts to
enlarge the jurisdictional scope of the NGA.52
The most definitive judicial resolution of the Jicarilla issue
prior to Southland occurred in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC.s In that
case the District of Columbia Circuit firmly rejected the FPC's
attempt to draw royalty interests within the scope of the NGA.
Circuit Judge Leventhal, writing for the court, concluded that the
FPC distorted the common understanding of words used in the
Act and departed from congressional intent when it character-
ized the lessor's retention of a royalty interest in gas sold as a
participation in interstate sales.5 He recognized the FPC's mo-
tive for expanding its jurisdiction may only have been to imple-
ment an underlying purpose of the Act by protecting consumers.
However, he found that motive was "not sufficient justification
" The Federal Power Commission (FPC) was granted general jurisdiction to effec-
tuate the provisions of the NGA. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717a(9), 717o (1976). However, the FPC
was disbanded and its functions transferred to the FERC by the Department of Energy
Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565, §§ 204, 402-404 (to be codified
in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7134, 7172; 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, d, e, g, h, w).
For discussions of the increasing importance and judicial treatments of both royalty
rates and rights to take royalty in kind, see Morris, Taking Royalty Gas In Kind, 22 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 993 (1976); Note, Federal Rate Regulation of Independent Oil and
Gas Producers and the Royalty Interest, 26 KAN. L. Rxv. 309 (1978).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1976). Courts have repeatedly stressed "the need for a
jurisdictional foundation in 'sales in interstate commerce.'" See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC,
463 F.2d 256, 262 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972) (noting such a judicial trend).
See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 677 (1954).
11 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 463 F.2d 256, 259 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976
(1972).
" See Moody, Uncertainty in Natural Gas Regulation and Legislation-A Dilemma
for the Gas Producer and His Attorney, 22 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 695 (1976).
"463 F.2d 256 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972).
54 Id. at 262.
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upon which to base an expansion of the Act to activities clearly
not within its terms.
' '
5
In Southland, the Supreme Court abruptly departed from
the well-established precedent represented by Mobil Oil and from
the NGA's own explicit definite of its scope. It expanded the
scope of the Act by holding that a lessee's "dedication" 6 of gas
to the interstate market under a certificate of necessity imposes
an obligation to continue such sales upon the lessor-owner to
whom the mineral fee interest in the subject gas reverts upon
expiration of the lease.57
1. The Case
Jicarilla involved a lessor's reserved right to take royalty in
kind. The Jicarilla Apache Tribe (the Tribe) had leased land on
its reservation to gas companies, who sold the gas produced from
the land in the interstate market. Under the lease, the Tribe
reserved the right to elect royalty in kind, and its decision to
exercise that right was the genesis of the case.
The Tribe evidently intended to sell its royalty gas initially
to the companies for resale in interstate commerce. However, it
ultimately intended to use most of it to meet its own industrial
needs on the reservation, selling only the excess to the compa-
nies.- Although the initial sales to the companies required an
FERC certificate, special regulations exempt small producers
from certain filing requirements and allow them to charge prices
above the interstate ceilings set for large producers." However,
the higher rates are not allowed for sales made by a small produ-
cer "where the gas reserves relating thereto were acquired by the
purchase of developed reserves in place from a large producer."6,
The FERC granted the Tribe a small producer certificate,
but ruled that the election to take royalty in kind was
" Id. at 262-63.
" Once a certificate of necessity is obtained and sales commence, the gas being sold
is deemed "dedicated" to the interstate market, and the sales or services constituting that
dedication may not cease without abandonment authorization from the FERC, persuant
to 15 U.S.C. 717f(b) (1976). For a thorough study of judicial development of the concept
and parameters of dedication under the NGA, see Conine and Niebrugge, Dedication
Under the Natural Gas Act: Extent and Escape, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 735 (1977).
" 98 S. Ct. 1955, 1959 (1978).
578 F.2d 289, 290 (10th Cir. 1978).
" See 18 C.F.R. § 157.40 (1977).
" Id. at (c)(2)(ii).
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"'tantamount to a purchase' of the gas"'" from the companies,
thus disqualifying the Tribe from small producer rates. Further-
more, it ruled that the Tribe could not remove the gas from the
interstate market to meet its own industrial needs unless it ob-
tained abandonment authorization from the FERC. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the order requiring abandonment authorization,
but reversed the order disqualifying the Tribe from the small
producer rates.2
The two sections of the Jicarilla opinion are strikingly incon-
sistent; the same reasoning which justifies the holding in the last
section argues against the holding in the first section. In rejecting
the contention that an election to take royalty in kind is tanta-
mount to a purchase, the court relied on basic concepts of prop-
erty law. It noted that the "ownership" of royalty oil remained
in the lessor, "who retained the power of disposition and the right
to receive possession . . . ." Thus, it concluded that the Tribe's
"express reservation of the unqualified right to take royalty in
kind" precluded the conclusion that an election to take royalty
in kind is a purchase.6' However, the characterization of the
right as "unqualified" and commensurate with "the power of
disposition and the right to receive possession" was clearly incon-
sistent with the court's holding in part one. There, the court's
affirmation of the order requiring abandonment authorization
before the Tribe can use its royalty gas to meet its own needs
must proceed from the premise that the royalty right is qualified.
Since the Tribe will almost certainly not be able to get abandon-
ment authorization, 5 the court's holding implicitly characterizes
the right to take royalty in kind as a "qualified" right, which may
not involve either the power of disposition or the right to receive
possession.
' 578 F.2d at 291.
63 Id. at 291-92.
3 Id. at 292 (quoting Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U.S. 113, 118 (1927)).
578 F.2d at 292.
" Abandonment is only permitted if the FERC finds the supply of gas is depleted,
or "the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment." 15
U.S.C. 717f(b) (1976). In view of the pressing need for more gas in the interstate market,
there is little chance of the FPC determining that public convenience would permit aban-




The inconsistency in Jicarilla derives from the court's reli-
ance upon Southland in part one, in contrast to its reliance upon
established principles of property law and the common sense
meaning of words such as "purchase" in part two. Furthermore,
it appears the reliance on Southland in part one was unavoidable,
given the broad wording of the Southland holding.
Southland concerned the impact of a lessee's dedication on
the rights of the owner of the remainder of the mineral fee inter-
est. The all-encompassing scope of the Court'e expanded con-
struction of the "dedication"-and hence of the jurisdic-
tion-triggered by a sale is evident in its conclusion that "the
obligation to continue service attached to the gas. . . and bound
all those with dominion and power of sale over the gas, including
the lessor to whom it reverted." 6 In attempting to justify such a
conclusion, the Court addressed the questions suggested by the
inconsistencies in Jicarilla: How can a lessee's sale of his limited
interest cause a burden to be imposed on the lessor's unqualified
right to take royalty in kind, or to receive and dispose of the
remainder of his estate? Stated in terms of basic property law,
how can a man give, or "dedicate," that which he does not own?
In response to the foregoing questions, a slim majority of the
Southland Court declared that the "dedication" of gas does not
effect a "gift" or "surrender" of the gas, but only changes its
regulatory status: it is simply "placed within the jurisdiction of
the Commission, so that it may be sold to the public at the 'just
and reasonable' rates specified by section 4 of the Act." 7 The
fallacy of that reasoning, of course, is its failure to consider what
the dissent correctly identifies as the fact which gives the case its
real importance: the great disparity in prices in the regulated and
unregulated markets." Because of that disparity, the holding
greatly reduces the value of the lessor's property right without
compensation, and causes a "revolution in property interests
touching natural gas."'
'9
" 98 S. Ct. at 1959.
I d. at 1960.
U Id. at 1962 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1969 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Southland majority claimed Sunray Mid-
Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137 (1960) logically impelled its holding. Sunray,
however, merely held that a private contract between a producer and a pipeline company
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As the discussion of Southland indicates, the inconsistencies
in the rationale supporting the two parts of Jicarilla are not
"explained" by the lengthier rationale offered in Southland. Per-
haps both decisions can only be understood if one looks beyond
the express rationales to the fact of the current need to retain gas
in the interstate market. 0 However, as Judge Leventhall warned
in Mobil Oil, even the commendable desire to achieve an objec-
tive arguably underlying the NGA is not sufficient justification
for judicially expanding the Act to cover persons clearly not
within its scope.
7'
B. Shearn v. Andrus" and McCombs v. FERC
73
Two other oil and gas decisions merit brief discussion, in that
they reached seemingly conflicting conclusions on the issue of
whether strict compliance with pertinent regulations is manda-
tory. In Shearn v. Andrus, the Tenth Circuit furthered well-
established precedent in affirming an Interior Board of Land
Appeals (IBLA) decision that strict compliance with regulations
governing non-competitive oil and gas lease applications was
mandatory.14 The court found the insistence on strict compliance
justified, even though the actual facts of the case indicated that
the expressed objective of the regulation could be met just as well
without strict compliance. However, in McCombs v. FERC, the
court set aside an FERC order requiring strict compliance with
the abandonment authorization procedures under the NGA. The
court held that the facts showed abandonment had occurred, as
a matter of law, making strict compliance with the abandonment
provisions of the NGA unnecessary.7'
could not supplant the FPC's authority in determining how long the gas owned by the
producer would be subject to the dedication he initiated. In extending that holding, the
Southland majority reasoned that "since a private contract is not determinative of the
scope of a dedication, a private lease is not determinative of whether there has been a
dedication." 98 S. Ct. at 1965. That, as the dissent correctly noted, is a non sequitur. Id.
" As one commentator has remarked in reference to recent FPC rulings, "A pattern
of decisions is emerging which might seem irrational, were it riot for the underlying
consideration that the Commission knows that it is not attracting gas to the interstate
market and must therefore compel gas deliveries to that market." See Moody, supra note
52, at 695.
71 463 F.2d 256, 262-63 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972).
No. 77-1228 (10th Cir., Sept. 19, 1977).
- 570 F.2d 1376 (1978).
" No. 77-1228 at 6.
,1 570 F.2d at 1381.
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The court's willingness in McCombs to forego the traditional
insistence on strict compliance with procedures made mandatory
by the Act might be hailed by some as a new and welcome prece-
dent for looking to the equities or facts of the case, instead of
the wording of the Act, to determine when strict compliance is
necessary. However, the very unique nature of the McCombs
fact pattern, and the obvious problems inherent in any expansion
of the holding beyond its facts, suggest it would be wiser to view
Shearn as the controlling precedent and McCombs is a fleeting
aberration.
Shearn was the first drawee at a public drawing for a non-
competitive oil and gas lease, and hence had the right to receive
the lease, if he was qualified." Unfortunately, he had failed to
include a particular statement of interests with his application,
as required by a regulation in force at that time." Thus, his offer
was rejected. On appeal, he correctly noted that under the facts
in his case, the stated purpose of the regulation would have been
fulfilled whether or not he complied.78 Common sense seemed to
support his contention that strict compliance with the regulation
should not only be mandatory in situations where it was neces-
sary to assure compliance with the public interest, as defined by
the regulation. However, the court placed great reliance on the
fact that the Secretary has consistently determined that the regu-
lation is mandatory in all cases.7 Although consistency may well
be the proverbial hobgoblin in many contexts, in this context the
court wisely perceived it as the most pragmatic way to meet "the
need for evenhandedness" in administering noncompetitive
leases.1 The court might well have added that the widespread
'1 See provisions governing non-competitive leasing under the Mineral Leasing Act,
30 U.S.C. § 226(c) (1976), and regulations implementing them. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3110.1-1 to
3110.1-8 (1977).
" 43 C.F.R. § 3130.4-4, amended to delete requirement at issue in 1976. See 41 Fed.
Reg. 43,149 (1976).
No. 77-1228 at 4.
"Id. at 5.
Id. at 6. The court noted that although the lease must go to the first "qualified"
applicant, the Secretary has discretion to determine who is qualified. The regulations help
to contain that discretion. As one commentator has explained, if the more flexible concept
of substantial compliance, so prevalent elsewhere in the law, were applied to the leasing
regulations, the determination of who is qualified might require "an exercise of discretion,
which could more easily lead to an unfounded charge of favoritism than could a strict
application of the regulations in accordance with their letter." ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT.,
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knowledge of the Secretary's policy of insisting on strict compli-
ance, even when the wisdom of requiring strict compliance with
particular regulations appears debatable, mitigates the seeming
harshness of applying the policy to fact patterns such as that in
Shearn.
McCombs involved an FPC finding that a certificate author-
izing the continued sale of gas in interstate commerce was still
in force after several decades, despite a lengthy cessation of all
production. The FPC ruled that since no lessee of the field had
ever received abandonment authorization as required by the
NGA, the party currently holding rights to the field must cease
selling gas produced therefrom to the intrastate market."' The
Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the cessation of production
and lack of evidence of any recoverable reserves from the tract
over a five year period, plus the "recognition" by all par-
ties-including the FPC-that known reserves were depleted,
constituted abandonment, as a matter of law.82 It reasoned that
strict compliance with the NGA requirements for abandonment
authorization was not required, since the occurrence of abandon-
ment as a matter of law had removed the issue of whether aban-
donment had occurred from the expertise of the FPC.8
The basic fallacy in the court's reasoning is its apparent
assumption that the "fact" of abandonment can be equated with
statutory abandonment under the mandatory NGA provision.
Although FPC letters suggesting that a subsequent lessee initiate
abandonment procedures arguably constituted a recognition by
the FPC that production had ceased, that recognition can hardly
be equated with the required finding, after a hearing, "that the
available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the
continuation of services is unwarranted .... "" Furthermore,
the alleged "recognition" by the original interstate purchaser that
reserves were depleted was qualified, since he reserved the right
LAw or FEEmRAL On. AND GAs Lmis, § 5.14 at 180-81 & n.15 (1977).
" 570 F.2d at 1377, 1379. The FPC held that "there can be no abandonment of a
certificate authorizing interstate service absent strict compliance with the requirements
of petition, notice, hearing and establishment of cause for abandonment" as required
under 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976). Id. at 1379.
I d. at 1382.
Id. at 1381.




to reinstall his collection equipment should production begin
again.m Such facts suggest courts might have difficulty determin-
ing when abandonment has occurred, if they choose to replace
agency expertise with their own judgment, yet retain-as they
must-the statutory standards. However, the issue of whether
courts can or should make that choice will probably never arise,
since the unique presence of the FPC letters in the case suggests
it will most likely be narrowly limited to its facts, which may well
never occur again.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Jette v. Bergland" merits attention as the first case directly
holding that a plaintiff may seek judicial review of an agency's
decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS),8 even though the plaintiff has failed to exhaust available
sources of administrative review. The holding is a logical exten-
sion of Tenth Circuit decisions limiting agency discretion in im-
plementing the procedural mandates of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA). 1 It also follows logically from the
flexible nature of the doctrine of administrative remedies, as that
doctrine has been defined by the Supreme Court. 0 However, as
part of its justification the Jette court included an attack on the
procedures an agency used to arrive at its decision not to prepare
an EIS. That attack may have weakened the precedential value
of the opinion, since it arguably represents the sort of judicial
intrusion into agency procedures which the Supreme Court vigor-
ously condemned in a critical NEPA decision handed down only
the month before Jette was decided." Nevertheless, intimations
in one other recent Supreme Court NEPA case suggest the Jette
holding should survive as an important precedent fostering early
u 570 F.2d at 1378.
- 579 F.2d 59 (1978).
" The statutory provision requiring preparation of impact statements is 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C) (1976).
U The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Ecology Center, Inc. v. Coleman.
515 F.2d 860, 864-67 (1975), although the conclusion was not a necessary basis of its
decision, since it found there was an issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff had exhausted
his administrative remedies.
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
" See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).
1 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1197 (1978).
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court review of the NEPA threshold decision."
NEPA litigation has focused not on the many and broad
substantive provisions of the Act, but rather on the one specific
procedural mandate requiring agencies to prepare impact state-
ments." The Act itself helped initiate that focus by requiring
agencies to comply with the EIS mandate "to the fullest extent
possible"'" while only requiring them to comply with the sub-
stantive mandate through "all practical means, consistent with
other essential considerations."'" Thus, as construed by the
courts, the EIS provision "mandates a particular sort of careful
and informed decisionmaking process and creates judicially en-
forceable duties.""
The question of whether an agency has adequately complied
with the EIS mandate does not arise until after resolution of the
earlier threshold question of whether the action in question com-
prises a "major Federal action significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment.' 7 A related question, and the pri-
mary issue raised in Jette, is what is the proper timing for judicial
review of an agency's answer to the threshold question?
The agency involved in the Jette case was the Forest Service.
The plaintiff had objected to its decision that approval of exten-
sive road building and mining exploration in a national forest did
not require preparation of an EIS. However, he chose not to pur-
sue available administrative appeals of the agency's decision. 8
Thus, the primary issue on appeal was whether administrative
remedies were sufficiently exhausted to alllow judicial review of
the decision. The Tenth Circuit held that they were, citing the
Supreme Court's classic explication of the flexible nature of the
exhaustion doctrine in McKart v. United States" as its primary
authority.
" See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). For a comprehensive discussion of the reasons
for that focus and decisions developing it, see McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies and
NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TEx. L. Rav. 801 (1977).
" 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
0 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1976).
" Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
" 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). Agencies must only prepare an EIS for actions fitting
that description. Id.
" 579 F.2d at 62.
" 579 F.2d at 62 (citing 395 U.S. 185 (1969)).
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The court's application of McKart should have sufficed to
support its decision. McKart emphasized that a plaintiff's failure
to exhaust administrative remedies does not dictate summary
judgment for the defendant; rather, it dictates a balancing of
interests and careful consideration of the purposes of the doc-
trine.' ® Judge Doyle, writing for the court in Jette, noted that a
primary purpose of the doctrine is to give agencies a chance to
apply their expertise or discretion. He claimed that purpose is not
relevant to the NEPA threshold decision, since under the strong
NEPA mandate, agencies have little discretion to exercise. Al-
though the extent of agencies' discretion in determining whether
the EIS requirement applies is a current point of controversy,' 01
Tenth Circuit opinions certainly support Judge Doyle's claim. 02
In addition, the sweeping wording of the statutory test, plus the
statutory qualification that the EIS mandate is to be followed "to
the fullest extent possible" both suggest that agency discretion is
limited, especially in reference to actions such as those in Jette,
which undeniably have a broad impact on the environment.'
The second purpose of the exhaustion doctrine upon which
Judge Doyle implicitly focused is the desirability of avoiding pre-
mature interruption of the administrative process. He cited sev-
eral decisions emphasizing the importance of carrying out the
NEPA procedural obligations without delay.'4That line of rea-
soning offers the strongest support for the holding, in that it rests
on and implements the congressional concern underlying NEPA.
If the EIS requirement is to effectuate the dual goals of forcing
agencies to reorder their priorities in the process of decisionmak-
ing, and fostering protection of the environment by preventing
initiation of government actions which might have adverse envi-
ronmental effects, then agencies must be required to prepare
395 U.S. at 193-95.
'' For discussions of that controversy see Comment, The Developing Common Law
of "Major Federal Action" Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 31 Apx. L. Rv.
254 (1977); McGarity, supra note 93; Trubek, Allocating the Burden of Environmental
Uncertainty: The NRC Interprets NEPA's Substantive Mandate, 1977 Wis. L. Rav. 747.
10 See, e.g., National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1001 (10th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484
F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
'" See 579 F.2d at 61, 64.
IU 579 F.2d at 63 (citing National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 656 (10th
Cir. 1971) and Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,
1119 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
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impact statements before decisions harden into established poli-
cies which are not likely to be reevaluated objectively, and before
actions commence and cause irreparable damage to the environ-
ment.
Unfortunately, the Jette court focused attention not on the
delay caused by postponement of judicial review, but on what it
termed the "shameful delay" of the Forest Service in determining
whether an impact statement should have been filed.'0 5 That
focus projected a confusing rationale. Judge Doyle first noted that
the Forest Service had used an Environmental Analysis Report
(EAR) as a means of considering whether an EIS was necessary. '0
He then attacked the EAR as just "another layer of bureaucratic
paperwork," "invented" by the Forest Service to "avoid" prepa-
ration of an EIS while allowing the activity which damages the
environment to continue.10 While inclusion of such candid ap-
praisals in judicial opinions can be both courageous and refresh-
ing, it should perhaps be reserved for those cases where such
candor is necessary to explain or support the holding, and where
the validity of the appraisal is made evident in the opinion. The
Jette opinion offered no support for the implied premise that the
EAR was used to make the threshold decision, yet failed to re-
quire consideration of the magnitude of the operation in terms of
the required statutory standards. Furthermore, the question of
whether the Forest Service adequately considered statutory cri-
teria in arriving at its negative EIS decision was not the issue in
Jette; it was the issue to be addressed on remand.
The majority's premature conclusion that the procedures se-
lected by the Forest Service for making its threshold decision
were "meaningless" and inspired by dubious motives provoked
an indignant attack by the dissent.' It also may have weakened
the precedential value of Jette, since attempts by courts to pre-
vent agencies from fashioning their own rules of procedure-even
in the context of NEPA's judicially enforceable mandates-were
recently condemned by the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 109
' 579 F.2d at 63.
iM Id.
107 Id.
,m Id. at 65.
,0 98 S. Ct. 1197 (1978). The Vermont Yankee Court stressed the limited role of a
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In view of the importance of establishing the right of plain-
tiffs to seek judicial review of threshold decisions before complete
exhaustion of administrative appeals, one wishes the Jette court
had heeded the warning of Vermont Yankee and avoided unnec-
essary attack on the EAR policy of the Forest Service as partial
justification for its holding. Instead, the court could have turned
to a recent Supreme Court decision which addressed a similar
NEPA timing issue to find strong, if indirect, persuasive support
for its holding. In Kleppe v. Sierra Club,"0 the Court held that
NEPA does not give courts authority to review the adequacy of
an agency's environmental considerations relating to federal ac-
tions until those actions are actually proposed, rather than
merely contemplated."' Thus, under Kleppe, an agency's own
threshold decision must predate judicial review. However, it is
important to note that a vocal minority of the Court objected to
even that much delay before allowing judicial review of whether
an EIS is required. It noted that "NEPA contemplates agency
consideration of environmental factors throughout the decision-
making process," suggesting that "[elarly consideration of envi-
ronmental consequences . . . is the whole point of NEPA." 2
The existence and vigor of the Kleppe dissent suggests that
a narrow reading of the holding is appropriate: it bars judicial
review before an agency's threshold decision is formally due, but
it does not suggest such review must await complete exhaustion
of administrative review. On the contrary, the Kleppe majority
specifically stated that "the time at which a court enters the
process is when the report or recommendation on the proposal is
made, and someone protests either the absence or the adequacy
of the final impact statement. This is the point at which an
court in reviewing the sufficiency of an agency's consideration of environmental factors,
even in the NEPA context. Id. at 1217. It based its decision on "the very basic tenent [sic]
of administrative law that agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure."
Id. at 1212.
" 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
" d. at 406. The Court cited 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) and its own earlier decision in
Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 320 (1975), as authority for its
underlying assertion that an agency need not have an EIS ready until such time as it
makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal action. It reasoned that since
that procedural mandate is "quite precise .. the role of the courts in enforcing that duty
is similarly precise." Id.
"I Id. at 415-17 (Marshall, J., with whom Brennan, J., joined, dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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agency's action has reached sufficient maturity to assure that
judicial intervention will not hazard unnecessary disruption."" 3
Thus, although the Court was admittedly not addressing the spe-
cific issue of whether exhaustion of administrative remedies must
predate judicial review, its assertion clearly suggests that review
at the time of the initial agency determination would not defeat
the purpose of the exhaustion doctrine by prematurely interrupt-
ing the agency's procedures.
The Jette decision may be perceived as facilitating "judicial
activism" as a means of implementing the NEPA EIS mandate."'
Although it can be argued that both Kleppe and Vermont Yankee
portend an early end to judicial activism in forcing agency com-
pliance with NEPA's procedural mandates, Jette's authorization
of early judicial review seems firmly grounded in the Supreme
Court's own pronouncements in McKart and Kleppe. Thus, it
appears Jette may well survive as an important addition to the
growing federal common law giving shape to and forcing imple-
mentation of NEPA."5
Judith L. Roberts
"I Id. at 406 n.15.
' For a discussion of the potential benefits of judicial activism in implementing
NEPA, see Oakes, The Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 498 (1977).
For a discussion of the need for judicial activism as a means of overcoming the reluctance
of agencies to comply with NEPA, see Cortner, A Case Analysis of Policy Implementation:
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 16 NAT. Ras. J. 323 (1976).
"I Referring to NEPA in his dissent in Kleppe, Justice Marshall remarked that "this
vaguely worded statute seems designed to serve as no more than a catalyst for develop-
ment of a 'common law' of NEPA. To date, the courts have responded in just that manner




In three of the four Tenth Circuit cases decided under the
federal securities laws during the period of this survey, the very
existence of a security was the issue litigated.' Where novel
schemes have been outside the literal language of the Securities
Acts,' it has been necessary to compare the specific facts of each
scheme with the definition of an "investment contract ' 3 that has
coalesced from Supreme Court decisions in SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp.,' SEC v. WJ. Howey Co.,5 and United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman.' There is no conflict as such in this
line of authority; yet a subtle shifting of emphasis in language
from one case to another has produced different results in close
cases. 7
Courts have discovered investment contracts related to such
underlying assets as whiskey warehouse receipts," beaver,' silver
I See Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1978); Crowley v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1978); McGovern Plaza Joint Venture v. First of
Denver Mortgage Investors, 562 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1977).
The fourth case, Hassig v. Pearson, 565 F.2d 644 (10th Cir. 1977), was brought under
the anti-fraud section of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976). It was litigated on the merits, but its significance is limited; the Tenth Circuit
merely affirmed the finding of the trial court that the facts did not support the allegation
of fraud.
Section 2 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. i 77(b) (1976) provides:
When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires-(1) The term
"security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence
of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or sub-
scription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas,
or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, tempo-
rary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase,any of -the -foregoing.
Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10)(1976),
sets forth a similar definition. The Supreme Court has noted that the two definitions are
"virtually identical." Tcherepin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967).
See text accompanying notes 19, 28, and 33 infra.
4 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
328 U.S. 293 (1946).
4 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
See text accompanying notes 19-35 infra.
Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Constantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974).
Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967).
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foxes,'0 and gold coins." Indeed, state securities officials have
recently challenged promoters of worm breeding schemes.,2 The
Tenth Circuit has considered and rejected a residential subdivi-
sion lot,'3 a loan commitment," and a franchise'5 as investment
contracts. These latter transactions may not be as exotic as the
former, but they are undeniably significant to the practitioner.
II. REAL ESTATE: Woodward v. Terracor, Inc. ,'
That a transaction which purports to be a real estate transac-
tion may be a security is not debatable.'7 In Woodward, however,
the Tenth Circuit was asked to find that the sale of a lot in a
residential subdivision constituted an investment contract.
A. Facts of the Case
Terracor, a developer, promoted Stansbury Park as a
planned residential community with an impressive array of
amenities.'" The plantiffs, who had purchased lots in the develop-
ment, charged that it was "dying on the vine," although there
was a factual dispute as to the actual status of the project.', Some
of the plantiffs apparently intended to build on the lots for their
own use, while others purchased solely for speculative purposes.
The alleged misrepresentations of the developer formed no part
of the written agreement between the parties.
B. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. identified an
" SEC v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Dist., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
" Machalaba, Many States Worry About Using Worms to Lure Investors, Wall St,
J., June 5, 1978, at 1, col. 4.
" Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1978).
" McGovern Plaza Joint Venture v. First of Denver Mortgage Investors, 562 F.2d 645
(10th Cir. 1978).
Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1978).
, 574 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1978).
" See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (fee simple interests in tracts
containing citrus groves); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (assign-
ments of oil leases); Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1973) (real estate joint
venture); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970) (fractional interests in oil and
gas leases). See also, Clurman, Condominiums as Securities: A Current Look, 19 N.Y.L.F.
457 (1974).
" 574 F.2d at 1025. The amenities were to include shopping, transporation, recrea-




investment contract as a "contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and
is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or
a third party ... ."20 Judge Breitenstein applied the facts to this
test and failed to find any evidence of a common enterprise bind-
ing the plaintiffs to Terracor.1' In particular, the only contractual
agreement between the parties was a standard real estate con-
tract; there was no collateral management contract.
22
The court cited ample support for its approach in the opin-
ions of several federal district courts.2 However, Judge Breiten-
stein was forced to distinguish the Tenth Circuit's own contrary
precedent established by McCown v. Heidler.2 1 In McCown the
defendants had "contractually promised" to complete certain
projects which would have enhanced the value of the plaintiffs'
lots,2 whereas Terracor's contractual obligation was apparently
limited to delivery of title."
C. Analysis
The decision of the court might have been correct either as
a syllogistic application of Howey or as a response to the Supreme
Court's current restrictive posture toward the securities laws.2
328 U.S. 293, 298-99.
" 574 F.2d at 1025.
', Id. In Howey, a collateral management contract enabled the investors to rely solely
upon the efforts of the promoter to pick the citrus crop, market it, and distribute the
profits. The investors lacked the knowledge, skill, and equipment to do the job themselves.
328 U.S. at 296.
12 Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Happy
Investment Group v. Lakewood Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Con-
tract Buyers League v. F & F Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Il1. 1969). Contra, Fogel
v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Jenne v. Amrep Corp. [1978
Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. RaP. (CCH) 96,343 (D. N.J. Feb. 14, 1978).
527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 209. It is not clear from the opinion whether the promises were limited to
material contained in the traditional real estate documents, or whether promises made
in conversations and brochures were included.
* 574 F.2d at 1025, 1027.
* Cf. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S.Ct. 1292 (1977) (§ 10(b) will not be avail-
able to minority shareholders in a short form merger absent a misrepresentation); Piper
v. Chris Craft Indus. Inc., 97 S.Ct. 926 (1977) (defeated tender offeror has no cause of
action against successful competitor); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)
(plaintiff must prove "scienter" in suits brought under § 10(b)); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (plaintiff must have been a "purchaser" or
"seller" to pursue a § 10(b) remedy). See generally, Lowenfels. Recent Supreme Court
Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891
1979
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
However, the facile distinction between McCown and
Woodward-whether or not the representations were part of the
written agreement between the parties-is not entirely satisfac-
tory. One could infer that Professor Loss would not support the
distinction, although the Tenth Circuit confidently quoted from
his treatise:
[N]o "investment contract" is involved when a person invests
in real estate, with the hope perhaps of earning a profit as the result
of a general increase in values concurrent with the development of
the neighborhood, as long as he does not do so as part of an enter-
prise whereby it is expressly or impliedly understood that property
will be developed or operated by others.u
It is reasonable to conclude that it would be necessary to go
beyond the written agreement of the parties to examine their
express or implied understandings.
Perhaps the court had extended itself too far in McCown by
relying on the more general language of Joiner.2' In that early case
the test for an investment contract was formulated as:
what character the instrument is given in commerce by the terms
of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements
held out to the prospect. In the enforcement of an act such as this
it is not inappropriate that promoters' offerings be judged as being
what they were represented to be."
Joiner made no distinction between written and oral representa-
tions. One could easily imagine an overzealous developer's oral
representations holding out inducements such that an investment
contract might exist in the sale of a residential lot. In the recent
case of Jenne v. Amrep Corp.,3' which cited McCown with ap-
proval, the Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey
detailed the economic inducements offered and examined all rep-
(1977); Ruppert, The Supreme Court's Trimming of the Section 10(b) Tree: The Cultiva-
tion of a New Securities Law Perspective, 3 J. CoR' L. 112 (1977).
574 F.2d at 1026 (quoting 1 Loss, Szcuarrws RFULATION 491-92 (2d ed. 1961))
(emphasis added).
- 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
In McCown, the Tenth Circuit said: "In characterizing the purchase of... lots, the
standard set out in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., must be applied .... " 527 F.2d
at 208. The court described the enthusiatic marketing techniques of the promoters in great
detail. For example, the court observed that the brochures "covered such topics as 'the
secret in speculating in raw land,' capital gain and real estate and fortunes, large and
small are being made in land." Id. at 210.
3 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943).
3, 11978 Transfer Binderl FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,343 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 1978).
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resentations of the promoter, both written and oral. The defen-
dants had urged that the court consider only the purchase agree-
ment, a short form document. This the court refused to do be-
cause to do so would have been inconsistent with Joiner.
32
Another consideration in determining whether investment
contracts are securities is the subjective motivation of the pur-
chaser. Other than to note that various plaintiffs in Woodward
had different motivations for purchasing the lots in Stansbury
Park, :3 Judge Breitenstein wisely declined to decide the case on
the basis of the purchasers' subjective motivations. There was
language in the Supreme Court's Forman decision which might
have led him to do so. In support of its holding that the "expec-
tation of profit" element of Howey had not been met, the Court
noted that "[ijn the present case there can be no doubt that
investors were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a
place to live, and not by financial returns on their investments.13
Common sense would have supported an assertion that most of
the Woodward plaintiffs were "acquiring a place to live." In an-
other recent case involving a real estate development, Fogel v.
Sellamerica, Ltd.,3 the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York focused upon the subjective motivation of
the purchasers: Did they or did they not purchase the lots for
investment purposes? 36 Under this rationale some buyers would
have purchased a security while others would have merely pur-
chased a lot. Courts inclined to follow this deceptively simple
approach may find themselves mired in speculation over the
dominant motivation of purchasers.
Finally, McCown,37 Jenne,3' and Foge39 appeared to involve
land for vacation or retirement homes, whereas Woodward ap-
peared to involve a typical residential development."0 Circum-
" Id at 93,166.
574 F.2d 1023, 1025.
" 421 U.S. 837, 853 (1975).
445 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
Id. at 1277-78. The court found support for this analysis in McCown. Id. at 1278.
" 527 F.2d at 210 (lots for "individuals to construct a home and retire, all in a scenic
and recreation area").
[1978 Transfer Binderl FEn. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,343 at 93,164 (semi-arid land
in New Mexico), at 93,167 (other litigation pending across the country).
"' 445 F. Supp. at 1272 (plaintiffs who were New York residents purchased lots in the
Pocono mountains of Pennsylvania).
11 574 F.2d at 1024 (a planned residential community). See also. Note. Recreational
Land Subdivisions As Investment Contract Securities, 13 Hous. L. Rav. 153 (1975).
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stances surrounding the marketing of vacation homes would more
easily support the finding of an investment contract. As a policy
matter there may be valid reasons to keep the typical sale of
residential real estate beyond the purview of the securities acts.4
As a practical matter, developers should avoid certain represen-
tations until this area of the law becomes settled. 2
III. THE LOAN COMMITMENT: McGovern Plaza Joint Venture v
First of Denver Mortgage Investors3
Just as the securities laws have stopped somewhat short of
absorbing all real property transactions, they have not reached all
commercial transactions. The concept of a "commercial-
investment dichotomy" has been offered as an aid to analyzing
whether commercial loan transactions are securities."
A. Facts of the Case
In furtherance of its plan to build a hotel, the plaintiffs ob-
tained a construction loan commitment from defendant First of
Denver, and a permanent loan commitment from defendant B.F.
Saul Advisory Co.45 Plaintiffs alleged that there had been a misre-
presentation of material facts. In any event, the loan commit-
ments were not carried out and the hotel was not built; the plain-
tiffs sought an anti-fraud remedy under the securities acts."6
" See generally, Berman & Stone, Federal Securities Law and the Sale of Condom i-
niums, Homes and Homesites, 30 Bus. LAw. 411 (1975).
11 Id. at 430-31.
The authors counsel developers to avoid representations concerning the increasing
value of property and income or tax benefits of ownership. Mandatory collateral services
should be avoided. The purchase of multiple units by single purchasers should be discour-
aged because it suggests specualtion. Futhermore, the authors advocate that developers
keep a careful watch on salesmen, that they require purchasers to sign a statement ac-
knowledging that they are buying for current or future residential use, and that they tape
the closing transaction to "provide a permanent record of the parties' state of mind."
13 562 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1977).
" See Comment, An Overview of Promissory Notes Under The Federal Securities
Laws, 6 FORDHAM URn. I. J. 529 (1978); Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of
"Security" Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB.
L. Rsv. 478 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Commercial Notes].
" 562 F.2d at 646.
" Id. The applicable anti-fraud sections are § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15




B. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
Judge McWilliams noted that "[t]he plaintiffs were in no
sense relying on the efforts of either First of Denver or Saul to gain
their profits." 7 Thus the reliance element of the Howey test was
not met. An inquiry into the motiviation of the plaintiffs (pre-
sumably they wanted to build a hotel), or into the manner of the
lenders' promotions (the facts gave no indication of anything
other than private negotiations) would not have supported a find-
ing of reliance in McGovern.
In addition, Judge McWilliams reasonably concluded that
the loan commitment was a commercial rather than an invest-
ment transaction. 8 He relied upon Zabriskie v. Lewis," a Tenth
Circuit case adopting a test of whether the transaction was of a
type in which stock was usually given.10 Under the facts of
Zabriskie, which involved a note given in consideration of funds
to promote a corporation, the answer was "yes." 5' In McGovern
the transaction was of a type in which stock is usually not given.
C. Analysis
Many courts have employed the concept of a commercial-
investment dichotomy to analyze notes in order to escape the
literal language of the statutory definitions of a security.52 The
Tenth Circuit's Zabriskie opinion summarized the rationale of
the test:
This test is based upon the purpose of the Act to protect investors,
the "unless the context otherwise requires" language, and the pract-
ical considerations of subjecting commercial notes to the registra-
tion provisions of the Securities Act as well as fear of the resulting
litigation flooding the federal courts if commercial notes were in-
cluded .3
" 562 F.2d at 647.
I d.
" 507 F.2d 546 (loth Cir. 1974)
Id. at 551 In adopting the test, the Tenth Circuit cited with approval the student
comment, Commercial Notes. supra note 44.
" 507 F.2d at 551-52.
" See, e.g., McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 494-95 (5th Cir. 1974); Bellah
v. First Nat'l Bank of Hereford. 495 F.2d 1109, 1111-14 (5th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City
Investing Co.. 48. P.2d 689, 694-95 (3d Cir. 1973); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463
F.2d 1075, 1080 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972).
The definitions of a security in both the 1933 and 1934 Acts include "any note." See
note 2 supra.
53 507 F.2d 546, 551.
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While at least one commentator has formulated detailed cri-
teria for application of the test,54 others have observed that the
test is more easily stated then applied.55 Although it may be of
little assistance in analyzing close cases, it is hard to fault the use
of the commercial-investment dichotomy analysis in McGovern.
The loan commitments were obtained to assure funds for the
hotel construction, a commercial project. Neither party contem-
plated that they were to stand on their own merits as invest-
ments. 6
The outcome in McGovern required the Tenth Circuit to
distinguish its own precedent, United States v. Austin,57 which
had declared a loan commitment to be a security. Fortunately,
there was nothing inconsistent in the two decisions: "[w]hether
a particular investment constitutes a security depends upon the
facts and circumstances of the case."58 In Austin, the defendants
had conceived an ambitious scheme of issuing back-up commit-
ments guaranteeing that others would make loans. Investors were
induced to purchase the commitments with the expectation of
immediately selling them at a profit.5 Unfortunately, there is
language in McGovern which might lead one to believe that the
" Commercial Notes, supra note 44 at 510-24. The factors include use of the proceeds,
application of the Howey test, risk, numbers of notes issued, dollar amount of the transac-
tion, time elements, and characterization of the notes on the relevant financial state-
ments. The Ninth Circuit opinion in Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252
(9th Cir. 1976), examined the character of a note using a list of substantially similar
factors.
" See, e.g., Lipton & Katz, Notes Are Not Always Securities, 30 Bus. LAW. 763, 766
(1975); Comment, 30 VAND. L. Rav. 110, 117 (1977); Comment, Bank Loan Participations
as Securities; Notes, Investment Contracts, and the Commercial/Investment Dichotomy,
15 DuQ. L. REv. 261, 276-77 (1976-77); Comment, Notes as Securities Under the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 MARYLAND L. REV. 233, 243-44
(1976).
" One suggested criterion for analyzing a note is to examine the common expectations
of the parties: How would a reasonable businessman characterize the instrument? See
Commercial Notes, supra, note 44 at 510.
- 462 F.2d 724 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972).
" Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 435 (10th Cir. 1973).
11 462 F.2d at 727-29. The Austin opinion provided scant analysis. Its language
seemed applicable to the loan commitment in McGovern:
[Tihis letter of commitment was sold for a substantial consideration,
and the buyer received what appeared to be an enforceable obligation which
contemplated the flow of funds. It indicated a binding and legally enforce-
able right. Therefore, we can find no fault with the ruling of the trial court




result in Austin differed (1) because it was a criminal case, and
(2) because "[tlhe entire procedure was fraudulent an no loans
were ever made."10 The existence of a security should not depend
upon the nature of the action, civil or criminal, nor should it
depend upon the degree of fraud perceived by the court. Not
every fraudulent scheme involves a security.
IV. THE FRANCHISE: Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co."'
In 1975, in an unpublished opinion, the Tenth Circuit re-
versed the District Court for the District of Utah, which had
granted defendant Montgomery Ward's motion to dismiss the
action on the grounds that its catalog sales agency agreement
with the plaintiff could not be a security. 2
Were the Howey test to be interpreted literally in that profits
must have come solely from the efforts of others, 3 the Utah court
would have been correct. Furthermore, it would be useless to
question franchises or any other investment contract, since clever
counsel could help their clients design schemes in which a token
amount of investor effort would defeat the application of the se-
curities laws.'
The Tenth Circuit has now concluded that the catalog sales
agreement was not a security;" its consideration of the factors
which went into this determination merits some discussion.
A. Facts of the Case
The opinions in both the instant case and the earlier case
were silent concerning the gravamen of plaintiff's injury. One can
only infer that the catalog sales agency was less than successful.
Although the plaintiff was required by the agreement to
"devote his full time and best efforts to the operation of the
Agency," 6 the factual question of the amount of control actually
exercised by Montgomery Ward was critical.
562 F.2d 645, 648.
" 570 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1978).
' The case has now been published at 570 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1975).
328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
' One commentator has suggested that the promoters in Howe could have avoided
the application of the securities laws by requiring each investor to pick one orange. See
Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities
Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. Rav. 135. 145 (1971).
570 F.2d 877, 878.
U 570 F.2d 875, 876.
1979
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B. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
Judge Breitenstein reaffirmed the Tenth Circuit's alignment
with other circuits that have modified that part of the Howey test
which directed that profits were to come solely from the efforts
of others. 7 The Tenth Circuit's position was that the franchisee's
"control over the factors essential to success of the enterprise"
would preclude existence of an investment contract." The opera-
tor of the catalog agency had some discretion in pricing, credit,
and advertising policies. He was responsible for hiring and firing
employees, together with all of the day-to-day operations of the
business. Thus the court concluded that in economic reality "the
contributions of the franchisees significantly and substantially
affect[ed] the profits expected from the enterprise.""
C. Analysis
Many cases have considered and rejected the contention that
a particular franchise agreement was a security.70 Among them is
the Tenth Circuit's decision in Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City
Steak, Inc.,7" which provides more than adequate support for the
court's holding that the agreement between Crowley and Montgo-
mery Ward did not constitute an investment contact.
" See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 480 (5th Cir. 1974) ("a
literal application of the Howey test would frustrate the remedial purposes of the Act");
Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1973) ("an investment contract can
exist where the investor is required to perform some duties, as long as they are nominal
or limited .. ."); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied 414 U.S. 821 (1973) ("[W]e adopt a more realistic test, whether the
efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones .... ").
The Supreme Court has yet to put its imprimatur upon this expansion. In United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the Court acknowledged the
variation and explicitly declined to comment upon it. Id. at 852 n.16.
U 570 F.2d at 880.
0 Id. at 881.
70 Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co.,
487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); Nash & Assocs. v. Lum's of Ohio, 484 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1973);
Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969).
Cases which have held to the contrary have involved pyramid schemes, in which the
promoter stresses the amount of money the participant can make by recruiting others to
participate: SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 414 U.S. 821
(1973).
For a balanced discussion of most of these cases, see Freedman, An Analysis of the
Franchise Agreement Under Federal Securities Laws, 27 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 919 (1976).
"1 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972) aff'g 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970).
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In Mr. Steak, the franchisee essentially abdicated all mana-
gerial responsibility for running the franchised restaurant. He
could have selected the manager, but the franchisor was responsi-
ble for training the manager, who then held his job at the franchi-
sor's sufferance." Other than this option to select a manager
(which was not exercised), the scope of the franchisee's authority
was severely circumscribed." Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit
held that the mere possibility of control constituted sufficient
participation in the enterprise to controvert the implication of an
investment contract.74 However, the fact that the court had so
thoroughly examined the relationship between the parties dem-
onstrates its unwillingness to apply the Howey test in mechanical
fashion."
When the facts of Mr. Steak are compared to the facts of
Crowley one must wonder why the court found it necessary to
remand the latter case for further factual determination. While
the franchisee in Mr. Steak merely could have selected a man-
ager, the Crowley plaintiff's agreement with Montgomery Ward
required that he "devote his full time and best efforts to the
operation of the Agency."" It is puzzling that when Crowley was
first before the Tenth Circuit in 1975, the court did not cite its
opinion in Mr. Steak for the quantity or quality of managerial
control necessary to preclude the existence of an investment con-
tract.r7
Abuses in the burgeoning franchise method of doing business
have led some commentators to suggest that franchisees need the
protection of the Securities Acts.7" However, the SEC, in agree-
ment with most courts, has taken the position that "true fran-
, 324 F. Supp. at 643.
" In particular, the financial control exercised by the franchisor was comprehensive.
Id.
' 460 F.2d at 670.
, The detailed analysis was contained in the district court opinion of Judge Arraj at
324 F. Supp. 640, which the Tenth Circuit gratefully adopted. See 460 F.2d at 669.
570 F.2d 875, 876.
7 Mr Steak was cited for the proposition that courts should give consideration to the
tfcts in determining the existence of an investment contract. 570 F.2d at 880.
It was apparent that the Tenth Circuit disapproved of the lack of analysis in the trial
court's order of dismissal. Id.
11 See, e.g., Comment, Compelling Full Disclosure in Franchise Agreements, 5 CuM.-
SAM. L. REv. 501 (1975); Comment, What is a Security? Howey, Turner Enterprises, And
Franchise Agreements, 22 KAN. L. REv. 55 (1973).
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chising" is distinguishable from pyramid marketing schemes and
that the former is normally not an investment contract."' There-
fore, the decision in Crowley would seem to have ample support
even under an interpretation of the investment contract in which
profits are not required to come solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party.
V. CONCLUSION
It cannot be assumed that future cases bearing some re-
semblance to the cases discussed herein will be decided in the
same way. This caveat, rather than expressing criticism of the
Tenth Circuit's analytical approach, merely recognizes that the
determination of a security is a "shifting, highly fact-oriented
determination. '"80 However, given the Supreme Court's recent
pronouncements on the securities laws,8 it seems unlikely that
the Tenth Circuit will adopt an expansive definition of a security.
Elaine A. Menter
SEC Securities Act Release, No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971), reprinted in 11971-1972
Transfer Binderl Fem. Sac. L. RaP. (CCH) 78,446.
0 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975).




The tax cases decided by the Tenth Circuit during 1977 rep-
resent consistent, conforming applications of the law with no de-
partures from tax principles established previously either by the
Tenth Circuit or by other jurisdictions.' Nevertheless, several of
the cases are worth noting for they delineate the current status
of the tax law in their respective fields.'
The Tenth Circuit had the opportunity to decide several cases, regarding tax protest
litigation, which are more interesting from a sociological than a legal standpoint. The
leading and dispositive case, in a series of four cases, is United States v. Carroll, 567 F.2d
955 (10th Cir. 1977). Following the pattern of tax protest cases, all four cases allege
constitutional claims, specifically contending that the taxpayer's constitutional privileges
under the first (freedom of religion), fourth (protection of privacy) and fifth (freedom from
self-incrimination) amendments have been violated by the Internal Revenue Service. See
United States v. Carroll; United States v. Johnson, No. 77-1366 (10th Cir. Mar. 22, 1978)
(Not for Routine Publication); Ellison v. Commissioner, No. 76-2178 (10th Cir. Jan. 20,
1978) (Not for Routine Publication); and United States v. Cotton, 567 F.2d 958 (10th Cir.
1977).
The Tenth Circuit, relying on well established Supreme Court precedent and on prior
Tenth Circuit cases, dismissed all of the constitutional arguments as meritless. See, e.g.,
United States v. Carroll, (relying on Gillett v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 439 (1971);
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 304 (1940); and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878)).
The Johnson case made the unusual argument that the taxpayer's conviction should
be overturned because the jury panel was not a fair cross section of the community since
it had a disproportionate number of Cheyenne residents and federal and state employees.
The tax protester also argued that the oath taken by the jurors was not in compliance with
Article 6, clause 3 of the Constitution which requires all judicial officers to be bound by
oath to support the Constitution. No. 77-1366, slip. op. at 2.
The Johnson and Ellison cases set forth the incredible argument that they had no
income during the years in question for all of their income was in the form of federal
reserve notes which are not actual dollars because they are not redeemable in gold or
silver. This argument was rejected as meritless on its face by the Tenth Circuit.
I Other cases were decided by the Tenth Circuit, but are not included within the
discussion of this note: United States v. New Mexico, No. 76-1888 (10th Cir. Aug. 7, 1978)
(New Mexico's gross receipt tax on expenses and equipment purchased by contractors.
who had cost plus contracts with the United States which included state and local taxes
within the definition of reimbursable costs, was not unconstitutional because the legal
incidence of the New Mexico tax was on the contractors as sellers of services to the United
States. Id. at 5-10. Further, the New Mexican compensating or use tax placed on reim-
bursements for property purchased out-of-state and brought into New Mexico for use
under government contracts was valid as, again, the legal incidence of the tax was on the
contractors as purchasers who brought the materials and supplies into New Mexico. Id.
at 10. Finally, the court upheld the rule that a gross receipt tax can be placed on only
those reimbursed general and administrative expenses which arise from contracts and
services performed within New Mexico's borders. Id. at 16-17.); Central Motor Co. v.
United States, 583 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1978) (Whether or not a corporation has accu-
mulated its earnings and profits beyond the reasonable needs of its business, including
reasonably anticipated needs, is a factual determination. Id. at 476. The opinion dis-
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I. THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF PAYMENTS FOR CATTLE FEED: Weisbart
v. Commissioner'
Unlike most taxpayers engaged in the production of goods for
sale who are forced to use the accrual method of accounting in
order to accurately reflect income,' farmers' engaged in the busi-
ness of raising livestock for profit have been entitled since 1915
to file their returns on the cash basis method and hence, deduct
most production costs in the year of payment irrespective of when
the associated income is earned.' This allowed farmers to manip-
ulate their taxable income by incurring expenses prematurely,
which in turn created a substantial business in the use of farms
as tax shelters. One frequently employed manipulative technique
involved the prepaid feed expense. Feed to be used during the
ensuing year would be prepaid in December to obtain, at that
time, the concomitant deduction.7 Understandably, this device
became the subject of substantial litigation.8
cusses the factors which the Tenth Circuit, and other jurisdictions, consider as indicat-
ing whether the accumulation was reasonable. Id. at 476-77 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.537-
2(b), (c) (1960), and Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 626-28 (1975) (which
the Tenth Circuit viewed as laying down the basic guidelines for the determination of
whether or not earnings had been accumulated unreasonably). See Case Accumulated
Earning Tax Aspects of Business Expansions and Investments, 32 TAX L. REv. 1, 64-65
(1976)); Jacobs Equipment Co. v. United States, 574 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir 1978) (The
act of welding a hoist to a truck body did not constitute "manufacture" of a truck body
within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 4061(a)(1)); Stern v. United States, No. 76-1550
(10th Cir. Sept. 23, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication) (Parole evidence could not be
used to supply the necessary, but unexpressed, restrictions in an instrument of gift in
order for the gift to qualify for a charitable deduction.).
3 564 F.2d 34 (10th Cir. 1977).
1 See generally I.R.C. §§ 446(a)-(c), 471; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.471-1 (1960), 1.471-11
(1973), 1.446-1(c)(20) (1957); see also Comment, Farmers' Prepaid Feed Deductions:
Mann v. Commissioner, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 485.
1 The word "farmers" includes "individuals, joint venturers, partnerships, corpora-
tions, or other entities engaged in the business of raising livestock for profit . Pinney
& Olsen, Farmers' Prepaid Feed Expenses, 25 TAx LAw. 537 (1972).
1 Comment, supra note 4 at 487-88, citing T.D. 2153, 17 TREAS. DEc. INT. REv. 101
(1915). The relevant language for our purposes is now found in Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12(a)
(1972), which states in part:
A farmer who operates a farm for profit is entitled to deduct from gross
income as necessary expenses all amounts actually expended in the carrying
on of the business of farming . . . . The purchase of feed and other costs
connected with raising livestock may be treated as expense deductions inso-
far as such costs represent actual outlay ....
See Comment, supra note 4, at 487-89.
See, e.g., Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g 41 T.C.M. (P-
H) 843 (1972); Shippy v. United States, 308 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962), aff'g 199 F. Supp.
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Weisbart v. Commissioner represents the most recent case of
this type. Taxpayer Weisbart was the 100% owner of the G. Weis-
bart and Co., a cash method business whose purpose was the
buying and selling of cattle. Weisbart was also the ninety-two
percent owner of the stock of the 7A Land and Feeding Company.
The two corporations entered into a transaction whereby Weis-
bart and Co. purchased $100,106 worth of feed from 7A Land and
Feeding Company. In payment for the feed Weisbart and Co.
gave to the 7A Company $100,106 worth of contract rights to
purchase cattle. The feed was purchased on December 16, 1968,
and the evidence established that the major portion of the feed
was not used until 1969. The 7A Company did not take advantage
of the contract rights that it obtained from the transaction, and
on March 31, 1969, Weisbart and Company repurchased all of the
contract rights at the original price.'
The Tenth Circuit upheld the decision of the Tax Court in
rejecting Weisbart and Company's deduction for feed expenses in
1968.10 The court first held that what constitutes payment by a
cash method taxpayer is a question of federal, rather than state,
law and it was open to the Tax Court to conclude that there was
no geuine payment in 1968 resulting from the transfer of the
contract rights."
In resolving the particular situation presented by this litiga-
tion the court cited the well-worn tenets of tax law that (1) the
character of a taxpayer's transaction or arrangement is controlled
by substance rather than form, (2) findings as to what is the
substance of a transaction are to be treated as questions of fact
and (3) a trial court's findings of fact are to be upheld unless
clearly erroneous.'" The Tax Court's finding as to the substance
842 (D.S.D. 1961); Cravens v. Commissioner. 272 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1959), rev'g 30 T.C.
903 (1958); Gaddis v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 741 (S.D. Miss. 1971); Estate of Cohen,
39 T.C.M. (P-H) 1331 (1970); Tim W. Lillie. 45 T.C. 54 (1965), affd per curiam, 370 F.2d
562 (9th Cir. 1966); John Ernst, 32 T.C. 181 (1959), acq'd in 1959-2 C.B. 4. See generally
Pinney & Olsen, supra note 5.
564 F.2d at 35.
In reaching this decision, the Tenth Circuit declined to address the issue of piercing
the corporate veil between these two corporations. The court stated that the question to
be decided was what constituted payment by a cash method taxpayer which is a question
of federal, not state law, and does not depend on the relationship between the two corpora-
tions. Id. at 36.
"Id.
, Id at 36-37.
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of the transaction was that the parties at all times intended the
1969 repurchase and, therefore, the 1968 transfer was not genu-
ine. The Tenth Circuit supported this finding with the following
factors: (1) Weisbart was the owner of 92% of the stock of the
7A Company and the owner of 100% of the stock of Weisbart and
Company; (2) the repurchase price was exactly the same as the
original price, which was significant because the value of contract
rights such as these are subject to substantial fluctuation; (3) if
the transfer had been real, it would have placed the cattle under
the ownership of the feed corporation, thereby defeating the pur-
pose of the separate incorporation of the two companies; and, (4)
the availability to Weisbart of a line of credit at a bank, which
had been increased on December 20, 1968, a few days after the
transaction, refuted the contention that the contract rights had
been used due to a shortage of available cash, and supported the
eventual conclusion that the transfer had been intended to be a
temporary one. 3
In reaching its conclusion the Tenth Circuit relied on well-
known precedents 4 developing the factors which, if met, will
allow a farmer to deduct the prepayment of feed."5 The factors can
be summarized as follows:
(1) The payment should be an actual outlay of money (i.e., cash, not
notes);
(2) there should be a binding written contract specifying price and quant-
ity;
(3) there should be no provision for refunds, i.e., the expenditure must
be for payment only, not a deposit;
" Id. at 36.
" The Tenth Circuit specifically relied on Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673 (8th
Cir. 1973); Shippy v. United States, 308 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962); Cravens v. Commis-
sioner, 272 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1959); John Ernst, 32 T.C. 181 (1959), acq'd in 1959-2 CB.
4. Treasury Regulations relied on were as follows: Tress. Reg. §§ 1.446-(1)(c)(1)(i) (1973),
1.461-1(a)(1) (1967), 1.62-12(a) (1972).
"1 In order to preserve his deduction, the taxpayer must first qualify as a farmer. See,
e.g., Hi-Plains Enterprises v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d 520 (10th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Chemell, 243 F.2d 944 (5th Cir 1957). Treasury Regulations define "farm" and
"farmer" as follows:
As used in this section, the term "farm" embraces the farm in the ordinarily
accepted sense, and includes stock, dairy, poultry, fruit, and truck farms;
also plantations, ranches, and all land used for farming operations. All i di-
viduals, partnerships, or corporations that cultivate, operate, or manage
farms for gain or profit, either as owners or tenants, are designated as farm-
ers.




(4) only reasonable amounts of feed for the number of cattle to be fed
should be purchased;
(5) risk of loss (e.g., ownership) should pass to the taxpayer;
(6) services (e.g., yardage, veterinary services, etc.) should not be prepaid;
(7) a valid business purpose (e.g., to insure supply, obtain preferential
treatment or delivery, establish a set price, etc.) should be present, not mere
tax avoidance."5
(8) the payment must not materially distort the taxpayer's income. 7
The payment/deposit test is uniformly supported by the case
law,"5 and it was the major factor in the Tenth Circuit's upholding
of the Tax Court's refusal of the deduction. The court noted that
transactions of this nature that have been upheld usually involve
payments in cash," but the true deciding factor is the finality of
the payments. 20 The court also reviewed several cases concluding
that notes cannot be the basis for a deduction for a cash basis.
taxpayer since a cash basis taxpayer can only claim a deduction
for payments made in cash or its equivalent; notes from a cash
basis taxpayer are not the equivalent of cash since such notes are
merely promises to pay, which may not be fulfilled."'
The court ended by observing that Weisbart, being a cash-
basis taxpayer, would be allowed to take a deduction in the year
cash or its equivalent was paid, and
[Iln the case of an executory contract of sale in which payments
are deferred and are evidenced only by the contracts, the deferred
payments are ordinarily not taxed to the cash basis seller until re-
ceived .... The cash equivalency rule is the same for items of
income as it is for deductions. . . .Payments under such a contract
are not deductible by the purchaser who is on a cash basis until the
actual payment."
' See generally cases cited note 8 supra; and Rev. Rul. 75-152, 1975-1 C.B. 144. See
also Pinney & Olsen, supra note 5, at 542-43; Willingham & Kasmir, Prepaid Feed Deduc-
tion: How to Cope with the IRS' Restrictive New Ruling, 42-43 J. TAX. 230 (1975).
11 Weisbart v. Commissioner, 564 F.2d 34; Rev. Rul. 75-152, 1975-1 C.B. 144. See also
Willingham & Kasmir, supra note 15, at 230-31.
"1 See, e.g., Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g 41 T.C.M. (P-
H) 843 (1972); Shippy v. United States, 308 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962), aff'g 199 F. Supp.
842 (D.S.D. 1961); Cravens v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1959); Estate of
Cohen, 39 T.C.M. (P-H) 1331 (1970); John Ernst, 32 T.C. 181 (1959).
" See generally authorities cited note 17 supra.
564 F.2d at 38.
, Cases reviewed by the court included: Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429
U.S. 569, 577.78 (1977); Baltimore Dairy Lunch, Inc. v. United States, 231 F.2d 870 (8th
Cir. 1956). The Tenth Circuit also relied on Tress. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (1973), 1.461-
I(a)(1) (1967); and 2 J. MEirrENs, THE LAw OF FEDERAL IcomE TAXATION § 11.02 (1974).
564 F.2d at 38.
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The court then stated that due to the lack of substance found
by the Tax Court in the transaction, which was supported in the
mind of the Tenth Circuit by the facts enunciated above, the
transfer of the contract rights brought the case within the rule
applicable to executory contracts.2
Weisbart re-emphasizes the importance of the factors out-
lined above. Cash basis farmers within the jurisdiction of the
Tenth Circuit should never lose a deduction for the prepayment
of feed if they simply conform to the guidelines delineated by the
Internal Revenue Service and the Tenth Circuit.
IL, THE TAXATION OF PATENT TRANSFERS: Eickmyer c
Commissioner 
2
The eligibility of patent transfers for treatment as capital
transactions has long been an area of controversy. In the past, the
difficulty lay not in the nature of the property transferred but
rather in the manner in which it was transferred. Frequently, the
seller received his consideration in the form of "royalties" over a
period of time, usually coterminous with the life of the patent,
and he retained some degree of control over the patent until the
purchase price was paid.2 This form of transfer created problems
in meeting the Internal Revenue Code requirement that, for capi-
tal gains treatment, there must be a sale or exchange of the prop-
erty.2 On the basis of two early Supreme Court cases,27 the Com-
missioner maintained for several years that if the consideration
received for a patent was in the form of "royalties" paid over a
period coterminous with the life of the patent, the transaction
was a license and could not be treated as a sale within the mean-
ing of the Internal Revenue Code.28
One of these cases, Waterman v. Mackenzie,"' still remains
as precedent for the taxation of patent sales. Even though
Waterman itself is not a tax case, it has been cited as authority
Sld.
2. 580 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1978).
25 Comment, Capital Gains Treatment of Proceeds from Patent Transfers.. .4 Mo. 1_
Re. 98, 99 (1969).
= I.R.C. § 1231.
' United States v. General Electric, 272 U.S. 476 (1926); Waterman v. MacKenzie,
138 U.S. 252 (1891).
Comment, supra note 25, at 99.
138 U.S. 252 (1891).
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in nearly every patent tax case involving the question of a "sale
or exchange" within the past two decades. In Waterman,3 the
Supreme Court held that:
The patentee or his assigns may, by instrument in writing, assign,
grant and convey, either, 1st, the whole patent, comprising the ex-
clusive right to make, use and vend the invention throughout the
United States; or, 2d, an undivided part or share of the exclusive
right; or 3d, the exclusive right under the patent within and
throughout a specified part of the United States . . . Any assign-
ment or transfer, short of one of these, is a mere license, giving the
licensee no title in the patent, and no right to sue at law in his own
name for an infringement. ... n
It was this language that established the basic criteria for a
sale of a patent for federal income tax purposes, and provided
support for the position that periodic payments received for the
use of a patent could not qualify for capital gains treatment.M
A turning point for the taxpayer/inventor came in the case
of Edward C. Myers. u Myers had transferred the exclusive right
to use, manufacture, and sell his patented invention, but he had
retained the right to terminate the agreement if a certain amount
of royalty payments were not made, and the transferee had the
right to terminate after a certain date.Y The Commissioner
argued that these provisions were inconsistent with a sale of a
patent and therefore no capital gains treatment could be ac-
corded the transfer. The Supreme Court rejected this argument
See, e.g., Eickmeyer v. Commissioner, 580 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1978); Commissioner
v. Celanese Corp. of America, 140 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Commissioner v. Hopkinson,
126 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1942); Claude Neon Lights, Inc. 35 B.T.A. 424 (1937); Julius E.
Lilienfeld, 35 B.T.A. 391 (1937); Parke, Davis & Co., 31 B.T.A. 427 (1934), cited in
Comment, supra note 25, at 100 & n. 16.
11 In Waterman the plaintiff was suing for infringement of a patent, posing his right
to sue on an agreement whereby the owner of the patent had granted him the "sole and
exclusive right to manufacture and sell under the patent." The defendant claimed that
the plaintiff had no right to sue because he was a mere licensee. 138 U.S. 252, 253 (1891).
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant and held that the agreement was a license,
not an assignment because the plaintiff had received no grant of the right to use the
patented item. Id. at 257.
Id. at 255.
J' Comment, supra note 25, at 100.
3, 6 T.C. 258 (1946). Myers had invented and patented a rubber covered flexible steel
track and had transferred it to B. F. Goodrich Rubber Co. in consideration for annual





and held that these provisions were merely conditions subsequent
which did not prevent the passing of legal title. The Court distin-
guished this transaction from the one involved in Waterman v.
Mackenzie on the grounds that here transferee's exclusive license
included the express authority to use the invention, whereas in
Waterman this authority had been absent.
31
Initially, the Commissioner acquiesced, but four years later
he revoked this acquiescence and substituted nonacquiescence.
37
Due to the need to resolve the confusion created by the Commis-
sioner's nonacquiescence, and partially because of sympathy for
the taxpayer/inventor, Congress enacted section 1235 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954.3 The statute eliminates problems as-
sociated with the method of payment for the patent and the use
of terms inconsistent with the granting of an assignment. Addi-
tionally, the legislative history of section 1235 clearly indicates
that capital gains treatment will be allowed despite the presence
of a clause in the written agreement that the rights to a particular
patent may revert to the transferor on the occurrence of a condi-
tion subsequent .
3
Section 1235's provisions as to what constitutes a sale or
exchange of a patent read not unlike Waterman's requirements,
but with one important difference. Section 1235 provides as fol-
lows:
A transfer . of property consisting of all substantial rights to a
patent, or an undivided interest therein which includes a part of all
such rights, by any holder shall be considered the sale or exchange
of a capital asset held for more than 1 year, regardless of whether or
not payments in consideration of such transfer are-
(1) payable periodically over a period generally coterminous
with the transferee's use of the patent, or
(2) contingent on the productivity, use or disposition of the
property transferred. 40
31 Id. at 263. See alo, Comment, supra note 25, at 100.
1946-1 C.B. 3, nonacq. 1950-1 C.B. 7, acq. 1958-1 C.B. 6.
" Comment, supra note 25, at 100-01.
" See generally Notes, Capital Gains Treatment of Patent Transfer, 17 W. Ras. L.
REv. 844 (1966).
I.R.C. § 1235(a). Of course, the transfer cannot be by gift, devise or inheritance.
Id. Additionally, the holder of the patent must be the individual whose efforts created the
property or any other individual who has acquired an interest in such property in exchange
for consideration in money or its equivalent prior to the actual reduction to practice of
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This section naturally resolved the problem of periodic pay-
ments which had rendered a transfer of a patent a mere license
not qualifying for capital gains treatment. Not surprisingly, the
statute created a new problem. This new problem centers around
the definition of what is a sale of "all substantial rights" and the
definition of what is a sale of "an undivided interest therein
which includes a part of all such rights."
The regulations are helpful in providing a definition for these
terms. The regulations define all substantial rights to mean all
rights (whether or not then held by the grantor) which are of value
at the time the rights to the patent (or an undivided interest
therein) are transferred." The term "all substantial rights" to a
patent does not include a grant of rights to a patent which:
(1) is limited geographically within the county of issuance,
(2) is limited in duration by the terms of the agreement to a period
less than the remaining life of the patent,
(3) grants rights to the grantee in fields or use, within trades, or
industries which are less than all the rights covered by the patent
which exist and have value at the time of the grant,
(4) grants to the grantee less than all the claims or inventions
covered by the patent which exist and have value at the time of the
grant.
12
Rights which are not considered substantial, of course, may
be retained by the holder. 3
Importantly, however, the regulations provide that the cir-
cumstances of the whole transaction, rather than the particular
language used in the document of transfer, shall be considered in
determining whether or not all substantial rights to a patent are
transferred." The regulations give two examples of rights which
the invention covered by the patent so long as the person is neither the employer of the
creator nor related to the creator. Id. § 1235(b), (d).
Tress. Reg. § 1.1235-2 (1957).
" Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)(i)-(iv).
Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(2)(i)-(ii). The regulations give two examples of rights which may
be retained by the transferor:
(i) The retention by the transferor of legal title for the purpose of securing
performance or payment by the transferee in a transaction involving transfer
of an exclusive license to manufacture, use, and sell for the life of the patent;
(ii) The retention by the transferor of rights in the property which are not
inconsistent with the passage of ownership, such as the retention of a security
interest... . or a reservation in the nature of a condition subsequent ....
Id.
44 Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(1).
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may or may not be substantial depending upon the circumstances
of the whole transaction: (1) the retention by the transferor of an
absolute right to prohibit sublicensing or subassignment by the
transferee;" and (2) the failure to convey to the transferee the
right to use or to sell the patent property." Of course, the reten-
tion of a right to terminate the transfer at will is the retention of
a substantial right. 7
Finally, the regulations provide that a person owns an undi-
vided interest in all substantial rights in a patent when he owns
the same fractional share of each and every substantial right to
the patent." This does not include, by way of an example, a right
to the income from a patent, or a license limited geographically,
or a license which covers some, but not all, of the valuable claims
or uses covered by the patent." Furthermore, a transfer limited
in duration to a period less than the remaining life of the patent
is not a transfer of an undivided interest in all of the substantial
rights to a patent.N
In Eickmeyer v. Commissioner5 the Tenth Circuit dealt with
the problem delineated above in determining whether there had
been a transfer to an "undivided interest," as defined by the
Code, in "all substantial rights" to a patent so that the royalties
paid to the transferor could receive capital gains treatment.
2
Eickmeyer developed and patented in 1974 a process which
had wide application in the oil refining, petrochemical and ferti-
lizing industries. The process was called the Catacarb process
and Eickmeyer was the only record owner.53
From January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1970, Eickmeyer en-
tered into twelve separate agreements for the use of the Catacarb
process, and during the three years for which the Internal Reve-
nue Service had found a deficiency in Eickmeyer's income taxes,
he had received payments pursuant to eight of those agreements.
- Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(3)(i).
- Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(3)(ii).
- Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(4).
I d. § 1.1235-2(c).
o Id.
*Id.
580 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1978).




Eickmeyer claimed that the royalties received from the agree-
ments were eligible for capital gains treatment under section
1235, but the Commissioner disagreed, claiming that not all of
the substantial rights to the patent had been transferred .'
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Commissioner. The court
noted that even though the percentage of ownership or quantity
of ownership need not be the same as that of the transferor, "the
character of the right of transfer must be the same. Each element
in the title must be present in that which is transferred."5 5 The
court further noted that in order to receive capital gains treat-
ment there had to have been a sale of an interest in all of the
rights which the transferor had in the patent, and that the inter-
est transferred by Eickmeyer fell short of this requirement." The
crucial right which Eickmeyer had retained, according to the
Tenth Circuit, was the right to collect royalties for all uses of the
patent not only from the original transferees, but also from their
subassignees or sublicensees 7 All the substantial rights to the
patent had not been transferred by Eickmeyer, the court ob-
served, for if his transferees were to grant a sublicense or subas-
signment they would only be doing so in behalf of Eickmeyer; the
royalties would inevitably be paid to Eickmeyer either by his
transferee or the subtransferee.51 The Tenth Circuit concluded
that the practical effect of Eickmeyer's assignment was to grant
non-exclusive licenses to each of the transferees and, as each of
the transferees remained under the control of Eickmeyer and were
not true owners of their respective interests, section 1235 treat-
ment was not available.5
Therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit, the
term "undivided interest" contemplates a fractional interest in
all of the rights which are part of the ownership of the patent.
There is no such transfer when the transferor retains the right to




'7 Id. All of the contracts purported to give the assignees of the patent the right to
transfer a similar interest to other parties. However this provision was coupled with the
requirement that the compensation measured by the extended use of the patent by these





transferees, and the original transferees or assignees remain ac-
countable to the transferor."
II. SECTION 337 AND THE PROBLEM OF EXPENSES ARISING FROM THE
SALE OF CORPORATE AsSETs: Benedict Oil Company v. United
States.
6'
Section 337 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code was enacted
in an effort to eliminate an inequitable distinction in tax treat-
ment of certain methods of corporate liquidation." Before the
enactment of section 337, if a corporation sold its assets prior to
liquidation in an attempt to distribute cash to its stockholders in
exchange for their stock, the corporation was still taxed at the
corporate level for any gain made on the sale. 3 However, if the
corporation chose instead to make an in kind distribution of the
assets to the stockholders in exchange for their stock, no gain or
loss was recognized to the liquidating corporation, only to the
stockholders."
Section 337 eliminated this distinction, which had often re-
sulted in a difference in the net realizable distribution to a share-
holder in liquidation, by providing:
(a) General Rule-If-
(1) A corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or
after June 22, 1954, and
(2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the
adoption of such plan, all of the assets of the corporation are distrib-
uted in complete liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims,
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the
sale or exchange by it of property within such 12-month period.'
Therefore, if the requirements of section 337 are met, the
corporation recognizes no gain or loss from the sale of its corpo-
rate assets.
However, even though no gain or loss is recognized by the
corporation under section 337, the corporation would naturally
incur expenses, usually in the form of attorney and brokerage
"Id.
" 582 F.2d 544 (10th Cir. 1978).
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2nd Seas. 38-39 A106 (1954), reprinted in [1954]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4244.
u See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
See, e.g., United States v. Cumberland Public Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950); see
generally I.R.C. § 336.
- I.R.C. § 337.
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fees, while attempting to sell those assets prior to liquidation. In
United States v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Company" the
Tenth Circuit, following the only other circuit court decision at
that time, Pridemark Inc. v. Commissioner,"7 held that legal fees
related to the sale of assets during a section 337 liquidation were
deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense under
section 162 of the Code.
6 8
This ruling, however, was not subsequently followed by any
other circuit court." Additionally, the Fourth Circuit reversed its
earlier decision in Pridemark Inc. v. Commissioner,7° and joined
the view of the other circuits holding that expenses attributable
to the sale of assets pursuant to a section 337 liquidation must
be offset against the gain from the sale and are not deductible
under section 162.
7'
Benedict Oil Company v Commissioner" is an important
Tenth Circuit decision in that it overrules Mountain States
Mixed Feed Company, and brings the Tenth Circuit into accord
- 365 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1966).
,7 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), rev'd, Of Course Inc. v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 754
(4th Cir. 1974).
" United States v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Co., 365 F.2d 244, 245 (10th Cir.
1966). The Tenth Circuit's rationale for this holding was expressed as follows:
It is difficult to determine any reason in the authorities or in the statutes
for any distinction as to the type or purpose of the legal work involved. It is
probable that the attorneys could account for the time they devoted to the
corporate dissolution as compared with the sale of assets, but there is no
reason why this sale of assets is not as much a part of the liquidation as the
dissolution of the corporation. Certainly if the costs of distribution in kind
may be deducted as ordinary expenses, the legal cost of the sale of assets
should likewise be deductible. Thus. it is all part of the liquidation-
dissolution of the corporate entity.
Id. at 245-46. See also Pridemark Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965).
" Page v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975); Connery v. United States,
460 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir. 1972); Lanrao Inc. v. United States, 422 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970); United States v. Morton, 387 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1968);
Alphaco, Inc. v. Nelson, 385 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1967).
1* Pridemark Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), rev'd, Of Course, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1974).
" See generally cases cited notes 68 and 69 supra.
" 582 F.2d 544 (10th Cir. 1978). It should be carefully noted that, even though expen-
ses incurred in the selling of corporate assets are no longer deductible as ordinary and
necessary expenses, nevertheless expenses, such as accounting or legal fees, attributable
to the complete liquidation of the corporation are still deductible. See, e.g., Gravois
Planning Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962). Therefore, attorneys and
accountants should keep careful records of their time and expenses allocable to the liqui-
dation in order to insure that these items will not be treated as selling expenses.
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with the other circuit courts which have decided the same issue.
Benedict Oil Company in 1965 adopted a plan of liquidation pur-
suant to section 337, and successfully met the requirements of the
statute. 3 On its last income tax return, relying on Mountain
States Mixed Feed Company, the corporation deducted as an
ordinary and necessary business expense the accounting, legal
and brokerage fees attributable to the sale of the assets." The
Commissioner disallowed the deduction by stating that the ex-
penses incurred had to be offset against any gain made on the
sale. 5
The Tenth Circuit reversed its prior holding, and upheld the
Commissioner's disallowance. 71 In doing so the Tenth Circuit re-
lied not only on the authority established in other jurisdictions,
but also upon the traditional rule that costs incurred in the selling
of capital assets are capital expenditures which must be offset
against the gain made on the sale, not expenses deductible
against ordinary income."
The Tenth Circuit further supported its reversal by noting
that shareholders, who receive corporate assets in exchange for
their stock and then sell the assets, are subject to the rule requir-
6582 F.2d at 545.
' Id. at 545-46.
IZ d. at 545.
" Id. at 546.
" Id. at 546, 548. See Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970), which reaf-
firmed this rule by stating:
Since the inception of the present federal income tax in 1913, capital expend-
itures have not been deductible. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 263.
Such expenditures are added to the basis of the capital asset with respect to
which they are incurred, and are taken into account for tax purposes either
through depreciation or by reducing the capital gain (or increasing the loss)
when the asset is sold. If the expense is capital, it cannot be deducted as
"ordinary and necessary," either as a business expense under § 162 of the
Code or as an expense of "management, conservation, or maintenance"
under § 212.
It has long been recognized, as a general matter, that costs incurred in
the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset are to be treated as capital
expenditures. The most familiar example of such treatment is the capitaliza-
tion of brokerage fees for the sale or purchase of securities, . (footnotes
omitted).
582 F.2d at 574-75. Of course if there is a loss on the sale of the capital asset, the expense
of selling that asset will increase the amount of loss, the deduction for which must be




ing the selling expenses to be offset against the gain on the sale.
In light of this fact, to follow Mountain States Mixed Feed
Company would promote a distinction in the tax treatment of
these two forms of corporate liquidation, perpetuating a depend-
ence upon good tax advice, and putting a premium on recognizing
the problem early, all of which section 337 was designed to elimi-
nate.7"
IV. THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF RESERVES FOR COMMISSIONS EARNED ON
DEFERRED PREMIUM INSTALLMENTS: Western Casualty and Surety
Company v. Commissioner."
Insurance companies, since 1913, have had special taxation
treatment due to the policy of the non-taxation, as income, of
that part of the premium which the insurance company must
place in reserve in order to meet obligations under its policies."
Western Casualty and Surety Company deals with the sections
of the Code that handle these unique and special taxation prob-
lems. The opinion of the Tenth Circuit is organized into two
distinct sections. The first section deals with the issue of whether
Western Casualty was entitled to deduct as an expense commis-
sions on deferred premium installments under section 832 (b)(6).
The second section deals with the problem of how to adjust West-
ern Casualty's income in the year of change in the accounting
method, an issue which was contingent upon the Tenth Circuit
upholding the Commissioner's decision to disallow a deduction of
the deferred commissions."
Western Casualty had two basic methods of payment for
insurance policies. The method involved in this particular litiga-
tion consisted of issuing insurance policies of one year duration,
and allowing the premiums to be paid in installments within the
policy year. 2 All policies lapsed if there was failure to pay a
premium, and nonpayment of the premium installments was an
option of the policyholder under the insurance agreement. The
portions of the premium which were not paid at the outset with
' 582 F.2d at 548.
' 571 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1978).
See e.g., Commissioner N, Standard Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 433 U.S. 148, 152-54
(1977); see generally I.R.C. §§ 801-844.




this particular type of policy were called "deferred premium in-
stallments. ' ' m
Western Casualty, in its annual National Association of In-
surance Commissioners (NAIC) statement, elected to treat its
deferred premium installments as though they had been prepaid,
but the deferred premiums were not included in the company's
income for tax purposes in the year that the policy was sold."
Each year, Western Casualty would establish a reserve for de-
ferred premium installments, and a reserve for the aggregate
amount of commissions to be paid to the salesmen on these one
year insurance policies. However, the salesmen were only paid
their proportionate part of the commissions if and when the pol-
icyholder paid his installment on the premium. In that event, the
reserve for commissions was reduced by the appropriate amount,
and the salesmen were paid their respective portion of the total
commission on the policy91
It was these reserves for commissions that created the dis-
pute between Western Casualty and the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice. During the years in question, Western Casualty added the
amounts of the reserves for commissions to the commissions ac-
tually paid and deducted the entire sum as a business expense.
Inasmuch as the policyholders were not obligated to pay the
premiums, and could let the insurance lapse if they so desired,
the Commissioner and the Tax Court determined that Western
Casualty would not be obligated to pay the commissions until the
premiums had actually been paid, and, therefore, the deduction
of the entire amount constituted an over-deduction to the extent
that it included the unpaid commissions on the deferred premium
installments."
The Tenth Circuit, relying heavily upon the analysis of the
Tax Court, upheld this decision. The applicable taxing statutes
were sections 832 and 162. 87 Section 832 (b)(6) defines "expenses
3 Id.
" Id. Western Casualty also had the option of including these deferred premium
installments as they became due.
Id. at 516.
UId.
, Id. The tax court also relied on Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii), which provides that
a deduction under the accrual method of accounting is not allowable unless all events have
occurred which establish the fact of liability giving rise to the deduction. The Tenth
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incurred" as all expenses shown on the annual statement ap-
proved by the \:ational Association of Insurance Commissioners,
which expenses are deductible from income if so allowed by sec-
tion 832(c). Section 832(c) defines which of the expenses are de-
ductible from ordinary income by the insurance companies, and
authorizes their deduction. Section 832(c)(1) permits a deduction
for all "ordinary and necessary expenses incurred, as provided in
section 162 (relating to trade or business expenses)."
The Tenth Circuit accepted the Tax Court's analysis that
section 832 expressly incorporated section 162 and its standards."
Under section 162 standards, and the rules and regulations ap-
plicable to accrual taxpayers, the commissions could not be con-
sidered an expense since all events had not occurred, i.e., the
paying of the premium by the policyholder, which fixed on the
insurance company the obligation to pay the commissions."
Additionally, to deduct as an expense commissions earned on
premiums when those same premiums have not been included in
the income of the taxpayer would cause the taxpayer's method of
accounting to fail to reflect the income from which the expense
of commissions arose and from which the expense should appro-
priately be deducted. Hence, the taxpayer's accounting methods
distorted his income." Furthermore, the taxpayer's method of
accounting violated the general policy of symmetry of income and
Circuit did not explicitly rely on this regulation, but it did so implicitly by stating that it
agreed completely with the Tax Court's analysis. 571 F.2d at 517.
I.R.C. §§ 832(b)(6), 832(c), 832(c)(1). Specifically, these sections read as follows:
(6) Expenses incurred.-The term "expenses incurred" means all ex-
penses shown on the annual statement approved by the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners, and shall be computed as follows: To all expen-
ses paid during the taxable year, add expenses unpaid at the end of the
taxable year and deduct expenses unpaid at the end of the preceding taxable
year. For the purpose of computing the taxable income subject to the tax
imposed by section 831, there shall be deducted from expenses incurred (as
defined in this paragraph) all expenses incurred which are not allowed as
deductions by subsection (c).
(c) Deductions Allowed.-In computing the taxable income of an in-
surance company subject to the tax imposed by section 831, there shall be
allowed as deductions:
(1) all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred, as provided in sec-
tion 162 (relating to trade or business expenses).
o 571 F.2d at 517. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) is implicitly incorporated in this part
ot the Tenth Circuit's analysis.
571 F.2d at 517.
"Id.
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expenses as prescribed by the United States Supreme Court."
Significantly, the Tenth Circuit rejected the contention that
all expenses are deductible if they are contained in the annual
statement approved by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners. Western Casualty had argued that the presence
of unpaid commissions on the annual statement form was enough
to render them expenses within the terms of the statute, and
deductible without needing to fulfill the requirements of section
162. The Tenth Circuit held that even though some deference
may be given the National Association of Insurance Commission-
ers' form, that form was not absolute, and where it conflicted with
the ordinary requirements of section 162, the latter prevailed. 3
This holding, the court observed, was the logical conclusion to be
reached by reading sections 832(b)(6) and 832(c) together. As
noted previously, 832(b)(6) prohibits deduction of expenses which
do not conform to the requirement of 832(c). Section 832(c)(1)
allows for deduction of necessary and ordinary business expenses
as provided in section 162. To hold that the requirements of sec-
tion 162 need not be met as long as the expenses were of the type
contained in the National Association of Insurance Commission-
ers' form would, the Tenth Circuit felt, subvert the meaning of
section 162.11
The second half of the decision dealt with the problem of
adjusting the taxpayer's income pursuant to section 481(a).15 Sec-
92 Commissioner v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 433 U.S. 148 (1977).
571 F.2d at 517. See also Commissioner v. General Reinsurance Corp., 190 F.2d 148,
161 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 863 (1951); Commissioner v. United States
Guarantee Co., 190 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1951).
" 571 F.2d at 517. See also 8 J. Marrais, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §
44.55 (1970).
571 F.2d at 518. The text of § 481(a) is as follows:
SEC 481. ADJUSTMENTS REQUIRED BY CHANGES IN METHOD
OF ACCOUNTING.
(a) General Rule.-In computing the taxpayer's taxable income for
any taxable year (referred to in this section as the "year of the change")-
(1) if such computation is under a method of accounting differ-
ent from the method under which the taxpayer's taxable income for
the preceding taxable year was computed, then
(2) there shall be taken into account those adjustments which
are determined to be necessary solely by reason of the change in order
to prevent amounts from being duplicated or omitted, except there
shall not be taken into account any adjustment in respect to any
taxable year to which this section does not apply unless the adjust-
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tion 481. provides that if a taxpayer computes his income under a
method of accounting different from the method under which the
taxable income for the preceding year was calculated, there shall
be taken into account, in the year of change, those adjustments
necessary to prevent the duplication or omission of amounts of
gross income or deductions."
Adjustment was essential in Western Casualty in order to
prevent the duplication of the deduction of the commissions both
in the current year and in later years. 7 The Tenth Circuit gave
the Commissioner broad authority to make the required adjust-
ments. and it rejected the contention that section 481 requires an
adjustment only for items that would be omitted or duplicated
during the year of change in the accounting method." The court
stated that section 481 had no limitation on the "amounts being
duplicated or omitted for which adjustment is required," and to
impose such a limitation would be inconsistent with the intent of
Congress which was to prevent items of income and expense from
being reported more than once or omitted entirely." The Tenth
Circuit also noted that both the Senate and the House legislative
history reflected the intention that section 481 adjustments were
to be used to prevent duplication or omissions in taxable years
after the year of change.'1' Therefore, the Commissioner had the
authority to make section 481 adjustments even though the dupli-
cations or omissions might not occur for many years after the
change in the accounting method."'°
Christa M. de la Garza
ment is attributable to a change in the method of accounting initiated
by the taxpayer.
For an excellent discussion of the statute and the problems solved and caused by it, see
Note, Problems Arising From Changes in Tax Accounting Methods, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1564
11960).
" 571 F.2d at 518.
.7 Id.
- Id.
" Id. at 520 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Seas. reprinted in [19541
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4017, 4076, 4303; S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess.
reprinted in 119541 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 4621, 4696, 4947).
11 571 F.2d at 520, (citing H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Seas. reprinted in
[19541 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEws 4017, 4303-04; S. REP. No. 1620, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess.
reprinted in 119541 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4948-49). See also, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.481-2(d), example (1) (1974).
"1 571 F.2d at 520.

UNFAIR COMPETITION, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS
© Burton & Dorr 1978
By Robert 1)orr* and Duane Burton**
1. SUMMARY OVERVIEW
During the period ot this survey the Tenth Circuit considered
four cases involving patents, trademarks and unfair competition.
There were no published cases involving copyrights.,
First, in Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co.,2 the court held that a trademark owner who cannot afford to
advertise correctionally while another infringes his trademark can
recover, as general compensatory damages, an amount sufficient
to enable him to so advertise in the future. The court further held
that reverse confusion, in which the public is led to believe that
the prior user of a trademark is infringing the mark of the subse-
quent. user, is actionable
Big 0 sued Goodyear for infringement of its common law
trademark "BIG FOOT" and for unfair competition. Goodyear
contended that: (1) Big O's evidence of confusion was in the form
of reverse confusion and, therefore, was not actionable; (2) liabil-
ity for trademark infringement could not be imposed without a
showing that Goodyear intended to trade on the goodwill of Big
O or to represent Goodyear's products as being those of Big O's;
and (3) the recovery of expenses for corrective advertising should
be limited to those actually incurred prior to the trial. The court,
in response to Goodyear's contentions, stated that the logical
consequence of Goodyear's position would be the immunization
Partner, Burton & Dorr, B.S., 1968, Milwaukee School of Engineering; M.S., 1970,
Northwestern University; J.D., 1974, University of Denver.
** Partner, Burton & Dorr, B.S., 1951, Colorado State University; J.D., 1957, Univer-
sity of Colorado.
Eggenhofer v. Koury, Nos. 76-1817-76 (D. Colo. Feb. 21, 1978), a copyright case,
made its second trip to the Tenth Circuit but was designated "Not for Routine Publica-
tion." Previously, the Tenth Circuit had remanded Eggenhofer's appeal from the denial
of a preliminary injunction to the district court for a written statement of findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The case, upon retrial, turned essentially upon matters of contract
rather than copyright law.
2 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977), aff'g 408 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Colo. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978).
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from unfair competition liability of a company with a well-
established trade name and with the economic power to advertise
extensively for a product name taken from a competitor. Such
conduct constitutes unquestionably unfair competition. The
court did, however, reduce the amount of the judgment seventy-
five percent by relying upon the Federal Trade Commission prac-
tice that requires businesses which engage in misleading advertis-
ing to spend twenty-five percent of their advertising budget on
corrective advertising. 3 The $19,600,000 judgment of the District
Court, as modified by the reduction in damages. was, therefore,
upheld on appeal.
In Education Development Corp. v. The Economy Co.,4 the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that "Continuous
Progress" was not properly registered as a trademark because
when it is used with educational materials, it is merely descrip-
tive of a concept of education. In this case, the plaintiff had
commenced use of the words "Continuous Progress" in 1968 and
had obtained federal registration in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office in 1970. The court noted that plaintiff had used
"Continuous Progress" in its promotional material in that term's
ordinary sense to describe the educational concept present in the
product. Defendant's predecessor in interest had commenced
using the words "Continuous Progress" two years before plaintiff,
and the defendant had attempted to obtain federal registration
but had been rejected by the Patent and Trademark Office. De-
fendant successfully contended that "Continuous Progress" was
merely descriptive of educational material notwithstanding its
own prior attempt to register the term as a trademark.
In Celebrity, Inc. v. A & B Instrument Co., 5 the court af-
firmed the trial court's award of combined damages for patent
infringement and unfair competition. Fifty thousand dollars was
awarded to the company manufacturing the patented product,
and eighty thousand dollars was awarded to the company mar-
keting the device as damages for violation of the Oklahoma De-
ceptive Trade Practices Act.' Since the infringement was willful,
the district court trebled the damages for patent infringement
561 F.2d at 1375-76.
562 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1977).
573 F.2d 11 (10th Cir.), cert. filed 46 U.S.L.W. 3723 (1978).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 78, § 52.
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and also awarded attorneys' fees. Payment of a royalty on a prod-
uct frees that product from any further control under the patent.
Thus, upon payment of the royalty to the manufacturing com-
pany, the marketing company would not have been entitled to
any damages except for the infringer's violation of the Oklahoma
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Moreover, while a judge can in-
crease the damages awarded for patent infringement under fed-
eral law,7 if a jury is involved the jury must make an award of
punitive damages. Although the trial judge trebled the damages,,
no punitive damages were awarded because punitive damages are
not allowed under the Oklahoma Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
In Eickmeyer v. Commissioner,' the court reversed the Tax
Court's ruling that the granting of assignments and "exclusive"
licenses by a patent owner were transfers of undivided interests
entitling the patent owner to long-term capital gain treatment
under Section 1235 of the Internal Revenue Code. The court
found that the patent owner had granted non-exclusive licenses
rather than assignments of an undivided interest in a patent since
the patent owner (1) retained the power to create additional inter-
ests by making additional assigrnments and (2) retained the right
to payment of royalty based upon use, including not only pay-
ments by the patent owner's assignees or transferees, but also
subassignees. Additionally, the court noted that the transfers
made by the patent owner withheld in each instance the right to
exclude others from the use of the patent.'0
11. BIG 0 TIRE DEALERS, INC. V. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO."
The recent Big 0 Tire Dealers case represents a classic in-
stance of trademark infringement, and reveals the disregard with
which the large competitor has come to treat the small. What
makes the case an illuminating example of modern unfair compe-
tition is the unique philosophy of the Big 0 franchise system and
the extreme degree to which Goodyear frustrated and disregarded
that philosophy.
7 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976).
See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1976).
580 F.2d 39.5 (10th Cir. 1978).
' For further discussion of this case see notes 24-60 and accompanying text in the
Tax Overview, this issue.
i 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977), aff'g 408 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Colo. 1976).
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A. Background.
In 1962, the Big 0 Tire Dealers' franchise system was created
and its founders embraced a business philosophy which ad-
dressed major deficiencies in the tire industry. 2 Big 0 Tire Deal-
ers' goal was the marketing of private brand tires. The expansion
of the dealership network was substantial, 3 and in 1973 Big O's
goal of marketing a private brand tire became economically feasi
ble. Big 0 selected several trademarks, one of which was BIG
FOOT. to allow customers to readily identify Big O's product line
and to distinguish it from others." Once a distinctive trademark
had been created, Big 0 could develop in implementation of its
philosophy separate areas of goodwill-an "honest dealership"
goodwill and a "product line" goodwill." s
In April 1974, Big 0 began marketing BIG FOOT 60 and BIG
FOOT 70 tires.'6 Consonant with its philosophy of developing
superior product reputation, Big 0 provided a remarkable tire
guarantee. 7 Big 0 Tire Dealers also spent significant sums in the
development of television and radio commercials advertising the
BIG FOOT line of tires.' 8 At the time of the trial, Big O's total
net worth was approximately $200,000
The defendant, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co .11 sought a
! Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 7, Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief] That philosophy was
composed of the following elements: (1) there is a compelling need to deal honestly and
fairly with the public; (2) a successful franchise system requires sufficient and proper
guidance for independent dealers; and, (3) incentive and service are enhanced by allowing
franchise dealers to retain a greater portion of their profits.
"1 At the time of suit, the Big 0 Tire Dealers' organization was composed of approxi-
mately two hundred independent dealers in fourteen states. 408 F. Supp. at 1222.
1' See Arnold & Durkee, Trademark and Unfair Competition in Franchised Business
Operations, 59 TRADa4ARK Rsp. 896 (1969); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43,
48-49 (9th Cir. 1971) (function of trademark).
" Brief at 8.
' The first BIG FOOT tire molds were manufactured in the fall of 1973; the first
interstate shipments of the tires, manufactured by Uniroyal, were in February 1974; BIG
FOOT tires were prominently displayed at a Reno, Nevada, tire convention in March
1974. In April 1974, Big 0 dealers began sales to the public. 408 F. Supp. at 1223.
'1 Aig 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Doc. No. 76-1199, Joint
Appendix p. 610-611a [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix]. Upon product failure, Big
0 would replace free of charge any tire throughout its lifetime down to 2/32 of an inch of
tread.
" Joint Appendix, 630-31a, 639-641a
" Goodyear is the world's largest tire manufacturer, selling its tires as original equip-
ment and as replacements through a nationwide network of 1,700 Goodyear-owned retail
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trademark to "quickly personalize" its recently introduced Cus-
tom Polysteel Radial and considered the word BIGFOOT for use
in upcoming proposed nationwide television promotion as a dis-
tinctive "nickname" to distinguish its new tire from the "tire
clutter." 0 Despite the earlier discovery in its trademark search on
June 28, 1974, of the use of the mark BIG FOOT 21 by Big 0 Tire
Dealers, Goodyear selected BIGFOOT on July 10, 1974, for its
advertising campaign.2 2 During August 1974 Goodyear's regional
managers were advised of this campaign by Goodyear's vice-
president for advertising. The vice-president disclosed:
First, we are putting six million dollars behind the launch between
now and New Year's day .... Second, we are once again putting
most of our marbles on TV, because no other advertising medium
can be so efficient and so dramatic ... Third, we are going to back
up the advertising. . with national magazine ads, newspaper an-
nouncements, radio spots, point of sale displays, product literature,
promotional gimmicks, and sales training .... Starting on the
NFL Monday Night Football Game of September the 16th, and
roaring right on through the big year-end Bowl games, we will run
163 commercials in exclusive positions in major football and other
prime time telecasts . . . . [Wihat all this means is that we will
reach about 80 per cent of all males in the USA about five times a
month all during the fall introductory period. You think they won't
know about BIGFOOT? You bet they will!2
stores, approximately 4,600 authorized independent tire dealers and approximately
60,000-80,000 other independent tire dealers. 408 F. Supp. at 1223. For the year ending
December 31, 1975, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. and domestic and foreign subsidiaries
had consolidated net sales of $5,452,500,000 (an increase of $196,226,000 over the previous
year) and total assets of $4,173,675,000. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Annual Report
1976, at 1, 26, 33.
Goodyear chose BIGFOOT because it was "distinctive and memorable," served as a
"memory device" and as a "handle" with which consumers could identify custom Poly-
steel tires with Goodyear. Joint Appendix 836a, 988a, 1056a.
U Joint Appendix, 2116a.
2" "On the cover of the page of the report it is shown that the mark searched was 'BIG
FOOT' for tires and that a full search was requested and conducted. Printed on the
face of Exhibit 299 is 'S.N. 010,921'-the serial number of the Plaintiff's now registered
trademark for Big 0 vehicle tires." Brief at 11.
" 408 F. Supp. at 1225.
For illustrations of the duty of care to be exercised in selecting a trademark, see
McNeill Labs. Inc. v. American Home Prods., 416 F. Supp. 804 (D.N.J. 1976); General
Foods Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 191 U.S.P.Q. 674 (N.D. Il. 1976); Jockey Int'l., Inc. v.
Burkard, 185 U.S.P.Q. 201 (S.D. Ca. 1975); Trademarks and the Concept of Greater Care,
5 PAT. L. RLzv. 325 (1973); Tanner, Exxorcising Esso-Name Change Brings Exxcedrin
Headaches and Costs Approxximately $100 Million, Wall St., J., Jan. 9, 1973, at 44, col.
1.
S408 F. Supp. at 1225-26.
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On August 24, 1974, Goodyear officials also received actual
notice from their Salt Lake City district manager that other tires,
not from Goodyear, displayed the name BIG FOOT." After var-
ious initial contacts, the president and two directors of Big 0 Tire
Dealers met on September 10, 1974, with Goodyear's vice presi-
dent for advertising and its manager of consumer marketing. In
that meeting the Big 0 officials made it clear that Big 0 objected
to any use of the BIG FOOT or BIGFOOT trademark by Good.
year.
tBig O's President] pointed out that the Big 0 dealers' organiza-
tion would be severely damaged if the dealers came to the conclusion
that Big 0 was not able to protect an exclusive right to use of this
trademark. The Big 0 representatives also made it clear that they
were not interested in money; but, that they were concerned about
preserving an exclusive use of this trademark."
Because the program "was too far along and too expensive to
stop," 2 the promotional campaign was continued as scheduled,
irrespective of Big O's interests and rights. Goodyear evidenced
a degree of smugness about the whole situation; a member of its
board of directors stated to a representative of Big 0 that Good-
year might obtain all the benefits it desired from the use of the
trademark during the pendency of litigation.
On September 16, 1974, on the Monday Night Football tele-
cast, Goodyear commenced its massive ten million dollar adver-
tising campaign.u Goodyear's own counsel described the advertis-
ing campaign as "an overwhelming saturation"'" and "an explo-
sion all over the country."' ' The resulting concurrent use of BIG-
FOOT by Goodyear and of BIG FOOT by Big 0 created various
forms of confusion in the marketplace. Some customers thought
" 408 F. Supp. at 1227. At this time Goodyear's commercials were still in the prepara-
tory stage. Joint Appendix at 950, 951a.
n 408 F. Supp. at 1227-28.
2 Id.- at 1228.
" Joint Appendix 1909a, see also 1130a-33a and 1067-75a.
u By August 31, 1975, (the closing of trial), Goodyear had spent $9,690,029 advertis-
ing "BIGFOOT." 561 F.2d at 1368. Compare Phoenix Mfg. Co. v. Plymouth Mfg. Co., 286
F. Supp. 321 (D. Mass. 1968) (the larger competitor waged the "biggest advertising cam-
paign in its history" knowingly using the smaller competitor's trademark) with Westward
Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 388 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1968) (distinguishable because
the smaller competitor had no goodwill, use of same trademark was on dissimilar product,
and mark was weak).
n Joint Appendix at 313a.
3 Joint Appendix at 523a.
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their Big 0 BIG FOOT tires were manufactured by Goodyear or
that Big 0 dealers were somehow associated with Goodyear.
When other potential customers came to Big 0 dealers asking for
BIGFOOT (Goodyear's tire was a radial tire), salesmen had to
explain that Big O's BIG FOOT was a bias belted tire. "The
necessity for such an explanation gave an obvious negative qual-
ity to such customer contact."" Because of Goodyear's continued
and voluminous advertising and because of the disparity in size
between the companies, an implication of a wrongful and dis-
honest use arose from Goodyear's advertising-it appeared to
members of the public that Big 0 had stolen Goodyear's trade-
mark!32 Writing for the trial court, Judge Matsch summarized
these events: "The saturation was persistent, consistent and
complete. Goodyear made no effort to avoid sending its message
into the area already occupied by Big O's product. Big 0 was
simply overrun and overwhelmed."
B. Legal Theories of Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co.
Prevailing on theories of trademark infringement and trade-
mark disparagement in the ensuing action,34 Big 0 Tire Dealers,
Inc. was awarded by the jury compensatory damages of
$2,800,000, punitive damages of $16,800,000,11 and was granted a
full injunction against Goodyear's use of BIGFOOT. Goodyear's
use of the identical trademark, BIGFOOT, on an identical prod-
uct line, vehicle tires, constituted a per se trademark infringe-
ment. 6 Goodyear's conduct also constituted what the court chose
" 408 F. Supp. at 1229.
'Id at 1230. The court remarked that Goodyear's knowledge of Big O's mark and
the scope of Goodyear's advertising raised a presumption that Goodyear officers must have
foreseen these consequences Id.
" Id. at 1240.
An accounting for profits was denied the plaintiff. An accounting is awarded where
(1) the remedy at law is inadequate, (2) the wrongdoer is unjustly enriched, or (3) the
deterrence of willful infringement and public protection are deemed necessary. The court
determined that the punitive damages awarded served as a sufficient deterrent and that
plaintiff was not entitled to an accounting of profits. Id. at 1241-42.
" Goodyear, however, prevailed on plaintiff's allegation of false designation of origin
under § 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1946), because it had made no effort
to pass its tires off as those of Big 0. 408 F. Supp. at 1224-25. The jury instruction fol
this cause of action was narrowly drafted by the court to embrace only "palming off"
situations. Id. at 1247. The court seemed to neglect the expansive reading § 43a has been
and is given.
" Goodyear's use of BIGFOOT created instant confusion in the consuming publo
1979
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to call trademark disparagement. Disparagement was defined in
the jury instructions as follows:
[No. 17, Disparagement]
To establish a claim for trademark disparagement, the plain-
tiff must show by the preponderance of the evidence:
1. That the defendant published some false statement or
statements to.the plaintiff's customers or potential customers
which could reasonably be understood to cast doubt or confu-
sion about the validity of plaintiff's trademark.
2. That the defendant acted with malice.
3. That such false statements had an adverse economic ef-
fect upon the plaintiff's business.
[No. 19, Malice]
To act with malice means to act with the intent to vex, injure
or annoy."
The disparagement instruction followed no direct precedent,
yet, as the court stated: "there is nothing which is really new or
novel, conceptually, in the elements of this theory. "31 Addition-
ally, the court noted that business goodwill is protectable against
the effects of false advertising.39 Analogizing to the law of defama-
tion, the district court stated:
The facts of this case fit within these traditional principles.
Some of Goodyear's advertising expressly said that BIGFOOT tires
were available only from Goodyear. All of it had the effect of creat-
ing that impression. Big 0 was selling and offering for sale tires
called BIG FOOT. That extrinsic fact made Goodyear's advertising
false. The additional extrinsic facts of the differences in the methods
"[t]oday, the Keystone of that portion of unfair competition law which relates to trade-
marks is the avoidance of a likelihood of confusion in the minds of the buying public." J.
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:3 at 46 (1973) (citing Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Properties, Inc., 307 F.2d 495 (2nd Cir. 1962)).
1 408 F. Supp. st 1248. The instructions also defined the term publish ("Words are
published when they are communicated or circulated in any manner to any person other
than the officers of the plaintiff," i.e., Goodyear's use of BIGFOOT in its advertising) and
stated that in determining whether the use of BIGFOOT in Goodyear's advertising cast
doubt upon the plaintiff's rights to use BIG FOOT, the plain and natural meaning of the
words used in the plain and popular sense in which the consuming public would under-
stand them should be considered. See Nims, Unfair Competition by False Statements or
Disparagement, 19 CoRmL Q. 63 (1933); Note, Injury to Public Relations by a Non-
competitor, 41 ILL. L. Rxv. 661 (1947).
408 F. Supp. at 1233.
I d. at 1234 (citing Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 106 F.2d 229
(10th Cir. 1939)). See also, Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp.
814 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Steams v. McManis 543 S.W. 2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
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,)f advertising used by the two companies and the difference in their
size, created the innuendo of an improper and unauthorized use of
BIG FOOT by Big 0. Big 0 had the exclusive right to the use of BIG
FOOT as a trademark for tires. The result of the reasonable implica-
tion from Goodyear's advertising was the disparagement of Big O's
trademark."
C. Damages
As stated above, Big 0 was awarded compensatory damages
of $2,800,000 and punitive damages of $16,800,000. Compensatory
damages were awarded for the diminution of Big O's goodwill due
to the acts of Goodyear. Specifically, the jury was allowed to
consider in its determination of damages the plaintiff's conten-
tion that it would be required to conduct an informational adver-
tising campaign "to place Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. in whatever
position with respect to the words BIG FOOT for tires that it may
have enjoyed prior to [Goodyear's advertising]."'" The damages
were apparently calculated as a percentage of the cost of Good-
year's advertising. 2 That this method of assessing damages had
never been used before in a trademark infringement or trademark
disparagement case did not disturb the court. Since the fact of
damage as evidenced in the resulting consumer confusion was
established with reasonable certainty, the trial court indicated
that the wrongdoer should bear the risk as to the uncertainty of
measuring that damage.
3
The court treated summarily Goodyear's contention that it
should be granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict for
plaintiff's alleged failure to provide evidence of plaintiff's reduc-
tion of goodwill or evidence supporting compensatory damages.
The court stated:
Whether the wrong done by Goodyear should be characterized as
common law trademark infringement or trademark disparagement,
408 F. Supp. at 1234.
"Id. at 1231.
2 Big 0 Tire Dealers were represented in 14 of the 50 states, or 28% of the states;
28% of the cost of Goodyear's $10,000,000 nationwide saturation advertising is $2,800,000.
Id. This was not an unprecedented method of damage calculation. See Maytag Co. v
Meadows Mfg. Co., 45 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1930); Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press,
Inc., 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251
(1946); Compania Pelineon De Navegacion, S.A. v. Texas Petroleum Co., 540 F.2d 53 (2nd
Cir. 1976); D. Doass, THE LAw ov REMEDIES, § 6.7 at 505 n.7, 8 (1973).
0 408 F. Supp. at 1232. The Tenth Circuit reduced the amount of damages by a
substantial 75%. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
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the result of it has been confusion in the minds of the public with
respect to the relationship between Big 0 and Goodyear. That con-
fusion did not exist before September 16, 1974. That confusion is,
in itself, damage. The appearance of dishonesty and wrongful con-
duct by Big 0 harms its reputation within the trade and with the
public. It is reasonable to redress that wrong by giving the plaintiff
enough money to conduct an advertising program of its own."
The jury award of punitive damages was supported by evi-
dence upon which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Goodyear acted with malice or a wanton and reckless disre-
gard of the plaintiff's rights.
What Goodyear did was to determine that the plaintiff was an
insignificant competitor and that Goodyear's investment of time,
money and effort was too great to give up the use of the BIGFOOT
material even though it would clearly damage and perhaps destroy
the plaintiff's use of its trademark. Goodyear then proceeded with
an intentional and deliberate infringement of the plaintiff's trade-
mark. In short, Goodyear elected to ignore completely the property
rights of Big 0. It is difficult to characterize such conduct in any
manner more favorable than as a wanton and reckless disregard of
the plaintiff's rights."
Moreover, because of the disparity in size between the two com-
petitors, the court said that Goodyear should be presumed to
have foreseen the results of its conduct.
Having unleashed this extraordinary effort to identify the name
BIGFOOT with this Goodyear tire and the defendant company,
after learning of the Big 0 BIG FOOT tires, the officers at Goodyear
must be presumed to have foreseen that one of the consequences of
such concurrent but disproportionate use would be the creation of
an innuendo that Big 0 was trading off of Goodyear in violation of
the law."
Thus, the $19.6 million award did not represent Big O's specific
lost sales but rather the extent to which its business reputation
and goodwill were harmed and the degree to which Goodyear's
injurious conduct reflected a total disregard of Big O's rights.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with Judge Matsch's analysis:
Goodyear argues a finding of malice is not supported by the
record in this case. We disagree. The record shows that on January
408 F. Supp. at 1232 (emphasis added).
, Id. at 1233. But "[while the mere difference in size and economic power between
competitors is not unfair, the competition becomes unfair if that power is used with a
complete disregard of the property rights of the smaller company." Id. at 1232.
0 Id. at 1230.
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2, 1975, after the filing of this lawsuit, Goodyear modified its
"Bigfoot" television advertising by adding "only from Goodyear."
The record shows Goodyear knew of Big O's "Big Foot" tires at least
by August 26, 1974, and there was adequate time to remove refer-
ence to "Bigfoot" from Goodyear's advertising before the September
16, 1974 telecast."
D. Conclusion
Factually, Big 0 Tire Dealers illustrates an instance in which
an enormous competitor effectively wields an unfair tool of com-
petition with absolute disregard for the rights of a less potent
competitor. The unfair tool was the use of a consciously misap-
propriated trademark-the hallmark of another competitor
which symbolized its reputation for honesty and fair dealing and
its product integrity-in a massive advertising scheme which
Goodyear knew would destroy the value of the trademark. Good-
year's wanton and reckless disregard of Big O's rights can be
made no more manifest than through reiteration of the fact that
Goodyear used Big O's BIG FOOT trademark notwithstanding
(1) actual notice to Goodyear executives from one of its own tire
dealers, and (2) meetings between officials of Goodyear and Big
0 in which the rights of Big 0 were clearly made known. 8
The legal analysis of Big 0 Tire Dealers represents a signifi-
cant step towards the protection of the efforts of a small competi-
tor. The efforts of Big 0 to develop goodwill and reputation were
essentially recognized by the courrt as property rights9 embodied
in its use and development of the trademark BIG FOOT; as such,
these efforts were protectable against disparaging advertising.
What the court recognized tacitly was Big O's right to conduct a
competitive enterprise and Goodyear's duty not to interfere with
that endeavor through unfair methods of competition. Because
Goodyear's advertising, creating instant reverse confusion, was
an unlawful usurpation of a small competitor's efforts to develop
561 F.2d 1365, 1373. Goodyear's disregard for Big O's rights was evident in its
attitude towards the legal resolution of their respective rights. At one point, with full
knowledge of Big O's BIG FOOT, Goodyear suggested it would bring suit against Big 0.
When it was suggested that Big 0 might bring suit, Goodyear stated that the case would
take long enough to allow Goodyear to reap the benefits from its proposed advertising.
408 F. Supp. at 1229. The ability of Big 0 to obtain legal protection for its trademark was
an obviously minor consideration.
" "In short, Goodyear elected to ignore completely the property rights of Big 0." Id.
at 1233.
" 408 F. Supp. at 1232.
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and maintain favorable customer contacts, Big 0 Tire Dealers,
Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. stands as notice that large
competitors cannot persist in an attitude of indifference toward
the rights of other competitors.
